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Abstract 
This thesis examines, through the most comprehensive historical-doctrinal analysis 
to date, the nature and extent of equity’s jurisdiction to impose trusts arising out of 
parol agreements. The central argument of this thesis is that all such trusts are 
enforced pursuant to a single doctrine of equity which arises to prevent fraud. This 
doctrine, which is uncovered and elucidated in this thesis, is named ‘the doctrine of 
parol agreement trusts’. It is argued that the ‘fraud’ which brings the doctrine into 
play will occur if the recipient of property knowingly reneges on a parol agreement 
subject to which she took the property and upon which the other party thereto relied. 
Moreover, it is demonstrated that trusts arising for the prevention of fraud were, until 
the early twentieth century, not seen as express, resulting or constructive trusts, but 
that, according to modern nomenclature, they are best regarded as constructive 
trusts. This thesis also challenges several modern orthodoxies. It is proven that the 
leading case of Rochefocuauld v Boustead was reported imperfectly, and that all 
previously presented accounts of the facts are inaccurate. Furthermore, it is 
categorically demonstrated that secret trusts are enforced for the prevention of fraud, 
but that this is not inconsistent with the notion that secret trusts are dehors the will. 
The juxtaposition between parol agreement trusts and related equitable innovations 
such as mutual wills, proprietary estoppel and ‘common intention’ constructive trusts 
is also examined, as well as the doctrine’s relationship with contract law and the law 
of agency, with a view to providing a doctrinal solution to some modern controversies 
in these areas. The historical-doctrinal relationship between parol agreement trusts 
and other types of constructive trusts is also examined with surprising results which 
suggest doctrinal affinities with the liability which affects knowing recipients. Finally, it 
is suggested that the manner in which modern commentators and some judges have 
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eschewed fraud as a justification for parol agreement trusts and other related trusts 
may represent an unwelcome development. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The Research Question 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse critically, through a historical-doctrinal lens 
and within the context of the law of trusts generally, the full range of circumstances in 
which equity will impose trusts for the prevention of fraud in order to give effect to 
parol agreements. The overriding aim is to trace the development of equity’s 
jurisdiction to intervene in such circumstances with a view to ascertaining whether 
there is a doctrine which provides a common justification and mechanism for the 
enforcement of some or all such trusts, and to consider the place of any such 
doctrine within the law of trusts, from both a historical and a modern perspective. It is 
hoped that the fruits of this research might be of assistance in proposing doctrinally 
sound solutions to the many contemporary academic and judicial controversies 
relating to trusts arising out of parol agreements and constructive trusts generally. 
1.1.1 What are Trusts Arising out of Parol Agreements (Parol Agreement 
Trusts)? 
For the purposes of this thesis, trusts imposed by equity in order to give effect to 
parol agreements (referred to hereafter as parol agreement trusts) may arise when 
two parties agree that, upon one of the parties receiving title to certain specific 
property, he or she will hold it subject to a certain trust, or for a certain specified 
purpose. Parol agreement trusts usually, but not always, arise in circumstances in 
which statutory formality requirements would seem to preclude the creation of a valid 
parol trust. The Statute of Frauds 1677 introduced the relevant statutory formality 
requirements. Section 5 required all wills of land to be in writing and formally 
attested, and ss18-21 also greatly restricted the circumstances in which nuncupative 
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wills of personalty could be created. Section 5 has been superseded by the Wills Act 
1837, s9 of which requires that all wills must be in writing signed by the testator and 
at least two witnesses. Section 7 of the Statute of Frauds, which has been replaced 
by the Law of Property Act 1925, s53(1)(b), required trusts of land to be evidenced in 
writing. The requirements of s53(1)(b) are, for the purposes of this thesis 
indistinguishable from those laid down by s7. 
Depending on the nature of the agreement and other circumstances surrounding the 
acquisition of the property by the party in question, equity may determine that, 
notwithstanding the formality requirements, he or she takes as a trustee in order to 
give effect to what was agreed. There is a wide range of situations in which equity 
will intervene in such a manner. Examples include secret trusts1 and trusts of the 
type imposed in the well-known cases of Bannister v Bannister2, Pallant v Morgan3 
and Rochefoucauld v Boustead.4 It is at least arguable that, inter alia, ‘common 
intention constructive trusts’5 and trusts arising pursuant to the doctrine of mutual 
wills6 are also types of parol agreement trusts.  
1.2 How the Research Question will be Answered 
1.2.1 Research methods 
1.2.1.1 Primary research method 
There is a great wealth of authorities, stretching back several hundred years, 
concerning parol agreement trusts. As will be seen, however, most commentators 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Blackwell v Blackwell [1929] AC 318, HL. 
2 [1948] 2 All ER 133, CA. 
3 [1953] Ch 43, CA. 
4 [1897] 1 Ch 196, CA. 
5 See Lloyd’s Bank v Rosset [1991] AC 107, HL; Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432; Jones v 
Kernott [2011] UKSC 53, [2012] 1 AC 776. 
6 See Re Goodchild [1997] 1 WLR 1216, CA; Re Walters [2008] EWCA Civ 782, [2009] Ch 212. 
3 
 
whose work focusses on various kinds of parol agreement trusts only cover the 
historic case law in a relatively superficial manner, preferring instead to examine the 
extent to which the more recent authorities concerning parol agreement trusts may 
be assimilated within theoretical models which have been conceived in order to 
rationalise various aspects of the law of property. 
Rather than seeking to assess the compatibility of the authorities with any pre-
conceived theories, the aim of this thesis is to consider the extent to which any 
principles or doctrines may be divined from the relevant case law. In other words, the 
intention is to establish what the law is, rather than what it ought to be. In order to 
assess the strength of any such findings, the degree and depth of judicial consensus 
relating thereto will be examined. Accordingly, a historical-doctrinal approach will be 
employed as the primary research method.7 The nature and development of equity’s 
jurisdiction, as it relates to the research question, will be ascertained through 
thorough analysis of all available authorities, as well as historical treatises and 
commentaries, and all relevant statutory provisions.  
It is pertinent at this point to recognise that the availability of most law reports8 and 
some historical treatises online, particularly in databases such as Westlaw, Lexis 
Library and Hein Online, provides the modern doctrinal researcher with considerable 
advantages over his or her predecessors, particularly in terms of the ability to browse 
and search law reports electronically. It is thus intended that, aided by modern 
technology, the doctrinal analysis undertaken for the purposes of this thesis will be 
the most rigorous to date in terms of authorities consulted.  
                                                          
7 For support of the doctrinal method as the most appropriate means by which to establish what the law is, see T 
Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research’ in D Watkins and M Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2013) 28. 
8 Although some series which proved very useful to this thesis, such as the Law Times Reports, the Weekly 
Notes and the Law Journal Chancery Reports, are still unavailable online. 
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1.2.1.2 Secondary research methods 
It is recognised that, in order to make best use of, and to glean maximum 
understanding of, any principles and doctrines which may be divined from the case 
law, it will be necessary on occasion to make reference to political and social factors 
and developments, particularly from a historical perspective. The most significant 
uses of such methods will be highlighted during the course of the thesis (most 
notably, below at 3.1-3.2). 
1.2.2 The various aspects of the research question 
In order to address the primary research question, there are several distinct, albeit 
interrelated, issues which arise. These issues can be summarised as follows: 
1.1.2.1 How should parol agreement trusts be categorised for the purpose of the 
doctrinal analysis? 
Traditionally, in many of the leading texts, parol agreement trusts arising out of post 
mortem transactions are separated from those arising out of inter vivos 
transactions.9 Frequently, secret trusts are considered alongside mutual wills.10 Inter 
vivos parol agreement trusts, on the other hand, are covered in a variety of ways. 
The trusts arising in cases such as Rochefoucauld and Bannister are often 
considered together,11 whilst cases in the Pallant line are often afforded separate 
                                                          
9See, for example, J Glister and J Lee, Hanbury & Martin, Modern Equity (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2015); S Panesar, Exploring Equity & Trusts (2nd edn, Pearson, Harlow 2012); P Pettit, Equity & the Law of 
Trusts (12th edn, OUP, Oxford, 2012); P Davies & G Virgo, Equity & Trusts, Text, Cases & Materials (OUP, 
Oxford, 2013). 
10Panesar, Exploring Equity (n 9); Pettit, Equity (n 9); A J Oakley, Constructive Trusts (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1997). 
11 E.g. Glister and Lee, Modern Equity (n 9) 134-135. 
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treatment,12 and other important recent inter vivos cases, such as Staden v 
Jones,13are regularly omitted altogether.14 
A novel approach will be taken in this thesis. In all of the scenarios under 
consideration, the party granting the property which becomes subject to the parol 
agreement trust will be represented by ‘A’, and the grantee by ‘B’. The beneficiary, in 
cases where s/he is other than A, will be represented by ‘C’. The vast bulk of parol 
agreement trusts can be categorised, according to the nature of the transactions, as 
follows: 
Category one: cases where A conveys to B subject to a parol agreement that B 
would hold on trust for A;15 
Category two: cases concerning transfers from A to B subject to a parol 
agreement between A and B;16 
Category three: cases concerning conveyances from A to B subject to a parol 
agreement between B and C that B will purchase all or part of the estate on 
behalf of C. 
Category one parol and two agreement trusts, both being trusts in which A is party to 
the parol agreement, are examined within two separate sections of Chapter Two. 
Category three parol agreement trusts, in which A has nothing to do with the parol 
agreement, are analysed in chapter 3. As will be elucidated in Chapter Three, the 
                                                          
12 Davies & Virgo, Equity & Trusts (n 9) 448-455; Pettit, Equity (n 9) 219-220. 
13 [2008] EWCA Civ 936, [2008] 2 FLR 1931. 
14 Davies & Virgo, Equity & Trusts (n 9); B McFarlane and C Mitchell, Hayton & Mitchell: Text, Cases and 
Materials on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015); B 
McFarlane, N Hopkins & S Nield, Land Law, Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford, 2015); Panesar, 
Exploring Equity (n 9).  
15 E.g. Bannister (n 2).  
16 E.g. secret trusts cases and cases such as Staden (n 13). 
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facts of Rochefoucauld are more closely analogous with those of Pallant than with 
other categories of parol agreement trusts, despite Rochefocuald having been 
sometimes described as a case analogous to category one17  or category two18 parol 
agreement trusts. It is suggested that this categorisation will provide the structure 
which is best served to address the research question because it will be possible to 
survey comprehensively judicial responses to analogous factual scenarios. 
1.1.2.2 What are the facts of Rochefoucauld v Boustead? 
Rochefoucauld is perhaps the most important single case considered in this thesis. It 
has long been regarded as the leading case concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of trusts arising out of inter vivos parol agreements,19 and it has also 
been cited as providing the doctrinal platform from which common intention 
constructive trusts were developed.20 It might seem strange, then, that no definitive 
version of the facts of Rochefocuauld has been presented,21 and that various 
versions appear in the literature.22 Ascertaining the precise facts is very important; 
without this knowledge, it is difficult to establish what proposition of law, in respect of 
trusts arising out of parol agreements, Rochefoucauld is authority for. This aspect of 
the research question is afforded detailed treatment in Chapter Two. 
                                                          
17 N Hopkins, ‘Conscience, Discretion and the Creation of Property Rights’ (2006) 26 LS 475.  
18 E.g. De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 1519, [2010] 2 FLR 1240 [51] (Patten LJ); S Gardner, 
‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’, in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart, Oxford, 
2009); L A Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (Pitman, London 1957) 180.  
19 For some recent examples of Rochefoucauld being cited within the context of parol agreement trusts, see 
Crossco No. 4 v Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1619 [93] (Etherton LJ); De Bruyne (n 18) [51] 
(Patten LJ); Samad v Thompson [2008] EWHC 2809 (Ch), [2008] NPC 125 [128] (Sales LJ); Singh v Anand 
[2007] EWHC 3346 (Ch) [144] (Norris J); Banner Homes Group Plc. v Luff Developments Ltd. [2000] Ch 372, 
CA, 383 (Chadwick LJ); AM v SS [2014] EWHC 2887 (Fam) [23] (Coleridge J). 
20 See Re Densham [1975] 1 WLR 1518, Ch, 732 (Goff J); M P Thompson, Modern Land Law (4th edn, Oxford, 
OUP, 2009), 298. 
21 The closest is Y K Liew ‘Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897)’, in P Mitchell & C Mitchell (eds), Landmark 
Cases in Equity (Hart, Oxford 2012). There are, however, several factual inaccuracies in this account. 
22 See below, 3.2.1 (especially n 21) for details of the different interpretations of cases which have been 
proposed by commentators.  
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1.1.2.3 What is the nature and contemporary relevance of equitable fraud? 
It is well-established that the prevention of fraud is the historical reason why parol 
agreement trusts were enforced.23 Most commentators, however, see this as an 
outdated justification24 Furthermore, it is often assumed that fraud in equity is similar 
to fraud at common law, and must involve some element of personal gain or ill intent 
on the part of the perpetrator.25 This understanding of equitable fraud provides many 
jurists with a key reason why fraud is of diminished relevance to the modern law.26 
One of the most significant questions to be addressed in this thesis, therefore, is the 
extent to which the prevention of fraud should still be regarded as the central 
justification for the enforcement of any or all species of parol agreement trusts. This 
will require careful consideration of the nature of equitable fraud as can be 
ascertained from the authorities. Consideration of this question will pervade all 
chapters of this thesis, with a particular focus in Chapter Four, which will seek to 
synthesise the fruits of the analysis in Chapters Two and Three. 
It should also be noted that there are several commentators for whom fraud is either 
no longer relevant to parol agreement trusts, or is reduced to a mere label of limited 
significance, who insist that, in order for equity to enforce a trust in furtherance of a 
parol agreement, it must be demonstrated that, were the trust not be enforced, B 
would gain personally27 or the other party to the parol agreement (A or C, as the 
                                                          
23 See, for example, cases such as Rochefoucauld (n 4); McCormick v Grogan (1869) LR 4 HL 82. 
24 See especially B McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts Arising on a Receipt of Property Sub Conditione’ (2004) 
LQR 667; Gardner, ‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’ (n 18) 64; Glister and Lee, Modern Equity (n 9) 135; 
Panesar, Exploring Equity (n 9) 204. 
25 P Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud, Testamentary Dispositions, and the Doctrine of Secret Trusts’ (1999) 115 
LQR 631; McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 24).  
26 See, for example, Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 25); J Feltham, ‘Informal Trusts and Third Parties’ 
[1987] Conv 246 (especially in respect of inter vivos parol agreement trusts); McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ 
(n 24); Gardner, ‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’ (n 18); L A Sheridan, ‘English and Irish Secret Trusts’ 
(1951) LQR 314; Pettit, Equity (n 9) 99; Glister and Lee, Modern Equity (n 9) 135. 
27 See McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 24); N Hopkins, ‘The Pallant v Morgan Equity’ [2002] Conv 35 (in 
respect of the ‘joint purchase’ cases). 
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case may be) would suffer some loss or detriment.28  There is also some judicial 
support for such stances.29 The relevance of gain, loss and detrimental reliance to 
the primary research question will therefore also be explored throughout this thesis, 
and summarised in Chapter Four. 
1.1.2.4 What is the modern relevance of the principle that equity will not allow a 
statute to be used as an instrument of fraud? 
Historically, the enforcement of parol agreement trusts in instances which would 
appear to conflict with statutory formality requirements has been justified on the 
ground that equity will not allow a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud 
(hereafter referred to as ‘the instrument of fraud principle’). This principle is often 
regarded as outmoded, and its compatibility with the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty is frequently called into question.30 This thesis will thus examine the 
continued relevance and constitutionality of the instrument of fraud principle, as well 
as the juxtaposition between this principle and the prevention of fraud generally as a 
justification for parol agreement trusts. Again, there will be particular emphasis on 
this issue in Chapter Four. 
1.1.2.5 What is the jurisprudential justification for the enforcement of secret trusts? 
Of all of the kinds of parol agreement trusts, secret trusts have attracted the most 
academic controversy, with many theories having been proposed in order to justify 
their enforcement. Furthermore, some commentators have suggested that secret 
                                                          
28 In K Gray and S F Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th edn, OUP, Oxford, 2008), 882, it is stated that there must 
be a ‘change of position or detrimental reliance… in order that a constructive trust should arise in English law’. 
See also Gardner, ‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’ (n 18) 68 (Gardner explains the detriment as a ‘reliance 
loss’); Hopkins, Ibid (in respect of the ‘joint purchase cases’); Liew, ‘Rochefoucauld’ (n 21). 
29 McCormick (n 23); Banner Homes (n 19); Hodgson v Marks [1971] Ch 892. 
30 See below, 4.6 for discussion of this point. 
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trusts are anomalies in the modern law, incapable of being convincingly justified.31 
As secret trusts are, for the purposes of this thesis, regarded as category three parol 
agreement trusts, the reasons for their enforcement will be subjected to doctrinal 
analysis in Chapter Two. 
1.1.2.5 What type of trusts are parol agreement trusts? 
Whether the various types of parol agreement trusts should be classified as express, 
constructive or resulting trusts has proven to be a rather tricky question. If parol 
agreement trusts are enforced pursuant to a single doctrine, it might be thought that 
they should all be classified as the same types of trust, and for the same reasons.32 
Although most modern commentators classify all parol agreement trusts as 
constructive, there are numerous dissenting opinions, many of which suggest that 
parol agreement trusts are not all trusts of the same kind,33 and the prevention of 
fraud as a reason for the enforcement of parol agreement trusts is rarely treated as 
relevant to explaining their classification.34 Furthermore, there is some degree of 
discord in the modern case law,35 and there are some apparent inconsistencies in 
some older authorities.36 This thesis will thus investigate, within Chapters Two, Three 
and Four, how parol agreement trusts are best classified and the extent to which the 
classification of the trusts is bound to the reasons for their enforcement. 
                                                          
31 For discussion of the academic controversy relating to secret trusts, see below, 2.3.1. 
32 Although c.f. N Hopkins ‘Conscience, Discretion and the Creation of Third Party Rights’ (2006) 26 LS 475. 
33 Although the most popular view is that all of the trusts to be considered here are constructive trusts, there are 
many dissenting voices. See, for example, W Swadling ‘The Nature of the Trust in Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ 
in Mitchell, Constructive and Resulting Trusts (n 18) 68; LA Sheridan ‘‘English and Irish Secret Trusts’ (1951) 
LQR 314; Hopkins ‘The Pallant v. Morgan “Equity”’ (n 27); S Manley, ‘Reconceptualising the Fully Secret 
Trust’ (2015) 21 Trusts and Trustees 802; Panesar, Exploring Equity (n 9) 139, 217-218. 
34 This is so even when it is argued that parol agreement trusts are all constructive trusts enforced pursuant to a 
single doctrine. See Gardner, ‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’ (n 18) 68; McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ 
(n 24), 676. 
35 See Ali v Khan [2002] EWCA Civ 974, [2009] WTLR 187; Hodgson (n 29). 
36 See Rochefoucauld (n 4); Re Duke of Marlborough [1894] 2 Ch 133, Ch. 
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1.1.2.6 The relationship between parol agreement trusts and other types of trusts 
In order to establish the place of parol agreement trusts within modern equity, it will 
be necessary to consider, in Chapter Five, their jurisprudential relationship with other 
trusts and similar doctrines. It is anticipated that the unparalleled depth of the 
historical-doctrinal research that will be conducted will enable fresh light to be shed 
upon which trusts, historically, bore affinities with some or all types of parol 
agreement trusts. The law of constructive trusts generally is a very fertile source of 
academic debate; it is hoped that, by comparing the jurisprudential origins and 
requirements of parol agreement trusts with other types of constructive trusts, it will 
be possible to advance understanding of the historical connections between some of 
the various types of trusts which are today, or have from time to time been, regarded 
as constructive trusts. To this end, there will be particular emphasis on common 
intention constructive trusts, mutual wills, ‘subject to contract’ constructive trusts,37 
proprietary estoppel and knowing recipients. Although the latter may appear at first 
glance to be an unusual subject for comparison, knowing recipients and all types of 
parol agreement trustees have long been held to be made trustees on the ground of 
fraud; the significance of this apparent similarity will be assessed.  
 
1.3 Why will the Intended Treatment of the Research Question as Lead to an 
Original Contribution to Knowledge? 
In conclusion to this first chapter, it is anticipated that the manner in which the 
research question will be addressed will represent an independent and original 
contribution to knowledge and understanding of an area of equity which is currently 
                                                          
37 Such as the trust in Lyus v Prowsa Developments Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 1044, Ch. 
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the subject of extraordinary academic discord. The thesis will contain the most 
thorough historical-doctrinal survey of relevant authorities to date, and will be the first 
to employ this research method in an analysis of all types of parol agreement trusts. 
For the purposes of this survey, the cases will be categorised within an original 
structure in order to provide clarity and consistency of analysis. Furthermore, the 
facts of one of the leading cases will be laid down in detail for the first time. This will 
enable fresh insights to be drawn in respect of the nature and significance of the 
precedents laid down in that case. It should also be noted that several articles which 
are derived from certain parts of this thesis have been accepted in leading peer-
reviewed journals.38 Furthermore, these articles have been cited a positive light in 
leading texts39 and in the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago.40 This 
evidences the academic influence and potential to challenge academic orthodoxies 
that certain aspects of this thesis have already demonstrated. 
 
                                                          
38 G Allan, ‘AM v SS: Fraud and Uncertainty’ [2015] 4 Conv 340; G Allan, ‘Ceylon Coffee, the Comtesse and 
the Consignee: A Historical Reappraisal of Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ (2015) 36 JLH 43; G Allan, ‘Once a 
Fraud, Forever a Fraud: the Time-Honoured Doctrine of Parol Agreement Trusts’ (2014) 34 LS 419; ‘The Secret 
is Out There: Searching for the Doctrine of Secret Trusts through Analysis of the Case Law’ (2011) 40 CLWR 
311. 
39 E.g. the (2014) 34 LS 419-443 article has been cited in B McFarlane, McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield, Land 
Law (n 14); McFarlane and Mitchell, Hayton & Mitchell (n 14); G Virgo, The Principles of Equity & Trusts (2nd 
edn, OUP, Oxford 2016) 320. The (2011) 40 CLWR 311 article has been cited in Pettit, Equity (n 9); C Huws, 
Text, Cases and Materials and Equity & Trusts (Pearson, Harlow, 2015); S Manley, ‘Reconceptualising the 
Fully Secret Trust’ (2015) 21 T&T 802. 
40 Re Harrygin Singh (24 January 2012) 
http://webopac.ttlawcourts.org/LibraryJud/Judgments/HC/rajkumar/2010/cv_10_1371DD24jan2012.pdf 
accessed 13 July 2016. 
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Chapter Two: Category One and Two Parol Agreement Trusts1 
 
 
2.1 General Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with parol agreement trusts in which A is a party to the 
parol agreement. These trusts fall into two categories. In the first category, A 
surrenders his or her land to B subject to a parol agreement that B will hold the land 
for the benefit of A or at some point reconvey to A. In category two parol agreement 
trusts, B takes subject to a parol trust agreed with A, in favour of C, the latter not 
being a party to the parol agreement. These cases can arise in respect of 
agreements relating to both the post mortem and inter vivos disposal of property. The 
former, usually known as secret trusts, appear frequently in the case law, whilst the 
latter are relatively rare. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to consider the extent to which the prevention of fraud and 
the instrument of fraud principle are relevant to the enforcement of these categories 
of parol agreement trust. The nature of equitable fraud, as may be gleaned from the 
authorities, will also be examined. Finally, the proper classification of these trusts as 
express, resulting or constructive trusts will be considered. Owing to the different 
considerations raised by these two types of trusts, they will be considered 
separately. 
 
                                                          
1 This chapter contains material published in G Allan, ‘Once a Fraud, Forever a Fraud: the Time-Honoured 
Doctrine of Parol Agreement Trusts’ (2014) 34 LS 419; ‘The Secret is Out There: Searching for the Doctrine of 
Secret Trusts through Analysis of the Case Law’ (2011) 40 CLWR 311. 
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2.2 Category One Parol Agreement Trusts 
2.2.1 The historical and contemporary relevance of fraud 
Cases of this nature have occurred with relative frequency since the Statute of 
Frauds, often in circumstances where the grantor has wanted to conceal his or her 
ownership of property for a particular reason,2 or where the grantee has wished to 
gain title to land on a temporary basis in order to obtain secured finance3, although 
there have been cases arising out of deliberate attempts by the grantor to deceive 
the grantee into surrendering title to his property.4Although it might be thought that 
the decisions in this line of cases are plagued by inconsistency, in respect of the 
relevance of fraud, this is not so.  
 
According to the vast bulk of authorities from over 300 years, B is made trustee for A 
for the prevention of fraud, and the instrument of fraud principle explains the 
inapplicability of the Law of Property Act 1925, s53(1)(b) and its predecessor 
section.5 An early case which illustrates the operation of this principle is Hutchins v 
Lee.6 Here, the plaintiff was in ill health and felt unable to manage his affairs 
properly. He therefore assigned a lease to the defendant subject to an oral 
agreement that the latter would hold the lease on trust for the plaintiff and transfer it 
back to him upon his restoration to good health. The suit arose when the defendant 
                                                          
2For example, in Davies v Otty (No 2) (1865) 35 Beav 208, 55 ER 875 where the plaintiff conveyed land to the 
defendant because the plaintiff feared that he may be charged with bigamy and as a result thereof lose his land. 
It was agreed that, when the danger was passed, the land would be returned to the plaintiff. See also Haigh v 
Kaye (1872) LR 7 Ch App 469, for another similar example. 
3e.g. In Re Duke of Marlborough [1894] 2 Ch 133, Ch; Ali v Khan [2002] EWCA Civ 974, [2009] WTLR 187; 
Kuppusami v Kuppusami [2002] EWHC 2578 (Ch). 
4e.g. Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133, CA; Hodgson v Marks [1971] Ch 892, CA. 
5See Wilkinson v Brayfield (1693) 2 Vern 307, 23 ER 799 at n 1; Hutchins v Lee (1737) 1 Atk 447, 26 ER 284, 
285 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Cripps v Jee (1793) 4 Bro CC 472, 29 ER 994 476 (Arden MR); Haigh (n 2) 474 
(James LJ); Booth v Turle (1873) LR 16 Eq 182, 188 (Malins VC); Re Duke of Marlborough (n 3) 141 (Stirling 
J); Bannister (n 4) 136 (Scott LJ). 
6 (n 5). 
 14 
 
refused to re-assign the lease. Lord Hardwick stated that ‘though there can be no 
parol declaration of a trust, since the [Statute of Frauds], yet this evidence is proper 
in avoidance of fraud, which was here intended to be put on the plaintiff’.7 The recent 
cases of Ali v Khan8 and Kuppusami v Kuppusami,9 show that the prevention of 
fraud is still the underlying justification for the enforcement of such trusts today.10  
 
In each authority in which the enforcement of the parol agreement was attributed to 
the prevention of fraud, there was a parol agreement reached between A and B, 
pursuant to which the property was conveyed, rather than a mere oral declaration of 
trust by either party. This shows that the cases within this line cannot simply be 
regarded as instances in which parol declarations of trust were enforced. Rather, it is 
the bilateral nature of the agreement, and A’s subsequent reliance thereupon, which 
triggers equity’s intervention on the ground of fraud. Contrarily, there several cases in 
which property was conveyed from A to B, for purposes other than to transfer the 
beneficial interest, but not subject to any actual agreement reached between A and 
B. None of these cases were enforced on the ground of fraud. Instead, they were 
enforced as resulting trusts.11 
 
In stark contrast to the number of authorities favouring the prevention of fraud as the 
justification for the enforcement of the trusts in B’s favour, there is only one example, 
Hodgson v Marks,12 of a category one parol agreement trust being enforced for 
                                                          
7 ibid 448 (Lord Hardwicke LC). For a similar explanation, see Booth (n 5) 187 (Malins VC). 
8(n 3). 
9(n 3). 
10In Ali (n 3) [22] and [35], Morritt VC, giving the Court of Appeal’s judgment, relied on Marlborough, 
describing it as a case of ‘fraud’, as well as Haigh and Rochefoucauld. For further discussion of Ali, see below, 
text to n 186. In Kuppusami (n 3) [72], Rimer J relied directly on Ali. 
11 Examples include Birch v Blagrave (1755) Amb 264, 27 ER 176 and Platermore v Staple (1815) G Coo 250, 
35 ER 548; Childers v Childers (1857) De G & J 482, 44 ER 810. 
12 (n 4). 
 15 
 
reasons other than the prevention of fraud.13 As will be explained below,14 the 
reasoning in Hodgson was arguably based on an erroneous understanding of the 
nature of fraud in equity, which led the Court of Appeal to hold that the instrument of 
fraud principle could not apply. It is unfortunate that, being an anomalous case, 
Hodgson is often regarded as a leading authority.15 The prominence of Hodgson in 
some of the literature perhaps undermines the fact that, in virtually all authorities 
concerning category one parol agreement trusts, the enforcement of category one 
parol agreements was unequivocally attributed to the prevention of fraud. 
 
2.2.2 Observations on the nature of fraud in equity 
Several of the cases in this category shed light on the nature of equitable fraud. 
Although some involved deliberate deceit or wilful dishonesty on the part of B,16 
several did not. Some early authorities, such as Wilkinson v Brayfield17 and 
Hutchins18 suggest that a deliberate intent to deceive is an essential ingredient of 
fraud within the context of category one parol agreement trusts. It should be 
recognised, however, that both Wilkinson and Hutchins are cases where there was a 
deliberate attempt by B to deceive A into transferring the land into his name. Thus, it 
is not surprising that the judgments referred to the nature of the malus animus. In 
neither case was it stated that cases of equitable fraud are restricted to instances of 
deliberate deceit by B and, in fact, Lord Hardwicke, who adjudicated in Hutchins, 
                                                          
13 Note that in Davies (n 2) Romilly MR, 213, describes the defendant's attempt to rely on s7 in order to keep the 
property as ‘not honest’. The word 'fraud' is not used. Nevertheless, it was confidently asserted in Haigh (n 2) 
474 (James LJ) and in Booth (n 5) 188 (Malins VC) that Davies was decided on the instrument of fraud 
principle. 
14 See below, 2.2.3. 
15 E.g. B McFarlane and C Mitchell, Hayton & Mitchell: Text, Cases and Materials on the Law of Trusts and 
Equitable Remedies (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) 89; P Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (10th 
edn, OUP, Oxford 2006) 95. 
16 E.g. Bannister (n 4). 
17 (n 5) at n 1. 
18 (n 5) 285 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
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held on several occasions, in cases involving other types of parol agreement trusts, 
that there could be equitable fraud without any intentional deceit.19 
 
Moreover, there are several cases in which category one parol agreement trusts 
were enforced absent any deliberate wrongdoing on B’s part. In Cripps v Jee, B 
unwittingly reneged upon the parol agreement because he was declared bankrupt. A 
had conveyed land to B as security for a loan, subject to an oral agreement that, 
subject to repayment, B would hold on trust for A. As A and B were relatives, they did 
not deem it necessary for the agreement to be reduced to writing. B later became 
bankrupt, and his assignees sought to rely on the absolute nature of the 
conveyance. B was held to have taken as trustee for A, and A was thus permitted to 
enforce the trust against B’s assignees in bankruptcy, on the ground that the case 
was one of ‘a pious fraud’.20 Similarly, in Re Duke of Marlborough, A (the Duchess) 
conveyed land to B (the Duke), in order that B could mortgage it. It was agreed 
between A and B that the conveyance was merely for the purposes of enabling B to 
take a loan. B died without having conveyed the equity of redemption to A. Even 
though Stirling J was of the opinion that, prior to his death, B ‘was willing and 
intended to reconvey’21, the case was still held to be one of fraud,22 and A was able 
to enforce the trust against B’s estate. 
 
Perhaps the strongest authority in favour of the view that equitable fraud does not 
depend on any finding of deliberate dishonesty by B is Bannister v Bannister.23 A 
                                                          
19 E.g. Drakeford v Wilks (1747) 3 Atk 539, 26 ER 1111, discussed below at 2.3.4.2; Young v Peachy (1741) 
Atk 254, 26 ER 557, discussed below at 3.4.1. 
20Cripps (n 5) 476 (Arden MR). 
21Re Duke of Marlborough (n 3) 146 (Stirling J). 
22 Ibid 141. 
23 (n 4). 
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was an elderly widow who had been persuaded by her brother-in-law, B, to sell two 
cottages to him for a price much below market value. Prior to the sale, they had 
agreed orally that she would be permitted to reside rent free in one of the cottages 
for the remainder of her life. After a few years, B sought to have A evicted from the 
cottage. It is therefore reasonable to say that, irrespective of his motives at the time 
of the parol agreement, B’s attempt to evict A, in flagrant breach of the parol 
agreement, was dishonest. The Court of Appeal did not, however, focus on B’s 
dishonest conduct; Scott LJ, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, was at pains 
to explain that deliberate deceit is not a necessary ingredient of equitable fraud. At 
first instance, it had been held that there was no fraud in the case because B had not 
intended, at the time of the parol agreement, to defraud A. The Court of Appeal did 
not agree: 
 
It is, we think, clearly a mistake to suppose that the equitable principle on 
which a constructive trust is raised against a person who insists on the 
absolute character of a conveyance to himself for the purpose of defeating a 
beneficial interest, which, according to the true bargain, was to belong to 
another, is confined to cases in which the conveyance itself was fraudulently 
obtained. The fraud which brings the principle into play arises as soon as the 
absolute character of the conveyance is set up for the purpose of defeating 
the beneficial interest, and that is the fraud to cover which the Statute of 
Frauds or the corresponding provisions of the Law of Property Act, 1925, 
cannot be called in aid in cases in which no written evidence of the real 
bargain is available.24 
                                                          
24 Bannister (n 4) 136 (Scott LJ). 
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Accordingly it was held that it was ‘fraudulent in [B] to insist on the absolute 
character of the conveyance for the purpose of defeating the beneficial interest 
which he had agreed [A] should retain’, even if he ‘may have been innocent of any 
fraudulent intent in taking the conveyance in absolute form’.25  
 
This reasoning is significant because it demonstrates that the fraud lies in any 
breach of the parol agreement. B’s motivation for entering into the parol agreement 
and taking the conveyance is immaterial, as is the question of why B breached the 
parol agreement. Rather, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning can equally be applied to 
cases such as Marlborough and Cripps in which there was no dishonesty. This very 
strongly suggests that wilful dishonesty is not a necessary ingredient of fraud in 
equity. 
 
In Hodgson, the nature of equitable fraud was viewed in rather different terms. The 
Court of Appeal recognised that the instrument of fraud principle was generally the 
reason for the recognition of category one parol agreement trusts, but seemingly 
held that the principle was not applicable to the facts. A, an elderly widow with no 
children, was persuaded by B, her lodger, to convey her land to him, subject to a 
parol agreement that the house was to remain hers. B then sold the land to the 
defendant, against whom A sought to assert her beneficial interest.26 Russell LJ, with 
whom Buckley LJ and Cairns LJ agreed, was uncertain as to whether, because the 
defendant was innocent of any wrongdoing, the instrument of fraud principle could 
apply against him. The trust was thus held to be a resulting trust, arsing on the 
                                                          
25ibid 136 (Scott LJ).  
26 According to the Land Registration Act 1925, s70(1)(g), an interest under a trust belonging to ‘someone in 
actual occupation of the land’ at the time of the registered disposition could override. 
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presumption that it had not been the intention of A and B that A should surrender her 
beneficial interest.27  Russell LJ’s dismissal of fraud is inconsistent with judgments 
such as Bannister, Cripps and Marlborough. It is submitted that in Hodgson it would 
have been preferable for the court to have regarded B as having taken as trustee for 
A for the prevention of fraud (which was undoubtedly perpetrated by B when he 
treated the land as his own). According to the rules of registered land, this trust was 
able to bind the defendant as it had bound B.28 Overall, it is suggested that Hodgson 
is best regarded as an anomalous decision, and not representative of the law 
relating to category one parol agreement trusts. 
 
 
2.2.3 The classification of category one parol agreement trusts 
Whilst it is clear that the bulk of authorities suggest that category one parol 
agreement trusts are enforced for the prevention of fraud, it should be noted that 
there is some inconsistency in the case law regarding the classification of these 
trusts. The possibility that category one parol agreement trusts are express trusts, 
although in occasional receipt of academic support, 29 is unfeasible as there is not a 
single authority in favour of this proposition. Furthermore, it is useful here to recall 
Lord Hardwicke’s observation in Hutchins that, since the introduction of statutory 
formality requirements for express trusts of land, ‘there can be no parol declaration 
of a trust’.30  
 
Unlike express trusts, category one parol agreement trusts have occasionally been 
                                                          
27 Hodgson (n 4) 933 (Russell LJ). 
28 In fact, Russell LJ seemed to accept this as an alternative to the resulting trust solution (Hodgson (n 4) 933). 
29See, for example, Pettit, Equity (n 15) 95. 
30Hutchins v Lee (n 5) 448 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
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held to be resulting trusts. In Hodgson, as has been seen, a resulting trust was 
imposed in consequence of a misapplication of the instrument of fraud principle. In 
another recent Court of Appeal case, Ali v Khan,31 the trust was also described as a 
resulting trust, although for different reasons. Here, A conveyed his land to his 
daughter, B (and initially to another daughter who later pulled out of the 
arrangement), so that B could use her favourable credit rating to obtain secured 
finance and also so that she could sponsor her husband’s immigration. It was orally 
agreed that A would retain some form of ‘ownership’ of the land, and that B would re-
convey the land to A at some time in the future. Morritt VC, with whom Rix LJ and 
Swinton Thomas LJ agreed,32 followed Haigh and Marlborough. He described both 
cases as examples of trusts enforced for the prevention of fraud,33 but he proceeded 
to classify them as cases involving the imposition of resulting trusts.34  
 
In fact, there is little in either Marlborough or Haigh to support Morritt VC’s 
interpretation. In Marlborough, Stirling LJ observed that counsel for the plaintiff had 
raised the Statute of Frauds, s8, but stated that that the proper answer to the 
defence's plea of s7 was that ‘to exclude the evidence would be to permit the Statute 
of Frauds to be used to cover a fraud’.35 Similarly, in Haigh, James LJ mentioned s8, 
probably again in deference to counsel's arguments, but based his judgment on the 
prevention of fraud.36 It should at this point be noted that s8 was generally 
interpreted by the courts as exempting resulting trusts from the requirement of s7, 
                                                          
31(n 3). Ali was directly followed in Kuppusami (n 3). 
32With whom Rix LJ and Sir Swinton Thomas agreed. 
33Ali (n 3) [21] and [22] (Morritt VC). 
34ibid [35] (Morritt VC). 
35Re Duke of Marlborough (n 3) 140-141(Stirling J). 
36Haigh (n 2) 474 (James LJ). 
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but not any other types of trusts.37 In both Haigh and Marlborough, enforcing the 
parol agreement trust for the prevention of fraud was presented by the court as an 
alternative to relying on s8. Thus, it is submitted that there is no basis for classifying 
either Haigh or Marlborough as cases concerning resulting trusts. It thus follows that 
there was no basis for the classification of the trust in Ali as a resulting trust. 
 
A final point to note is that it is an established rule that any finding of an actual 
agreement in respect of the apportionment of the beneficial interests in the property 
displaces any presumption that could give rise to a resulting trust.38 As both Ali and 
Hodgson are cases in which the court accepted that there was a parol agreement 
between A and B as regards the beneficial ownership of the property, the 
presumption of resulting trust ought to have been rebutted in both cases. It is thus 
submitted that the reasoning behind the classification of the trusts in Hodgson and 
Ali fails to stand up to scrutiny. Furthermore, there are no other cases (save for 
Kuppusami, in which the court directly followed Ali) in which category one parol 
agreement trusts have been held to be resulting trusts. Therefore, there is little to 
commend the view that category one parol agreement trusts ought to be regarded as 
resulting trusts.  
 
In terms of constructive trusts, Bannister is the only authority, albeit a strong Court of 
Appeal authority, in which it was held that a category one parol agreement trust is a 
constructive trust. It should be noted that the Court of Appeal cited39 Booth and 
Marlborough, as well as some cases concerning other categories of parol agreement 
                                                          
37See below, 3.5.1.4 for detailed discussion of this point. 
38This rule most obviously manifests itself in cases concerning inferred common intention constructive trusts- 
see Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432. 
39Bannister (n 4) 136 (Scott LJ). 
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trusts40 as authorities for the proposition that the constructive trust arises for the 
prevention of fraud, despite the fact that the phrase ‘constructive trust’ was not 
mentioned in any of those cases. In fact, it is notable that, prior to Bannister, the 
authorities conspicuously fail to classify the parol agreement trusts as express, 
resulting or constructive; Bannister is the earliest case in which a category one parol 
agreement trust was classified in this way. 
 
Surprisingly, the overriding trend in virtually all of the nineteenth century authorities in 
which a category one parol agreement trust was enforced is the trust was classified 
simply as one for imposed for the prevention of fraud, as if this was an alternative 
classification to that of express, resulting or constructive trust. In none of these cases 
was the trust which was recognised and enforced described as being either express, 
resulting or constructive. Furthermore, the prevention of fraud has been held to be 
an alternative to the classification of category one parol agreement trusts as resulting 
trusts. It would therefore seem that, according to nineteenth century equity, if a trust 
was found to have arisen for the prevention of fraud, no further classification or 
justification were necessary. 
 
2.3 Category Two Parol Agreement Trusts 
Category two cases are far more numerous, and have been the subject of far more 
academic debate, than category one cases. Firstly, the academic controversies, 
particularly in relation to secret trusts, will be examined, followed by a critical 
analysis of the role of fraud vis a vis category two cases, and of what these cases 
show about the nature of fraud. The proper classification of trusts within this category 
                                                          
40E.g. Chattock v Muller (1878) LR 8 Ch D 177; Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 196, CA. 
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will then be afforded consideration. 
 
2.3.1 Secret trusts- introduction and academic controversies 
There are two types of secret trusts, fully secret trusts and half-secret trusts. The 
former arises when a legatee, or in cases of intestacy, the deceased’s next-of-kin 
(B), takes some or all of the testator’s or intestate’s (A’s) property subject to an 
agreement, made with A during his or her lifetime, to hold some or all of that property 
on a certain trust (for C). B is often referred to in the literature (although not in the 
authorities) as a ‘secret trustee’. A half-secret trust arises when B is identified on the 
face of the A will as a trustee, but the terms of the trust and the identity of C do not 
appear in the will and, prior to the execution of the will, B has agreed with A that s/he 
will hold the property in question on a certain trust (for C). It is generally accepted 
that if A demonstrates intention to subject B to a trust obligation and this intention is 
communicated to and accepted by B during A’s lifetime41 or, in the case of half-secret 
trusts, before or contemporaneously with the will’s execution,42 then the secret trust 
is enforceable. The effect of these requirements is that there must be an 
‘“agreement,” a “bargain [original italics] between [A] and [B]”—a communication 
between the parties during A's life, which can be construed into a trust’.43 
 
Academic contributions to the debate have mainly focussed on how and why secret 
trusts are enforced, seemingly in defiance of the clear statutory provisions in the 
Wills Act 1837. 
Most discussions regarding secret trusts focus on two theories, the 'fraud theory' and 
                                                          
41See Ottaway v Norman [1972] Ch 698, Ch, 702. 
42See Blackwell v Blackwell [1929] AC 318, HL 334 and 339 (Viscount Sumner). 
43Wallgrave v Tebbs (1855) 2 Kay & J 313, 69 ER 800, 322 (Page Wood VC), partly quoting from Muckleston v 
Brown (1801) Ves Jun 53, 91 ER 934, 69 (Lord Eldon LC). 
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the 'dehors the will theory'. These are usually presented as competing theories,44 
although they have also been proposed as being complementary.45 The fraud theory 
proceeds along the lines that because equity will not permit B to perpetrate a fraud 
by relying on s9 of the Wills Act in order to avoid performance of the secret trust, it 
will be enforced, notwithstanding the statute.  The generally accepted view is that 
fraud must involve personal gain by B.46 If fraud is understood in this way, secret 
trusts are difficult to justify, especially half-secret trusts, as B, being identified on the 
face of the will as a trustee, cannot take the secret trust property for himself, 
regardless of whether or not the secret trust is performed. Furthermore, fully secret 
trusts in which B was honest could not be enforced on this basis.47 Even fully-secret 
trusts with dishonest secret trustees are difficult to justify if fraud must involve 
personal gain, for an order requiring B to hold the secret trust property on resulting 
trust for A’s estate would prevent fraud of this type without the need to enforce the 
secret trust in seeming defiance of the Wills Act.48 
 
In light of these theoretical problems, those advocating the orthodox form of the 
fraud theory have proposed a variety of reasons why half-secret trusts are enforced. 
It has been asserted that half-secret trusts are enforced because they are 
                                                          
44See for example, D Hodge, ‘Secret Trusts: The Fraud Theory Revisited’ [1980] Conv 341; P Critchley, 
‘Instruments of Fraud, Testamentary Dispositions, and the Doctrine of Secret Trusts’ (1999) 115 LQR 631; E 
Challinor, ‘Debunking the Myth of Secret Trusts’ [2005] Conv 492; S Panesar, Exploring Equity & Trusts (2nd 
edn, Pearson, Harlow 2012); R Pearce and  J Stevens, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations, 3rd edn 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005) Chapter 7; J Glister and J Lee, Hanbury & Martin, Modern Equity 
(20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) Chapter 6. 
45See especially J G Fleming ‘Secret Trusts’ (1947) 12 Conv 28; S Wilson, Todd and Wilson’s Textbook on 
Trusts, 9th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009) Chapter 10. 
46See, for example, L A Sheridan, ‘English and Irish Secret Trusts’ (1951) LQR 314; J A Andrews, ‘Creating 
Secret Trusts’ (1963) 27 Conv 92; P Matthews, ‘The True Basis of the Half-Secret trust?’ [1979] Conv 360; B 
Perrins, ‘Secret Trusts: The Key to the Dehors?’ [1985] Conv 248; Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44); 
Challinor, ‘Debunking the Myth’ (n 44); B McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts arising on a Receipt of Property 
Sub Conditione (2004) LQR 667; S Manley, ‘Reconceptualising the fully-secret trust’ (2015) 21 Trusts and 
Trustees 802; Panesar, Exploring Equity (n 44). 
47See, for example, Drakeford v Wilks (n 19), Sweeting v Sweeting (1863) 33 LJ Ch 211; Re Stead [1900] 1 Ch 
237, Ch and the cases concerning the Mortmain Act 1736, discussed below at 2.3.4.3.1. 
48This argument is referred to by McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 46). 
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incorporated into the A’s will under the probate doctrine of incorporation by reference. 
Unfortunately, this doctrine does not sit easily with the requirements that secret trusts 
be communicated and accepted, or with the absence of any requirement that a half-
secret trust be reduced to writing.49 Generally, however, those who insist that fraud 
must involve personal gain reach the conclusion that the fraud theory cannot justify 
the enforcement of secret trusts.50 An alternative position is that the concept of fraud 
in equity extends beyond fraudulent enrichment, and that any failure by B to perform 
the secret trust constitutes a fraud on A (often referred to as ‘fraud on the testator’) 
and C. The minority who subscribe to this view51 argue that the fraud theory can 
explain the enforcement of both fully and half-secret trusts because equitable fraud 
need not involve any element of personal gain. Advocates of the fraud theory in 
either form are not in agreement regarding whether secret trusts are express or 
constructive.52 
 
The dehors the will theory, which is the most widely accepted justification for the 
doctrine, is based on the idea that the Wills Act is irrelevant to the enforcement of 
secret trusts. There is, however, a dichotomy of opinion regarding precisely how and 
why a secret trust should fall outside of the scope of the Wills Act. The favoured 
standpoint is that a secret trust is an express inter vivos trust that remains 
                                                          
49See Sheridan, ‘English and Irish Secret Trusts’ (n 46); Matthews, ‘The True Basis’ (n 46), on the incorporation 
by reference theory. See below, 2.3.4.3.2 for consideration of the extent to which the authorities support this 
theory. 
50See especially McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 46); Challinor, ‘Debunking the Myth’ (n 44); Panesar, 
Exploring Equity (n 44); Pearce and Stevens, The Law of Trusts (n 44); A. Hudson,  Equity & Trusts, (7th edn, 
Cavendish, London 2013) Chapter 6. Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44), asserts that the fraud theory can 
provide a partial justification, but cannot explain the enforcement of half-secret trusts or fully secret trusts with 
honest secret trustees. 
51Hodge, ‘Secret Trusts’ (n 44); Wilson S, Todd & Wilson’s Textbook on Trusts (9th edn OUP Oxford 2009); 
Fleming, ‘Secret Trusts’ (n 45). 
52For differing opinions, see the works cited ibid and (n 50). See also McFarlane and Mitchell, Hayton & 
Mitchell (n 15) 116. 
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unconstituted until the death of A53 or until B actually receives title from the 
executors;54 this view renders the fraud theory redundant, but raises awkward 
questions as to whether secret trusts of land ought to comply with the Law of 
Property Act 1925, s53(1)(b). Others argue that a secret trust is dehors the will 
because it is a constructive trust, although opinions differ as to why this should be 
so.55 The main criticism of the dehors theory is that secret trusts are by their very 
nature testamentary dispositions, and that therefore it is disingenuous to suggest 
that they fall outside of the Wills Act.56 
 
What emerges from the literature is that academic opinion is bewilderingly divided. It 
appears, however, that academics have not been inclined to attempt to find a 
solution or unifying principle through doctrinal analysis of all of the case law. This 
part of the thesis, in seeking doctrinal solutions to these controversies, will thus 
present the most thorough doctrinal analysis of secret trusts to date. 
 
2.3.2 Inter vivos category two parol agreement trusts: the academic 
controversies 
A might also make an inter vivos transfer to B subject to a parol agreement that B will 
take as trustee for C. Far less has been written about these inter vivos equivalents of 
secret trusts, perhaps owing to the strange scarcity of reported cases. Nevertheless 
                                                          
53Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44) 640, describes this as the more ‘sophisticated’ version of the dehors 
theory. See also D Kincaid, ‘The Tangled Web: the Relationship between a Secret Trust and a Will’ [2000] 
Conv 420; Panesar, Exploring Equity (n 44) 205. 
54S Manley, ‘Reconceptualising the Fully Secret Trust’ (n 46). Manley argues that fully secret trusts are self-
declared (by B) express trusts. 
55See especially McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 46). 
56See especially Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44). 
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there is some debate as to whether the trust is enforceable in C’s favour,57 or 
whether instead a resulting trust for the benefit of A should be imposed.58 On point to 
be taken into account is that, in these cases, if a resulting trust is imposed in A’s 
favour, then assuming that A is still alive, A could transfer the property as s/he 
wished. This has been cited as an important difference from the situation with secret 
trusts, for in cases of the latter type, A will always be deceased at the time at which 
any resulting trust could be imposed.59 It should be noted that, despite the historical 
rarity of cases concerning inter vivos category two parol agreement trusts, there are 
two recent authorities which post-date the most influential academic contributions, 
and which will be analysed in this thesis.60 
 
2.3.3 The Historical and Contemporary Relevance of Fraud to Secret Trusts 
In Re Snowden,61 Megarry VC dismissed fraud as being merely ‘the historical origin 
of the doctrine',62 explaining that nowadays, 'secret trusts may be established in 
cases where there is no possibility of fraud’.63 This is frequently accepted as an 
accurate statement.64  Analysis of the authorities, however, reveals Snowden to be 
anomalous. More than forty cases spanning over three centuries65 have been 
identified in which the prevention of fraud is referred to as being the underlying 
justification for the doctrine, including House of Lords judgments concerning both 
                                                          
57As argued by T Youdan, ‘Formalities for Trusts of Land, and the Doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ 
(1984) 43 CLR 306; TG Youdan, ‘Informal Trusts and Third Parties: a Response’ [1988] Conv 267. 
58See N Hopkins, ‘Conscience, Discretion and the Creation of Property Rights’ (2006) 26 LS 475, 496-497; J 
Feltham ‘Informal Trusts and Third Parties’ [1987] Conv 246. 
59 See N Hopkins ibid 496-497; Feltham ibid 248.  
60 De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 1519, [2010] 2 FLR 1240 and Staden v Jones [2008] EWCA Civ 
936, [2008] 2 FLR 1931 were both decided after the leading recent work of Hopkins, ibid. 
61[1979] Ch 528, Ch. 
62ibid 535. 
63Ibid. 
64For example, Megarry VC’s comments have recently been cited with approval in two tribunal cases, Taylor v 
Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2008] STC (SDC) 1159; Davies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners 
[2009] UKFTT 138, TC. 
65See Appendix for details. 
 28 
 
fully66 and half-secret trusts. 67  It is therefore curious that Snowden, a first instance 
decision, has been afforded such significance, and it is submitted that any assertions 
that fraud is no longer relevant to the enforcement of secret trusts can be debunked 
immediately by sheer weight of authority. Serious questions remain, however, 
regarding the nature of the fraud. These questions can best be answered by 
analysing the development of the doctrine in relation to fraud. 
 
2.3.4 Observations on the nature of equitable fraud in secret trusts cases 
In order to trace the development of judicial understanding of the nature of the fraud 
which secret trusts are enforced to prevent, the secret trusts cases will be analysed 
in chronological order. As the dichotomy between fully and half-secret trusts was not 
fully established until the nineteenth century, it is only from then onwards that the two 
species of secret trusts will be treated separately.  
 
2.3.4.1 Authorities from the seventeenth century 
Secret trusts cases began to appear in the law reports very soon after the enactment 
of the Statute of Frauds.68 Although case reports from this period are unhelpfully 
brief, the word ‘fraud’, without further elaboration, is used to justify the enforcement 
of fully secret trusts in two early cases.69  
 
An interesting early judgment is Chamberlaine v Chamberlaine.70 Although the word 
                                                          
66 McCormick v Grogan (1869) LR 4 HL 82; Cullen v Attorney General for Ireland (1866) LR 1 HL 190. 
67Blackwell (n 42). 
68The earliest case after the Statute of Frauds is Dutton v Pool (1677) 1 Vent 318, 83 ER 523. It is cited in 
Oldham v Litchford (1705) 2 Freem 285, 23 ER 923 by the Lord Keeper as being ‘immediately after the statute 
(of Frauds)’, so it can be safely presumed that the Statute of Frauds did apply to the will in this case.  
69Thynn v Thynn (1684) 1 Vern 296, 23 ER 479 and Devenish v Baines (1689) Prec Ch 3, 24 ER 2. 
70 (1678) 2 Freem 34, 22 ER 1041. Although there is no actual mention of the Statute of Frauds in this case, the 
Statute seems to have applied. It was described in Caton v Caton (1865) LR 1 Ch App 137, 143 (Stuart VC) as a 
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‘fraud’ was not expressly used, Lord Nottingham provided some insight into the 
reasons why B was not permitted to renege upon his undertaking. A confided to B, 
his eldest son and heir, that he was contemplating changing his will in order to 
provide for his other children (C). B assured him that there was no need; he would 
pay the ‘legacies’ out of his inheritance. After A’s death, B sought to renege upon the 
agreement. Lord Nottingham enforced the secret trust on the ground that B had 
‘solemnly undertaken’ to pay the legacies and A had died ‘in peace upon the said 
promise [italics added].’71 It thus seems that Lord Nottingham attached significance 
to the fact that A had relied on the secret trust arrangement. It is also important to 
note that there is no mention in any of the early cases of fraud needing to entail 
personal gain. In fact, in Pring v Pring,72 the earliest useful half-secret trust case,73 it 
was not possible for B to gain personally from failure to perform the secret trust74. 
This was evidently seen as no bar to the secret trust’s enforcement.  
 
Overall, the seventeenth century authorities demonstrate that early secret trusts 
were enforced for the prevention of fraud. Moreover, these cases strongly suggest 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
case in which ‘the Court has, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, interfered… in order to prevent a fraud’. 
See also the commentary at 2 Eq Ca Abr. 
71Ibid. 
72(1689) 2 Vern 99, 23 ER 673. 
73Note that the half-secret trust case of Crook v Brooking (1688) 2 Vern 50, 23 ER 643; (1689) 2 Vern 106, 23 
ER 679 concerned events which occurred many years before the Statute of Frauds and there is no useful 
reasoning in either of the reports. 
74The defendant’s argument in Pring was that ‘though the will doth call them executors in trust and that it might 
be collected from the will that the executors were not to have more than 20 shillings a-piece, yet it is not said for 
whom the trust is, and therefore it shall be taken to be a trust for all, who might come in and take the benefit by 
the statute for distribution of intestate’s estates, and not for the wife alone’. Thus, the basis of the defendant’s 
argument was not that he should take absolutely in his capacity as executor, but that the trust should, in the 
absence of named beneficiaries on the face of the will, be construed as being for the benefit of all entitled in 
intestacy, rather than solely to the wife. ‘An Act for the Better Setling of Intestate’s Estates 1670-71’ is 
presumably the statute that was referred to in the defendant’s argument. This statute provided that, in the event 
of an intestacy, one third of the estate was to go to the deceased’s wife and the remainder in equal portions to the 
deceased’s children and, in the case of there being no wife, the estate was to be equally distributed amongst the 
children. Finally, if there were no children, the estate was to be distributed equally amongst the testator’s ‘next 
of Kindred’. Unless the defendant was one of those entitled to take under this Act, then there was no possibility 
of his gaining personally as a result of his submissions. There is no indication from the case that he was so 
entitled. This is notable as it appears to undermine the contention of counsel for the plaintiff in Re Fleetwood 
(1880) LR 15 Ch D 594, 600 that, in Pring the executor ‘claimed to hold the property himself’.  
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that a finding of fraud did not depend on any dishonest intention on the part of B at 
the time of the parol agreement, nor upon the question of whether B stood to gain 
personally from any failure to perform. Rather, it seems that A’s reliance on the parol 
agreement provided the basis for equity’s intervention.  
 
2.3.4.2 Authorities from the eighteenth century 
The reports from this century are far more detailed than those from the previous one, 
and there are a number of reports from this period in which the nature of fraud is 
considered in detail. All of the cases from the eighteenth century involve fully secret 
trusts. Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis appears in Reech v Kennigal75, in 
which Lord Hardwicke, in upholding a secret trust, explained the nature of the fraud 
in some detail. The facts, in brief, are as follows. B, who was the defendant, was also 
A’s residuary legatee. He had agreed to pay £100 from the residuary estate to C, 
assuring A that it was unnecessary for the will to be amended so as to include this 
legacy. Counsel for B conceded that he had broken his promise, but insisted that a 
mere breach of promise such as this was not a fraud. Lord Hardwicke rejected this 
argument, stating that 'it has been taken as if the fraud must be on the person, who 
might have remedy at law: but this court considers it as a fraud also upon the 
testator',76 going on to explain that, on the facts, there was 'a breach of promise; but 
attended also with fraud upon the testator as well as the plaintiff, by representing as 
if there was no occasion to alter the will'.77 Although in this case B did stand to gain 
personally from his refusal to perform the secret trust, crucially, Lord Hardwicke, 
when explaining the nature of the fraud and why B had committed a fraud, made no 
                                                          
75(1748) 1 Ves Sen 123, 27 ER 932. 
76ibid 125 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
77ibid. 
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mention of personal gain or fraudulent enrichment. Instead, his Lordship stated that: 
 
the statute should never be understood to protect fraud; and therefore 
whenever a case is infected with fraud,… the court will not suffer the statute to 
protect it, so as that any one [italics added] should run away with a benefit not 
intended.78  
 
This strongly indicates that Lord Hardwicke was of the view that, in order to prove 
equitable fraud, it is not necessary for B to have benefited from his betrayal of the 
parol agreement. 
 
The view of fraud elucidated by Lord Hardwick was not unique to the period; in 
Oldham v Litchford,79 Lord Cowper described B’s attempt to avoid performance of 
the trust as ‘a fraud upon the testator and the legatee,’80 and in Sellack v Harris,81 
the same judge upheld a secret trust ‘because of the Fraud in this Case, in that [B] 
promised [A] upon his Death-bed that [C] should enjoy the Lands, so he took this to 
be a case out of the Statute’.82 Similarly, in Barrow v Greenough83, Arden MR stated 
that, when determining whether to give effect to a secret trust, ‘the question is, 
whether the confidence, that [B] would perform the trust he undertook, did not 
prevent [A] from making a new will’.84 This again suggests that reliance by A on the 
parol agreement was regarded as an essential ingredient of fraud. Barrow is also 
                                                          
78ibid. 
79(n 68). 
80 ibid. 
81(1708) 20 Eq Ca Abr 46 
82 ibid.  
83(1796) 3 Ves Jun 152 
84ibid 154. See also Paine v Hall (1812) 18 Ves Jun 475, 34 ER 397, where Lord Eldon expresses a similar idea, 
although this is obiter: ‘…there is no evidence of a trust expressed, nor of such an engagement by words, or by 
silence, as would authorize the Court to say, the devisees undertook to do that, which prevented the devisor from 
imposing it upon them, as a trust’. 
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significant on account of the fact that B, reluctant to assume the office of trustee, 
advised A that he should execute a new will instead of relying on the secret trust. 
Although B eventually agreed to A’s plans, Arden MR pointed out that his initial 
reticence when asked to be a trustee meant that he ‘had no intention of fraud at that 
time’. 85 This shows that, as with category one parol agreement trusts, the state of 
mind of B at the time of the parol agreement is immaterial in determining whether a 
fraud was eventually perpetrated. 
 
Given that any requirements of personal gain are entirely absent from definitions of 
fraud from this period, it is perhaps unsurprising that in Drakeford v Wilks,86 a secret 
trust was enforced even though B had died without gaining personally or even 
attempting to do so. Lord Hardwicke’s reasoning was that: 
 
a will being ambulatory, if [A] has a conversation with [B], and [B] promises 
that, in consideration of the disposition in favour of her, she will do an act in 
favour of a third person, and [A] lets the will stand, it is very proper that the 
person who undertook to do the act should perform, because, as I must take 
it, if [B] had not so promised, [A] would have altered her will.87  
 
This also suggests that, once again, A’s reliance on the secret trust agreement was 
critical to the court’s reasoning. 
 
These definitions of fraud do not, however, mean that the court simply gives effect to 
                                                          
85 ibid. 
86 (n 19).  
87 Ibid. 
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A’s wishes in the face of the statutory formality requirements. In Whitton v Russell,88 
it was clear to A by the time of his death that the secret trustees (Bs) did not intend to 
perform their secret trust obligations. Thus, Lord Hardwick refused to enforce the 
purported secret trust on the basis that A was not ‘drawn by this promise (of Bs), not 
to add the legacy to this codicil’.89 So, in this case, fraud on the testator, was not 
present. As Lord Hardwicke pertinently put it, ‘every breach of promise is not to be 
called a fraud’90.  
 
The authorities discussed above indicate that, during the eighteenth century, it was 
firmly established that secret trusts are enforced to prevent ‘fraud on the testator’ 
(i.e. fraud on A)91, and that this fraud arises if the undertaking by B, upon which A 
relied, is not carried out. Those who assert that the historical basis for the doctrine is 
the prevention of fraudulent enrichment are incorrect. Surprisingly, none of the 
commentators who argue that the prevention of fraud on A is the justification for the 
enforcement of secret trusts cite any of the cases from this period. 
 
2.3.4.3 Authorities from the nineteenth century 
2.3.4.3.1 Fully secret trust cases 
Most of the authorities from his century are consistent with those from the previous 
century in that secret trusts are explained as being enforced to prevent the fraud 
which arises when B deviates from the secret trust agreement on which A relied. In 
                                                          
88 (1739) 1 Atk 448, 26 ER 285. 
89 ibid 449. 
90 ibid. This refutes arguments such as that of Challinor, ‘Debunking the Myth’ (n 44), who considers the 'fraud 
on the testator' argument to be ‘a bald assertion that a testator’s wishes should be put into effect in a manner that 
is not acceptable’.  
91Although, for two errant authorities, see Jones v Nabbs (1718) Gilb Rep 146, 25 ER 102 and Kingsman v 
Kingsman (1706) 2 Vern 559, 23 ER 962. 
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Muckleston v Brown,92 a case concerning the Mortmain Act 1736,93 Lord Eldon 
stated that secret trusts are enforced ‘on the ground that that [A] would not have 
devised the estate to [B], unless he had undertaken to pay that sum. The principle is 
that the statute shall not be used to cover a fraud’,94  and in Chamberlain v Agar,95 
Plumer VC referred to: 
 
that Species of Fraud, which consists of not complying with a Promise, on 
which [A] relied where [A], having come under such an Obligation, transfers it 
to his [B]; who give a positive Assurance to fulfil it: [A], relying on that 
Assurance; and under that Confidence abstaining from inserting the Legacy in 
his Will.96  
 
This approach was continued later in the century. In Jones v Badley,97 for example, 
Lord Cairns, paraphrasing Sir Page Wood VC in Wallgrave v Tebbs,98 who was in 
turn quoting Turner LJ in Russell v Jackson,99 stated that the doctrine exists 'for the 
prevention of fraud',100 explaining that when B undertakes: 
 
that he will carry [A]’s intention into effect, and the property is left to him upon 
the faith of that promise or undertaking, it is in effect a case of trust … 
                                                          
92(n 43). 
93The Mortmain Act 1736 essentially prohibited devises of land to charities or in trust for charitable purposes 
(see s1). There are a number of cases in which a testator devised land to a legatee, subject to an agreement 
outside of the will that the legatee would use the land for charitable purposes. Typically, the action would be 
brought by the residuary legatees who would claim that the legatee in question took the land subject to a binding 
secret trust for charitable purposes. If this claim was upheld, the land in question would be held by the would-be 
secret trustee on resulting trust for the testator’s estate on the grounds that it was an illegal devise. 
94 (n 42) 69. See also Stickland v Aldridge (1804) 9 Ves Jun 517, 32 ER 703, 519. 
95 (1813) 2 Ves & Bea 259, 35 ER 317. 
96 ibid 262. 
97 (1868) LR 3 Ch App 362. 
98(n 43) 321. 
99(1852) 10 Hare 204, 68 ER 900, 211-212. 
100(n 97) 364. 
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[because] no one can doubt that, if [B] had stated that he would not carry into 
effect the intentions of [A], the disposition in his favour would not have been 
found in the will.101  
 
This view was approved in the House of Lords in Cullen v Attorney-General for 
Ireland102 by Lord Westbury, who described C's interest as being created by B’s 
promise, 'the breach of which confidence would amount to a fraud’.103  
 
The House of Lords case of McCormick v Grogan,104 particularly Lord Westbury’s 
judgment, is generally regarded as the leading case on the fraud theory, and is 
generally taken as authority that fraud must involve personal gain by B,105 and that 
an unusually high standard of proof must be applied in secret trusts cases. If phrases 
from the judgment are taken in isolation, this view appears reasonable. Lord 
Hatherley stated that secret trusts should only be enforced in ‘clear cases of fraud’106 
when there has been a ‘fraudulent inducement’107 by B. Lord Westbury used even 
stronger language, emphasising ‘the criminal character of fraud’,108 explaining that 
the doctrine is based on ' personal fraud’109 which is only present if 'a malus animus, 
is proved by the clearest and most indisputable evidence’110 that B ‘knew that [A] 
                                                          
101ibid.  The original passage from Sir Page Wood was also quoted with approval by Lord Romilly in Proby v 
Landor (1860) LR 3 Ch App 362 and in Rowbotham v Dunnett (1878) 8 Ch D 430. This shows the great 
consistency during this period. 
102(n 66). 
103ibid 198. 
104(n 66). 
105See Snowden (n 61), and, by extension, those judgments relying on Snowden. See also Challinor, ‘Debunking 
the Myth’ (n 44); Pearce and Stevens, The Law of Trusts (n 44); Glister and Lee, Modern Equity (n 44); Hudson, 
Equity and Trusts (n 50). 
106 (n 66) 89. 
107 ibid. 
108ibid 97. 
109ibid.  
110ibid. 
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intestate was beguiled and deceived by his conduct’.111 The wording used by their 
Lordships is, it is respectfully submitted, unfortunate, particularly as many 
commentators all but ignore the pre-McCormick cases and instead focus on these 
eye-catching but ultimately misleading turns of phrase. 
 
A different picture emerges when the judgments are read fully. Lord Hatherley, once 
again,112 followed the established view of fraud, explaining that a secret trust arises 
due to the ‘fraud thus committed by the heir in inducing the testator to die intestate, 
upon the faith of the heir's representations that he would carry all such wishes as 
were confided to him into effect’,113 thus clarifying his comments regarding the need 
for a fraudulent inducement. He made no statement regarding the standard of proof 
to be applied. 
 
Lord Westbury similarly explained that a secret trust will be imposed when A 
‘communicates the disposition... and the disponee assents to it, either expressly, or 
by any mode of action which the disponee knows must give to the testator the 
impression and belief that he fully assents to the request’.114 What Lord Westbury 
seems to have meant is that once it is established that B has led A to believe that he 
will perform the secret trust by expressly or implicitly acceding to A’s requests, the 
court will insist that he fulfils his promise, otherwise A will have been ‘beguiled and 
deceived’115 and the fraud will have been ‘proved by the clearest and indisputable 
                                                          
111ibid 98. 
112Note that Lord Hatherley was known as Sir Page Wood prior before becoming Lord Chancellor. See his 
judgments in Wallgrave (n 43) 321; Tee v Ferris (1856) 2 K & J 357, 69 ER 819, 367-368. 
113(n 66) 88. 
114ibid 97. 
115ibid 98. 
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evidence’.116 Lord Westbury did not mention the need for an especially high standard 
of proof. Rather, he was explaining the nature of the fraud and why communication 
and acceptance are essential requirements for valid secret trusts. If B does not 
perform a properly communicated and accepted secret trust, he is committing a 
personal fraud or a ‘malus animus’.117 His use of the word ‘criminal’118 to describe 
fraud, when read in the context of the rest of his speech and the other authorities 
from the period, is likely to be a mere reinforcement of the idea that equity regarded 
it as repugnant for B to renege on his promise.  
 
Lord Westbury’s explanation of the legatee being converted into a trustee merely by 
his acceptance of the secret trust obligation is irreconcilable with the view that he 
regarded equitable fraud as synonymous with fraud in common law or even criminal 
law. In fact, as Solicitor-General,119 it appears that Lord Westbury stated that, in 
secret trusts cases, there must be an arrangement, ‘the abandonment of which by 
[B] would amount to a fraud on the testator’120 and that this ‘fraud or malus animus 
lay in the [secret trustee] inducing, by his promise, the testator to confer on her 
bounty, which, otherwise, he would not have conferred’.121 This interpretation is also 
corroborated by his comments on the nature of secret trusts in Cullen,122 and by the 
fact that Lord Cairns, in McCormick,123professed concurrence with Lord Westbury.124  
It is peculiar that, given how frequently Lord Westbury is cited as the leading 
                                                          
116ibid 97. 
117ibid.  
118ibid. 
119Lord Westbury, then Sir Richard Bethell, served as Solicitor General between 1852 and 1856. 
120Lomax v Ripley (1855) 3 Sm & Gif 48, 65 ER 558, 63. It appears from the report that these are Sir Richard 
Bethell’s words. If not, the only other likely explanation is that this is part of what is apparently a joint 
submission from counsels for the various defendants. 
121ibid, 64. 
122(n 66) 198. 
123(n 66) 99. Lord Cairns did not give a full speech. 
124Lord Cairns’s view of the nature of the fraud is clear. See Jones v Badley (n 97) 364. 
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authority on the fraud theory,125 this interpretation of his speech has virtually no 
currency. The orthodox interpretation of Lord Westbury's judgment has long provided 
ammunition for critics of the fraud theory, enabling them to bolster their position with 
House of Lords authority. That interpretation, it is submitted, is incorrect, and 
arguments and authorities relying on it126 should be reconsidered. 
 
Support for the interpretation of McCormick which is presented here can be gleaned 
from Norris v Frazer,127 a peculiar case in which B was a married woman. Upon the 
death of A, B’s husband, who had never promised to perform the secret trust, 
became entitled to the trust property in right of her. It is apparent from the facts of the 
case that neither the husband nor the wife had sought to enrich themselves 
fraudulently. Owing to coverture, B could not gain personally, and the husband’s 
conduct throughout had been ‘frank and honourable and fair in every respect’.128 
Nevertheless, the secret trust was enforced because 'a more direct, a more personal 
fraud could not be committed than for [the wife] to refuse to perform that promise 
which she made to the testator on his death bed’.129 Tellingly, Bacon VC cited Lord 
Westbury’s speech in McCormick as his main authority. Similarly, in Re Boyes,130 
Kay J, who cited McCormick, stated that B’s promise is: 
 
binding the conscience of the donee, on the ground that otherwise a fraud 
would be committed, because it is to be presumed that if it had not been for 
such promise the testator would not have made or would have revoked the 
                                                          
125See (n 105). 
126Ibid. 
127(1873) LR 15 Eq 318.  
128ibid 330. 
129ibid 331. 
130(1884) LR 26 Ch D 531. 
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gift.131  
 
Evidently, in the late nineteenth century, Lord Westbury was not regarded as having 
introduced a requirement that fraud must entail personal gain. 
 
In conclusion, in light of the academic disharmony on the same point, the uniformity 
in the case law regarding fraud in relation to fully secret trusts during this period is 
extraordinary. The underlying justification for the enforcement of fully secret trusts 
was repeatedly held to be the instrument of fraud principle, and fraud was repeatedly 
held to arise upon any breach by B of an undertaking on which A relied when 
deciding how to devise his property. There was no inconsistency during this period, 
not even in McCormick. 
 
2.3.4.3.2 Half-secret trust cases 
Although Muckleston v Brown132 has been mentioned in relation to fully secret trusts, 
in fact it was unclear in this case whether or not the face of the will identified B as a 
trustee.133 Although Lord Eldon considered whether the trust was fully or half-secret, 
he reached no conclusion on this point, instead explaining that the basis for the 
enforcement of secret trusts is prevention of fraud on A. This strongly suggests that 
Lord Eldon thought that all secret trusts share a common justification. This line of 
reasoning was followed in Podmore v Gunning.134 Although the alleged half-secret 
trust was not upheld, Shadwell VC stated that, had sufficient evidence been 
                                                          
131ibid 535. 
132(n 43). 
133A’s residuary estate consisted, inter alia, of an estate in Overseal, Derbyshire. Although the will devised the 
residuary estate absolutely to B, A then executed a codicil devising a farm to B ‘upon trust for the like uses and 
purposes as my manor and estate at Overseal now stand limited’. The plaintiffs (A’s next-of-kin) claimed that B 
had taken the estate at Overseal on secret trust for charitable purposes. 
134(1836) 8 Sim 644, 58 ER 985. 
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adduced, he would have given effect to the half-secret trust on the ground of 
fraud.135  
 
In Smith v Attersoll,136 a half-secret trust was enforced although Lord Gifford did not 
explain why. He did, however, describe C 'not as legatees, but as cestuis que 
trust'137 and he described the letter containing the half-secret trust's details as 'not to 
be considered as testamentary’,138citing a fully secret trust case as authority.139 This 
suggests that the half-secret trust was not incorporated into the will by reference, as 
has been claimed,140 rather that it was enforced on the instrument of fraud principle.  
 
Another case which has been cited by proponents of the incorporation by reference 
theory141 is Johnson v Ball,142 in which a half-secret trust that was not committed to 
writing until after the will's execution was held void on the ground that to enforce it 
‘would be to receive, as part of or as codicils to the will, papers subsequent in date to 
the will, which are unattested’.143  Parker VC proceeded to explain that fully secret 
trust cases ‘have no application to the present; nor... have those cases cited in the 
argument, in which the will refers to a trust [italics added] created by [A] by 
communication with [B] antecedently to or contemporaneously with the will.144 Parker 
VC’s description of validly communicated half-secret trusts as being created 'by 
                                                          
135ibid 656- 660. 
136(1826) 1 Russ 266. 
137ibid. 271. 
138ibid 270-271. 
139Jones v Nabbs (1718) Gilb Rep 146, 25 ER 102. 
140See Matthews, ‘The True Basis’ (n 46) 363. 
141ibid. 
142(1851) 5 De G & Sm 84, 64 ER 129. 
143ibid 90-91. 
144ibid 91. 
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communication’145 strongly suggests that he did not consider them to be 
incorporated into the will by reference. It should be noted that although the details of 
the half-secret trusts had actually been orally communicated to the trustees prior to 
the will's execution, the will referred to the half-secret trusts 'being appointed by 
letter'. Thus, the non-enforcement of the orally communicated trusts should not be 
seen as evidence in favour of the incorporation argument because enforcing these 
trusts would have been inconsistent with the will.146 It should also be noted that, in 
Irvine v Sullivan,147 a half-secret trust that was orally communicated prior to the will's 
execution but not reduced to writing until afterwards was enforced without question. 
In fact, there is only one case, Re Baillie,148 in which the court declined to enforce an 
orally communicated half-secret trust. The doctrine of incorporation by reference was 
not mentioned, however, and North J's reasoning was unclear.  
Another instructive case is Briggs v Penny,149 in which although the half-secret trust's 
terms had been put in writing prior to the will's execution, no communication 
appeared to have taken place. Knight-Bruce VC explained that unattested papers 
can by admitted either under ‘the power of [A] to incorporate in his will another 
existing paper'150 or for ‘the prevention of fraud, by compelling B to perform, after 
[A]'s death, a promise made by him to [A], upon the faith of which [A], to the 
knowledge of [B], gave the legacy.’151 That he ordered the determination of whether 
communication had been made152 indicates that he would have been prepared to 
                                                          
145There is no requirement that, for a document to be incorporated into a will by reference, it must be 
communicated to the legatee. See In bonis Smart [1902] P 238 at 240, cited in Glister and Lee, Modern Equity 
(n 44) 147, for a summary of the requirements for a document to be incorporated into the will by reference.  
146See alos Re Keen [1937] Ch 326, CA. 
147(1869) LR 8 Eq 673. See Re Young [1952] Ch 344, Ch for another example of an orally communicated half-
secret trust being enforced.  These seriously undermine the incorporation by reference argument. 
148(1886) 2 TLR 660, 
149 (1849) 3 De G & Sm 525, 64 ER 590. 
150ibid 547. 
151ibid. 
152ibid 548. 
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enforce the half-secret trusts for the prevention of fraud should sufficient evidence of 
communication have been established. 
 
In Re Fleetwood,153 a properly communicated half-secret trust was enforced. Hall 
VC, quoting directly from an Irish case, Riordan v Banon154 made it clear that half-
secret trusts are enforced to prevent fraud on the testator, stating that:  
 
the instruments of fraud [principle], appears to me to apply to cases where the 
will shews some trust was intended, as well as to those where this does not 
appear upon it. The testator, at least when his purpose is communicated to 
and accepted by the proposed legatee, makes the disposition to him on the 
faith of his carrying out his promise, and it would be a fraud in him to refuse to 
perform that promise.155  
 
He also described half-secret trusts as being created 'by communication’,156 which is 
consistent with the fraud theory, as well as pointing out that were the half-secret trust 
not to be enforced, 'the residuary legatees would stand to profit from B's fraud’.157 
Finally, Hall VC held that one of the secret beneficiaries could not take her interest 
because she had witnessed the will.158 Although this suggests that the half-secret 
trust was considered to be part of the testamentary disposition and was thus 
                                                          
153(n 74). 
154(1876) 10 Ir Eq Rep 649. 
155(n 74) 607. 
156ibid 604.  
157That equity will not allow one man to profit from another's fraud (the rule in Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 
Ves Jun 273, 33 ER 526) is a long-standing principle that has been invoked several times in secret trusts cases. 
(e.g. in Tee v Ferris (n 112) 367 (Page Wood VC); Blackwell (n 42) 241 (Lord Warrington)). 
158Presumably due to s15 of the Wills Act 1837. 
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incorporated into it,159 Hall VC's unequivocal comments regarding fraud demonstrate 
otherwise. 
 
In summary, the weight of authority from the nineteenth century favours the view that 
the fraud theory applies to half as well as to fully secret trusts, notwithstanding 
academic opinions to the contrary. This argument is considerably reinforced when 
these cases are read in the light of the fully secret trust cases from the period, in 
which fraud was consistently explained as not requiring any personal gain. On the 
other hand, by the end of the nineteenth century, no half-secret trust had actually 
been enforced under the incorporation by reference principle or indeed for any 
reason other than to prevent the statute being used as an instrument of fraud. 
 
2.3.4.4 Authorities from the twentieth century 
2.3.4.4.1 Fully secret Trust cases 
During this period, the fraud on the testator justification was endorsed several times, 
including three times by the majority in the Court of Appeal.160Furthermore, in Re 
Stead,161 a secret trust was enforced to prevent fraud on the testator. Farwell J saw 
no contradiction in citing McCormick as authority that secret trusts can only be 
enforced ‘in clear cases of fraud’162 whilst affording ‘the fullest credit to [B] for 
desiring to speak the truth’163. It is also notable that in Tharp v Tharp,164 Neville J 
                                                          
159This was included in the argument of Matthews, ‘The True Basis’ (n 46) 385-367, as was Hall VC’s use of 
the word ‘incorporated’, (n 74) 608. This unfortunate choice of words cannot, when the judgment is read as a 
whole, be taken literally to mean that half-secret trusts are incorporated into the will by reference. 
160See Re Pitt-Rivers [1902] 1 Ch 403, CA, 407 (Vaughan Williams LJ with whom Stirling LJ and Cozens-
Hardy LJ concurred); Re Maddock [1902] 2 Ch 220, CA, 225 (Collins MR) and 227 (Stirling LJ); Re Gardner 
(No 1) [1920] 2 Ch 523, CA ,530 (Warrington LJ) and 534-535 (Younger LJ). 
161 (n 47). 
162ibid 241. 
163ibid 240. 
164[1916] 1 Ch 142, Ch. 
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applied the doctrine of secret trusts to an analogous situation,165 explaining that ‘a 
subsequent action by [B] in contradiction of what he promised is a fraud’ and that ‘he 
should not, either for himself or for anybody else, take advantage of the fraud that he 
had committed.’166 
 
Nevertheless, the cases from the twentieth century do not manifest the same 
consistency of reasoning as is found in their nineteenth century counterparts. 
Perhaps the seeds of uncertainty were sown in the 1920s and 1930s. In Re 
Maddock,167 Cozens-Hardy LJ, although in the minority on this point, professed 
uncertainty as to whether the doctrine of secret trusts was based on ‘trust, or 
contract, or estoppel’.168 In Re Gardner (No 1),169 Lord Sterndale, stated that B: 
takes the property in accordance with and upon an undertaking to abide by 
the wishes of [A], and if he were to dispose of it in any other way he would be 
committing a breach of trust, or as it has been called in some of the cases a 
fraud. I do not think it matters which you call it. The breach of trust or the fraud 
would arise when he attempted to deal with the money contrary to the terms 
on which he took it.170 
 
Nevertheless, in both Re Falkiner171 and Re Williams,172 the justifications for the 
enforcement of secret trusts were explained in the same terms as those of Lord 
                                                          
165At the insistence of the defendant, the testator destroyed a codicil that had revoked a power of appointment. 
He did this in reliance on the defendant’s assurance that he would not exercise the reinstated power of 
appointment to the prejudice of the defendant. Neville J found in favour of the plaintiff, although the parties 
eventually settled. 
166(n 164) 151-152. 
167(n 160). 
168ibid 232 (Cozens-Hardy J). 
169(n 160). 
170ibid 529 (Lord Sterndale MR).  
171[1924] 1 Ch 88 Ch. 
172[1933] Ch 244, Ch.. 
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Sterndale, but without specific mention of the word ‘fraud’. Williams was the last case 
for several decades which concerned fully secret trusts. The cases discussed in this 
paragraph would seem, therefore, to mark the point at which the centuries-old 
continuity in judicial reasoning in respect of fully secret trusts came to an end. 
 
In two relatively recent cases, misconceptions regarding Lord Westbury’s judgment 
in McCormick led to unnecessary questions being asked regarding the standard of 
proof required in secret trust cases. In Ottaway v Norman,173 Brightman J, whilst 
accepting that the fraud in question is fraud on B174 interpreted Lord Westbury’s 
comments regarding the need for clear evidence of fraud175 as meaning that, in 
secret trusts cases, the standard of proof is ‘perhaps analogous to the standard of 
proof which this court requires before it will rectify a written instrument’176. He 
enforced the secret trust without further reference to the standard of proof, however, 
so his comments should not be taken to be an accurate reflection of the law.177  
 
In Snowden,178 Megarry VC based his judgment on the orthodox interpretation of 
Lord Westbury’s speech in McCormick, i.e. that fraud, for the purposes of justifying 
the enforcement of secret trusts, must involve personal gain by B. Having stated that 
secret trusts can be enforced in the absence of fraud,179 he concluded, on the basis 
of Lord Westbury’s comments, that in secret trust cases where fraudulent enrichment 
is possible, a high standard of proof ought to be applied, and that in all other secret 
                                                          
173(n 41). 
174ibid 709-711. 
175(n 66) 97. 
176(n 41) 712. 
177Brightman J’s comments regarding the adoption into English law of the ‘floating trust’, based on Birmingham 
v. Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666 ought similarly to be disregarded, as they were, again, speculative and have not 
been followed. 
178(n 61). 
179ibid 536. 
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trust cases, the ordinary civil standard should apply because this latter class of 
cases has nothing to do with fraud.180 If Megarry VC’s take on the doctrine of secret 
trusts is to be accepted, it must also be accepted that in 1869, not only did Lord 
Westbury propose a new definition of fraud, he also introduced an especially high 
standard of proof in cases where this fraud was present, and that both of these 
changes went unnoticed by the courts, even the House of Lords,181 for over a 
century. It is thus suggested that academic arguments or judgments relying on 
Megarry VC’s comments ought to be reassessed. 
 
2.3.4.4.2 Half-secret trust cases 
The enforceability of half-secret trusts and the correctness of Fleetwood were, 
without reasons being offered, called into question at first instance in Re Huxtable182 
and Re Hetely.183 In the former, the half-secret trust was reluctantly enforced and, in 
the latter, Fleetwood was distinguished. Despite this inauspicious start, perhaps the 
most important case concerning secret trusts, and one of the most significant of all 
authorities concerning parol agreement trusts, is from this period. Blackwell v 
Blackwell184 represents the most complete House of Lords analysis of the principles 
governing secret trusts. A half-secret trust, which had been properly communicated 
and accepted,185 was unanimously upheld for the prevention of fraud. The view that 
fraud must involve B gaining personally was rejected outright. Lord Buckmaster 
observed that if either a fully or a half-secret trust is not performed, ‘[C is] equally 
                                                          
180ibid. 
181See Blackwell (n 42). 
182[1902] 1 Ch 214, Ch. 
183[1902] 2 Ch 866, Ch. 
184(n 42). 
185 i.e. before the execution of the will. 
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defrauded in both cases, and the faith on which [A] relied is equally betrayed’.186 
Lord Warrington explained the fraud in similar terms, describing a secret trust as 
‘arising from the acceptance by [B] of a trust, communicated to him by [A], on the 
faith of which acceptance the will was made or left unrevoked, as the case might 
be’,187 so that ‘it would be a fraud on the part of [B] to refuse to carry out the trust’.188 
Here, it can be observed that both of their Lordships emphasised that A’s reliance on 
B’s undertaking is a key element. Lord Warrington also observed, echoing the 
comments of Lord Hardwicke in Reech189 that ‘if it would be a fraud on the part of [B] 
to refuse to carry out the trust, the residuary legatees cannot take advantage of and 
thus make themselves parties to such fraud.’190 
 
Finally, Viscount Sumner was unequivocal in endorsing the fraud theory, stating that 
the enforcement of half-secret trusts is 'justified by the same considerations as in the 
cases of fraud and absolute gifts’.191 He also stated, quoting Lord Cairns,192 that: 
 
for the .... prevention of fraud, it engrafts the trusts on the devise by admitting 
evidence which the statute would in terms exclude, in order to prevent [B] 
from applying property to a purpose foreign to that for which he undertook to 
hold it.193  
 
It is strange that doubts as to why half-secret trusts, and also fully secret trusts, are 
                                                          
186 (n 42). 
187ibid 341. 
188ibid. Lord Warrington also reiterates this point at 341. 
189(n 75). 
190Blackwell (n 42) 341. 
191ibid 335. 
192In Jones v Badley (n 97). 
193Blackwell (n 42) 336. 
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enforced have persisted since Blackwell. Indeed, the enforcement of half-secret 
trusts has been expressly attributed to the prevention of fraud three times194 since 
1929. It has to be asked why a unanimous House of Lords judgment which is 
consistent with the overwhelming majority of other authorities has been so frequently 
called into question, and why the myth that equitable fraud must involve personal 
gain has proven so persistent. 
 
2.3.4.5 Authorities from the twenty-first century 
There is little consistency in reasoning amongst the few authorities concerning secret 
trusts from this century.195 Megarry VC's view that fraud must involve deliberate 
personal gain, and that secret trusts can be justified without reference to fraud, has 
recently been followed twice196 in the tribunal courts. Furthermore, in Kasperbauer v 
Griffith,197 in the Court of Appeal, Peter Gibson LJ stated, in terms similarly vague to 
those used in Falkiner and Williams, that, in secret trusts cases, ‘equity acts to 
prevent fraud or other unconscionable conduct’.198 It is suggested that Peter Gibson 
LJ’s comment is not supportable; as has been demonstrated in the above analysis 
there is not a single instance of a secret trust actually being enforced to prevent any 
‘unconscionable conduct’ other than fraud. Furthermore, the instances of the term 
‘unconscionable’ being used in preference to ‘fraud’ are vanishingly rare. 
 
An important and interesting case which is often overlooked as an authority 
                                                          
194Re Keen (n 146) 244 (Lord Wright MR, with whom Romer LJ and Greene LJ concurred); Re Cooper [1939] 
Ch 811 815 (Green MR, with whom Clauson LJ and Goddard LJ concurred); Young (n 147) 349 (Dankwerts J). 
195Although the recent case of Re Freud [2014] EWHC 2577 (Ch), [2014] WTLR 1453, shows the relevance of 
the doctrine of secret trusts to the modern law. The justifications for the enforcement of secret trusts were not in 
issue and not discussed. 
196Taylor (n 64); Davies (n 64). 
197[2000] 1 WTLR 333, CA. 
198ibid [27]. 
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concerning secret trusts is Healey v Brown.199 Mrs Brown (A) and Mr Brown (B) 
executed mutual wills by which each left his/her entire estate to the survivor. Each 
will provided that the survivor would not ‘amend or revoke’ his or her will after the 
other spouse’s death. A and B were joint tenants of a long leasehold estate. 
According to the mutual wills, the survivor would bequeath this estate in the land to 
C. When A died, by virtue of the right of survivorship, B became sole owner of the 
leasehold estate. B then transferred the land into the names of himself and his son 
(the defendant) as joint tenants. When B died, the defendant, again pursuant to the 
right of survivorship, became the sole legal owner of the flat. C claimed that the 
defendant held the leasehold estate on trust for her. The doctrine of mutual wills 
provided the basis for C’s claim. Donaldson QC, sitting as Deputy High Court Judge, 
held that the doctrine of mutual wills was inapplicable because there was no contract 
entered into between A and B which satisfied the Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1989, s2. B was therefore free to do as he wished with the share in 
the land which had been his originally.  Accordingly, the defendant took that share 
free of any constructive trust for C. In respect of the interest in the land which had 
passed from A to B upon A’s death, however, Donaldson QC invoked the principles 
relating to secret trusts. He explained that, in secret trust cases, ‘a claimant's interest 
in such a case does not derive from contract, but turns rather on the acceptance of a 
trust by the recipient and avoidance of a fraud on the beneficiary and testator’.200 
Because B had received A’s interest subject to a parol agreement that B would 
bequeath it to C, B took A’s share on constructive trust for C. This constructive trust 
bound the defendant. C was hence entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in the land. 
 
                                                          
199[2002] WTLR 849. 
200ibid [28]. 
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Healey is important as a relatively recent case in which the prevention of fraud on A 
and C was accepted as the justification for the enforcement of secret trusts. This 
shows that, despite some recent aberrations, the long-standing conception of 
equitable fraud is alive and well in the twenty-first century. Healey also demonstrates 
that the doctrine of secret trusts is continuing to evolve, for it is the first case in which 
a secret trust has been held to bind a party who received the secret trust property 
through the operation of the right of survivorship upon the death of his joint tenant. 
Healey further shows the adaptability of the doctrine of secret trusts because even 
though neither A nor B intended to create a clandestine trust, the requirements for 
the creation of a secret trust had nevertheless been satisfied. 
 
2.3.5 Do the differing communication requirements for fully and half-secret 
Trusts undermine the fraud theory? 
The rule that half-secret trusts must be communicated before or contemporaneously 
with the will’s execution has generated much controversy. Numerous justifications for 
its existence have been proposed, and several commentators have used the rule as 
the cornerstone of their assertions regarding the justifications for the doctrine 
itself.201 In fact, the rule is simply the result of policy decisions. In Blackwell, Viscount 
Sumner stated that a half-secret trust could not be enforced if communicated after 
the will’s execution; this would be tantamount to allowing a testator to ‘reserve to 
himself a power of making future unwitnessed dispositions [and thus to] "give the go-
by" to the requirements of the Wills Act.’202 Put another way, whereas Viscount 
Sumner considered the enforcement of properly communicated secret trusts to be in 
                                                          
201See particularly Matthews, ‘The True Basis’ (n 46); Perrins, ‘Secret Trusts’ (n 46); D Wilde ‘Secret and 
Semi-Secret Trusts: Justifying the Distinctions between the two’ [1995] Conv 366.  
202(n 42) 339. 
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accordance with the legislature's intention, he considered that Parliament did not 
intend half-secret trusts communicated after the will to be enforceable,203 apparently 
because the will in such cases serves as an overt statement by A that although he 
has made his will, he still intends to alter by parol the final destination of legacies 
bequeathed under it. 
Viscount Sumner saw no contradiction between interpreting the effect of the Wills Act 
thus and attributing the enforcement of secret trusts to the prevention of fraud, nor is 
any such contradiction suggested in any of the other authorities.204 This is 
unsurprising because even if the non-performance of  a half-secret trust 
communicated and accepted after the execution of the will amounts to a fraud on A, 
it has been held on several occasions that the enforcement of such half-secret trusts 
is against the policy of the Wills Act. Thus, from a constitutional standpoint, equity is 
powerless to intercede to prevent any such fraud. An analogy may be drawn with the 
Mortmain cases. In many such cases,205 the court accepted that B took subject to a 
mandatory obligation to perform the secret trust because any non-performance 
would amount to a fraud on A.  This mandatory obligation upon B also amounted to 
an illegal devise, however, and the property was returned to A’s estate by resulting 
trust. Again, because of the manner in which legislation was interpreted by the 
judges, equity was powerless to intercede to prevent the fraud on A.  
 
                                                          
203See also Johnson (n 142); Hetely (n 183); Keen (n 146). The rule was also applied in Re Bateman’s WT 
[1970] 1 WLR 1463, Ch. 
204In particular, in Re Keen (n 146), the fraud theory and the communication requirement were accepted, by the 
Court of Appeal 
205E.g. Boson v Statham (1760) 1 Cox 16, 29 ER 1041; Russell v Jackson, (n 99). See above (n 93) for an 
explanation of the relevance of the Mortmain Act. 
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2.3.6 Summary of the observations on the nature of equitable fraud in secret 
trust cases 
As Healey shows, the consistency of the judiciary in relation to the nature of the 
fraud continues until the present day. The very small number of cases containing 
conflicting statements, most of which are relatively recent, can only sensibly be 
dismissed as being anomalous. As it is abundantly clear from the authorities that 
equitable fraud need not involve personal gain, the idea that fraud can be prevented 
by the imposition of a resulting trust in favour of A’s estate, and that therefore the 
fraud theory cannot explain why the secret trust should actually be enforced, ought 
to be disregarded, as should concerns regarding the standard of proof to be applied. 
It is equally clear that all secret trusts are justified on the same principles. There is 
insufficient evidence from the case law to support assertions that half-secret trusts 
are incorporated into the will by reference or are enforced for any other reasons. 
Similarly, arguments that fraud on A is not a strong enough type of fraud to explain 
equity’s intervention,206 and that there is a lack of clarity in the judgments regarding 
that nature of fraud207 are not borne out by the authorities. The fraud which causes 
equity’s intervention arises if B’s promise to perform the trust, upon which A relied 
when executing his testamentary dispositions, is not performed. Adoption of any 
other notion of fraud would involve overturning not only several centuries of 
jurisprudence, but also three House of Lords decisions. A final point to note is the 
striking similarities in the reasoning of the courts in the vast majority of secret trusts 
cases and the category one parol agreement trusts cases. Most significantly, the lack 
of any need to prove any deliberate intention by B to deceive, or any personal gain 
by B in the event of his reneging on the parol agreement, and the insistence that the 
                                                          
206See Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44). 
207See McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 46) 676.  
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fraud lies in any deviation by B from what he agreed and what A relied upon, are 
common threads running through the case law in respect of both types of trusts. 
 
2.3.7 Observations on the nature of equitable fraud in cases of inter vivos 
category two parol agreement trusts 
Perhaps the most significant case in this category is Staden v Jones,208 in which the 
Court of Appeal unequivocally upheld C’s claim. A and B, who were co-owners of the 
matrimonial home, agreed that, upon their divorce, A would transfer her share in the 
land to B so long as B would ensure that the share eventually passed to C, their 
infant daughter. Some years after obtaining the transfer, B remarried, and later 
transferred the property into the joint names of himself and his new wife as equitable 
joint tenants. B died intestate, and C sought to claim a 50% beneficial interest in the 
property from B's wife. There was no evidence that B had obtained A’s interest with 
the intention of retaining it for himself, or that B's wife had behaved dishonestly. 
Nevertheless, it was held that B’s wife held a 50% beneficial interest on trust for C. 
The basis of the judgment was the prevention of fraud, which was explained in 
exactly the same terms as in Bannister,209 and it was held that s53(1)(b) could not be 
used as an engine for such fraud.210 
 
Another recent Court of Appeal case in this category is De Bruyne v De Bruyne.211 
Here, the trustee of a discretionary trust which comprised of, inter alia, some 
valuable shares, had a power of appointment which empowered him, with the 
consent of a particular beneficiary, to distribute all income and capital to any persons 
                                                          
208(n 60). 
209See above, text to n 24. These words were directly quoted in Staden, (n 60) [30] Arden LJ in support of the 
judgment. 
210ibid. 
211(n 60). 
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within the class of beneficiaries. The adult beneficiaries, who wished to dissolve the 
trust, decided that the most expedient means by which to achieve this aim was 
through the trustee exercising the power. It was agreed that the trustee would 
distribute the shares to one of the beneficiaries, so long as the beneficiary in 
question would ensure that they would be held on trust for the benefit of his children. 
Essentially, then, the trustee and the beneficiary whose consent was required can be 
regarded as A, the beneficiary to whom the shares were transferred is B, and the 
children are represented by C. When a dispute later arose as to the beneficial 
ownership of the shares, the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of C. Patten LJ, with 
whom Thorpe LJ and Kennedy LJ agreed, held that a constructive trust arose in 
favour of C. Such trusts, according to his Lordship: 
 
concentrate… on the circumstances in which the transferee came to acquire 
the property in order to provide the justification for the imposition of a trust. 
The most obvious examples are secret trusts and mutual wills in which 
property is transferred by will pursuant to an agreement that the transferee will 
hold the property on trust for a third party. In neither case does the intended 
beneficiary rely in any sense on the agreement (he may not even be aware of 
it) but, in both cases, equity will regard it as against conscience for the owner 
of the property to deny the terms upon which he received it. It is not 
necessary in such cases to show that the property was acquired by actual 
fraud (although the principle would apply equally in such cases). The concept 
of fraud in equity is much wider and can extend to unconscionable or 
inequitable conduct in the form of a denial or refusal to carry out the 
agreement to hold the property for the benefit of the third party which was the 
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only basis upon which the property was transferred. This is sufficient in itself 
to create the fiduciary obligation and to require the imposition of a constructive 
trust. The principle is a broad one and applies as much to inter vivos 
transactions as it does to wills: see Rochefoucauld v Boustead…; Bannister v 
Bannister.212 
 
Several very interesting points for discussion arise out of Patten LJ’s observations. 
Firstly, his Lordship’s acceptance of the prevention of fraud as the underlying reason 
for the imposition of the trust, as well as his description of the nature of equitable 
fraud, are very much in keeping with the findings thus far in this thesis. It is also 
interesting to note that Patten LJ regarded all category two parol agreement trusts 
(i.e. secret trusts and trusts such as that in De Bruyne), as well as category one 
parol agreement trusts and the trust in Rochefoucauld, as being enforced pursuant 
to the same justifications. This strengthens the conclusions reached thus far in this 
thesis. It should also be observed that De Bruyne is unusual for not involving land. 
Section 53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act was thus irrelevant to its enforcement. 
There was evidently no enforceable express trust, however, because B’s promise 
that he would take the shares as trustee was made prior to his obtaining sufficient 
title to declare a trust of the shares. A final point to note is that Patten LJ’s treatment 
of parol agreement trusts and mutual wills as being doctrinally similar will be covered 
below, at 5.4. 
 
A final case to consider in this section is Rudkin v Dolman.213 Here, A conveyed land 
                                                          
212ibid [51]. 
213(1876) 35 LT 791. This has been cited as an authority that cases in this section should be resolved by the 
imposition of a resulting trust in favour of A rather than a constructive trust in favour of C- see JD Feltham 
‘Informal Trusts and Third Parties’ [1987] Conv 246. 
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to B. It might have been A’s intention that B should take as trustee for C; after having 
taken the conveyance, B executed a deed stating this to have been the case. When 
a dispute later arose as to the beneficial ownership of the land, it was held that B had 
taken as resulting trustee for A. As has been pointed out,214 however, the court did 
not find that A and B ever entered into any parol agreement. Rudkin therefore 
provides support for one of the contentions which might tentatively be made at this 
stage of this thesis, i.e. that constructive trusts imposed for the prevention of the type 
of fraud in aid of which a statute may not be used will only arise when there has 
been a parol agreement which has been relied upon.  
 
2.3.8 The classification of category two parol agreement trusts 
As has been seen, there is little doubt from the authorities that inter vivos category 
two parol agreement trusts are regarded by modern courts as constructive trusts. 
The same certainty is not, however, manifest in the cases concerning secret trusts. 
This section of the chapter will, therefore, deal with the enduringly controversial 
question of how secret trusts should be classified. It has been argued that all secret 
trusts are express trusts,215 that all secret trusts are constructive trusts,216 that fully 
secret trusts are constructive and half-secret trusts are express,217 and that all secret 
trusts can properly be regarded as either express or constructive.218 Inextricably 
bound to the question of how best to classify secret trusts is the further question of 
the extent to which secret trusts are dehors the will. Again, academic views differ 
wildly on this point. Some commentators insist that, if the fraud theory is correct, 
                                                          
214TG Youdan, ‘Informal Trusts and Third Parties: a Response’ [1988] Conv 267. 
215Hodge, ‘Secret Trusts’ (n 44) 346. 
216McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 46). 
217Sheridan, ‘English and Irish Secret Trusts’ (n 46); Andrews, ‘Creating Secret Trusts’ (n 46). 
218Glister and Lee, Modern Equity (n 44) 163. 
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secret trusts must be express testamentary trusts which are not dehors the will,219 
whilst others have asserted that secret trusts must be express trusts if they are 
dehors the will.220 On the other hand, it has also been suggested that secret trusts 
are outside of the scope of the Wills Act because they are constructive trusts arising 
for reasons other than the prevention of fraud.221 This part of the thesis will thus 
examine the extent to which secret trusts are dehors the will with a view to 
establishing whether they are best classified as express or constructive trusts. 
 
2.3.8.1 Secret trusts are dehors the will 
Although it is submitted here that it should be regarded as beyond doubt that the 
secret trusts are enforced on the basis of the instrument of fraud principle, it is also 
apparent from the authorities that secret trusts are dehors the will and enforced in a 
way that does not conflict with the Wills Act. This point was made by Viscount 
Sumner in Blackwell who, in addition to being unequivocal in attributing the 
enforcement of secret trusts to the prevention of fraud, said that he could ‘not see 
how the statute-law relating to the form of a valid will is concerned at all'222 with the 
enforcement of secret trusts. In fact, although this is at odds with the majority of 
academic opinion, there are numerous examples throughout the case law of express 
or implied references to secret trusts being dehors the will by judges endorsing the 
fraud theory.223  
 
                                                          
219Hodge, ‘Secret Trusts’ (n 44) 346. 
220Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44). 
221McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 46). 
222(n 42) at 334. 
223See, for example, Sweeting (n 47); Re Spencer’s Will (1881) 51 LJ Ch 271; Re Keen (n 146); Re Young (n 
147); Ottaway v Norman (n 41). 
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2.3.8.1.2 What is a testamentary disposition? 
Many of the debates regarding the relevance of s9 to the doctrine revolve around the 
question of whether secret trusts are testamentary dispositions, in which case they 
are exceptions to the Wills Act,224 express inter vivos dispositions, in which case s9 
is irrelevant to questions regarding their enforcement,225 or constructive trusts226. 
Before proceeding, therefore, the meaning of s9 should be reconsidered. The 
section states that ‘no will shall be valid’ unless it is in writing and signed by A in the 
presence of two or more attesting witnesses. The meaning of the term ‘will’ is 
described in s1 as extending to ‘a testament, and to a codicil... and to any other 
testamentary disposition’. Thus, the term 'testamentary disposition 'is synonymous 
with the term 'will'. The meaning of s9 is that all valid testamentary dispositions must 
be executed in accordance with the formality requirements. Any attempt to dispose 
of property upon death that does not comply with s9 shall not be valid and therefore 
cannot correctly be referred to as a testamentary disposition. In other words, s9 
regulates attempts at making testamentary dispositions. Actual testamentary 
dispositions by their very nature satisfy s9. So, to state that a secret trust is not a 
testamentary disposition is a statement of the obvious. This does not necessarily 
mean that the Wills Act is irrelevant to questions regarding its enforcement.  
 
This narrow definition of 'testamentary disposition' is not widely accepted.227  A wider 
definition that has been proposed is that any ambulatory and revocable disposition 
that is enforced is a testamentary disposition, regardless of whether it appears on 
                                                          
224See especially Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44). 
225See especially Pearce and Stevens, The Law of Trusts (n 44) 224-229. 
226See especially Sheridan, ‘English and Irish Secret Trusts’ (n 46); A Andrews, ‘Creating Secret Trusts’ (n 46); 
‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 46); Hudson, Equity and Trusts (n 50). 
227See especially Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44).  
 59 
 
the document commonly referred to as the 'will',228 and regardless of whether it is 
admitted to probate. Such 'testamentary dispositions' are regulated by s9. By this 
definition, a secret trust is a testamentary disposition which is enforced as an 
exception to the Wills Act.  
 
In order to answer the difficult questions229 surrounding the position of secret trusts 
vis a vis the statutory formality requirements of the Wills Act, the creation and 
enforcement of secrets trust will be examined in detail. Accordingly, the awkward and 
controversial questions concerning the extent to which A’s declaration of trust is a 
testamentary disposition will be considered, followed by analysis of whether the 
secret beneficiary acquires his or her beneficial interest through the operation of a 
testamentary disposition. 
 
2.3.8.1.3 A's declaration of trust is not a testamentary disposition 
There is a strong judicial consensus that A's declaration of trust is not a testamentary 
disposition. In Chamberlain v Agar,230 in which a fully secret trust expressed in 
writing was upheld, the Vice Chancellor stated that ‘no Paper exists, that can be 
properly described as a Will, Codicil, or testamentary Paper’.231 Similarly, in Smith v 
Attersoll,232 it was held that the paper containing the details of the half-secret trust 
was 'not to be considered testamentary',233 and in Briggs v Penny,234 of four papers 
containing the details of purported half-secret trusts,  Knight Bruce VC said that 'not 
                                                          
228See especially Critchley, ibid 634. 
229For examples of debates on this, see especially Holdsworth, above n. 9; Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 
44); Kincaid, ‘The Tangled Web’ (n 50); Challinor, ‘Debunking the Myth’ (n 44). 
230(n 95). 
231ibid 263. 
232(n 136). 
233ibid 270-271. 
234(n 149). 
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one can… be treated or considered as testamentary. If any one of them is valid at all, 
it can only be deemed valid in some other character than as a testamentary 
instrument’.235 This is consistent with the view of Stuart VC in Lomax v Ripley,236 
who made it clear that papers containing details of purported secret trusts did not 
‘have a testamentary character’237 because they could not have been ‘admitted to 
probate’.238 Likewise, in Re Maddock,239 Collins MR referred to the written terms of 
the secret trusts as ‘collateral non-testamentary document[s]’,240 and in Re 
Bateman’s WT,241 Pennycuick VC described a clause in A's will purporting to create 
a half-secret trust as ‘an attempt to dispose of the estate by a nontestamentary 
instrument’.242 Finally, in Re Cooper,243 Greene MR dismissed the argument that 
half-secret trusts should be incorporated into the will as an argument for 
'incorporating by reference into the testamentary dispositions of A the trusts actually 
declared to his trustees'.244 Clearly, he did not regard the declarations of secret trusts 
as testamentary dispositions. Significantly, there is not one case in which A's 
declaration of trust is described as being a testamentary disposition.245  What is also 
apparent from these authorities is that by 'testamentary disposition', the judges 
concerned were referring to the narrow definition of the term, i.e. A's will and 
anything incorporated therein, as opposed to the wider definition.  
 
                                                          
235 ibid 527. 
236(n 120). 
237ibid 76. 
238ibid.  
239(n 160). 
240ibid 224.  
241(n 203). 
242ibid 1468. 
243(n 194). 
244ibid 819. 
245Maddock (n 160) has been cited as authority that secret trusts are testamentary dispositions (e.g. by Challinor, 
‘Debunking the Myth’ (n 44). In fact, the secret trusts were merely treated as part of the testamentary 
disposition for the purposes of the litigation. 
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The next question is whether s9 applies to A's declaration of trust. The most 
instructive cases are those which deal with uncommunicated secret trusts which are, 
of course, void. The reason for this is that A's declaration of trust does not comply 
with the Wills Act. The leading case on this rule is Wallgrave v Tebbs,246 in which 
Page Wood VC refused to enforce the uncommunicated secret trust on the grounds 
that it is ‘impossible for the Court to look upon a document which is excluded by the 
statute’.247  Similarly, in Moss v Cooper,248 the same judge explained that 'if you 
attempt to raise a trust out of some uncommunicated intention, you contravene the 
express provisions of the statute by varying the dispositions of the will by parol 
evidence'.249 In Briggs v Penny,250 it was also held by Knight-Bruce VC that A's 
papers were not admissible as evidence as 'the statute of 1837 seems to me to 
exclude them'.251 The requirements of communication and acceptance have 
frequently been reaffirmed, including by the House of Lords.252  
 
These authorities reaffirm that the narrow definition of testamentary disposition is the 
correct one, as they are direct authorities that the Wills Act does apply to the 
declaration of secret trust, even though it has been repeatedly held that such a 
declaration is not a testamentary disposition. Thus, assertions that secret trusts are 
enforceable as express inter vivos trusts, to which the Wills Act has no application,253 
would seem to be unsustainable. Express inter vivos trusts are unilateral254 and 
                                                          
246(n 43). 
247ibid 326. See also Tee v Ferris (n 112) 366 (Page Wood VC); Whitton v Russell (n 88) 449 (Lord Hardwicke 
LC). 
248(1861) 1 J & H 352, 70 ER 782. 
249ibid 366. 
250(n 149). 
251ibid 547. 
252See McCormick (n 66); Blackwell (n 42). 
253For examples, see above (nn 53 and 54). 
254For a comprehensive list of theoretical reasons why secret trusts are not express, see R Burgess, ‘The Juridical 
Nature of Secret Trusts’ NILQ 263. 
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need not comply with statutory formality requirements for valid wills.255 A's 
declaration of secret trust is affected by the statutory formality requirements, and the 
secret trust can only be given effect if A's declaration is communicated to and 
accepted by B. Classifying a secret trust as an express inter vivos trust is contrary to 
both principle and the authorities. Perhaps the reason why the classification of secret 
trusts as express inter vivos trusts has endured is that it seems to be presumed that, 
if the declaration of secret trust is not a testamentary disposition, then it must be an 
inter vivos disposition.256 In fact, the declaration of secret trust has no effect due non-
compliance with the Wills Act. It is plainly inaccurate to describe as an inter vivos 
disposition that which is not a disposition at all.  
 
Although not a disposition, the declaration of secret trust by A has been described as 
being ‘in furtherance of the testamentary dispositions’,257 and, in Blackwell, Lord 
Buckmaster referred to the declarations of secret trusts as 'testamentary 
intentions',258 as did Vaughan Williams LJ in Re Pitt-Rivers.259 It is therefore 
submitted that A's declaration of trust is best described as an expression of his 
testamentary intentions. 
 
 
2.3.8.1.4 C does not acquire his interest by the operation of a testamentary 
disposition 
It would seem self-evident that if A's declaration of secret trust is not a testamentary 
                                                          
255They should, of course, comply with statutory formality requirements for inter vivos trusts (see Law of 
Property Act 1925, s53(1)(b)). 
256 E.g. Pearce and Stevens, Law of Trusts (n 44) 224-229. 
257Johnson (n 142) 91 (Parker VC). 
258(n 42) 325. 
259(n 160) 407. 
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disposition, then the interest that C takes cannot be part of a testamentary 
disposition either. This is indeed the case, as several authorities demonstrate. The 
starting point is the House of Lords judgment of Cullen v Attorney-General for 
Ireland,260 in which it was held that a secret trust was not a testamentary disposition 
and did not therefore qualify for a certain taxation exemption.261 Although this case 
has been dismissed as 'a policy decision',262 it deserves closer attention. Lord 
Westbury described the title claimed by C as ‘a title dehors the will, and which 
cannot be correctly termed testamentary’,263 and Lord Chelmsford reached a similar 
conclusion.264 In Re Young,265 it was held that C could take his interest, even though 
he had witnessed A’s will.266 Although s15 of the Wills Act renders void any 
disposition by will to a person who has been a witness to that will, it was held that 'a 
beneficiary under a secret trust does not take under the will, and that he is not, 
therefore, affected by s15'.267 This is further authority that the C's interest is not 
bestowed upon him or her by way of a testamentary disposition. These authorities 
are entirely consistent with the narrow definition of testamentary disposition;268 by 
this definition, it is obvious, despite numerous assertions to the contrary,269 that 
secret trusts are not enforced as testamentary dispositions for the simple reason that 
they does not appear in full in the will. Thus, as well as it being impossible that secret 
trusts are enforced as express inter vivos trusts, it can also be seen that that they 
                                                          
260(n 66). 
261The wording of the Stamp Acts in question (5 & 6 Vict C 82 s38 and 8 & 9 Vict C 76 s4) stated that the 
exemption from duty applied to ‘a gift by any will or testamentary instrument’. 
262Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44) 641. 
263Cullen (n 66) 198. 
264 ibid 197-198. 
265(n 147). 
266Section 15 of the Wills Act renders void any disposition by will to a person who has been a witness to that 
will void. 
267(n 267) 351. 
268See also Re Keen (n 146) 244 (Lord Wright). 
269See, for example, Hodge, ‘Secret Trusts’ (n 44); Wilde, ‘Secret and Semi-Secret Trusts’ (n 201); Critchley, 
‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44); McFarlane and Mitchell, Hayton & Mitchell (n 15) 115. 
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are not express testamentary trusts either.270  
 
2.3.8.2 Are secret trusts dehors the will because they are express trusts, or because 
C’s interest is acquired by a trust imposed for the prevention of fraud? 
It is well established that secret trusts must be communicated to and accepted by B 
in order for C to acquire an interest on the death of A.271 It is as a result of the 
communication and acceptance of the secret trust obligation that, at the time of A’s 
death, B’s conscience is affected272. This would seem to be consistent with the 
classification of a secret trust as a trust which is imposed on B because any 
deviation from his promise would amount to a fraud, rather than as an express trust. 
Notably, although there are no references to constructive trusts in any of the pre-
twentieth century cases, there are many authorities which suggest that secret trusts 
are trusts born out of equity’s jurisdiction to declare a party to be a trustee, rather 
than express trusts created by a settlor. In Stickland v Aldridge,273 Lord Eldon stated 
that, in cases of secret trusts, 'though within the intention [of the legislature] it cannot 
be said a trust is declared under these circumstances, it is clear, a trust would be 
created, upon the principle, on which this Court acts, as to fraud'.274 Similarly, in 
Lomax275 Stuart VC explained that secret trusts may only be enforced if it is possible 
to ‘prove by evidence a trust expressed, or such an engagement by words or by 
silence as would authorize the Court to say that [B] undertook to do that which 
                                                          
270Both Hodge, ‘Secret Trusts’ (n 44) and Wilde, ‘Secret and Semi-Secret Trusts’ (n 201) apparently classify 
secret trusts as express testamentary trusts. 
271 See, however Re Gardner (No 2) [1923] 2 Ch 230, Ch, which appears to indicate that some sort of beneficial 
interest may pass prior to the testator’s death. There are, however, inconsistencies in Romer J’s judgment 
(especially at 232-233), which is contrary to other authorities and appears to expressly contradict the earlier 
Court of Appeal judgment of Maddock (n 160). 
272See 2.3.1, above, for authorities regarding the requirements for communication and acceptance. 
273(n 94). 
274ibid 519. 
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prevented the devisor from imposing upon her an express trust'.276 Lord Westbury 
expressed similar views in McCormick, stating that equity 'imposes upon [B] a 
personal obligation, because he applies the Act as an instrument for accomplishing a 
fraud'.277 The same view was echoed in Re Spencer’s Will.278 Cotton LJ stated that 
in alleged secret trust cases: 
 
parol evidence is to be produced for the purpose of showing that there were 
circumstances which induced [A] to make this bequest, and which would 
enable the court to fasten upon [B] an obligation or trust… [and that] without 
creating an express declaration of trust... under the circumstances, implies an 
obligation of performing the wishes of A which A had relied upon their 
performing as a ground for giving the legacy.279  
 
Another illuminating judgment is that of Kay J in Re Boyes,280 who said that in cases 
of valid secret trusts, ‘the Court has compelled discovery and performance of the 
promise, treating it as a trust binding the conscience of [B], on the ground that 
otherwise a fraud would be committed'.281  Similarly, in Re Pitt-Rivers,282 Vaughan 
Williams LJ described the C’s interest as being ‘created by the giving by [B] of a 
promise which it would be unconscientious for [B] not to perform’283 (as opposed to 
being created by A's declaration of trust). In Blackwell, Lord Warrington described a 
secret trust in similar terms, as ‘arising from the acceptance by [B] of a trust, 
                                                          
276ibid 73. Note also that Stuart VC was paraphrasing the comments of Lord Eldon LC in Paine v Hall (n 84) 
475. 
277(n 66) 97. 
278(n 223). 
279ibid 521-522. 
280(n 130) 
281ibid 535. 
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communicated to him by A, on the faith of which acceptance the will was made or left 
unrevoked…’284  
 
In Blackwell, Viscount Sumner emphasised the similarities between secret trusts and 
resulting trusts, pointing out that it would be illogical for the court to refuse to give 
effect to a half-secret trust on the ground that it does not appear in the will but then 
to impose unquestioningly a resulting trust in favour of the estate '[as if] the will gives 
the fund to the legatee in trust for the residuary legatee, as if the document, signed 
and witnessed, had said so in words’.285 Neither resulting nor secret trusts appear in 
the will, but both are imposed when appropriate as a result of the 'exercise of general 
equitable jurisdiction'286 with which the legislature has never sought to interfere. 
Resulting trusts, which are routinely and uncontroversially imposed on legacies287 
are dehors the will in exactly the same way as secret trusts are.  This also goes a 
long way towards answering those who claim that a half-secret trust, because it is 
identified on the face of the will, must be an express trust.288 A half-secret trust is no 
more an express trust than is a resulting trust arising when property is bequeathed 
by will to a trustee to hold subject to a trust appearing in the will but whose objects 
are uncertain.  
 
Also of relevance is the almost total absence of references in the secret trusts cases 
to the normal requirements for express trusts, such as the three certainties. 
                                                          
284(n 42) 341. See also Falkiner (n 171) 95 (Tomlin J). 
285(n 42) 338. 
286ibid 339. 
287For example, in the case of a half-secret trust communicated after the execution of the will (e.g. Briggs v 
Penny (n 149)), or in a case where a party takes as a trustee but the objects or beneficial interests are uncertain 
(see Boyce v Boyce (1849) 16 Sim 476, 60 ER 959). 
288See especially Sheridan, ‘English and Irish Secret Trusts’ (n 46); Andrews, ‘Creating Secret Trusts’ (n 46); 
Glister and Lee, Modern Equity (n 44) 162. 
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Conversely, the requirements of intention, communication and acceptance have, as 
has been seen, been emphasised on many occasions. Moreover, there is a direct 
Court of Appeal authority that the three certainties do not need to be satisfied. In 
Russell v Jackson, Turner LJ stated that rather than being cases where all three 
certainties had to be proven (as alleged by the defendant),289secret trusts fell within 
‘that class of cases which says that, if there be fraud, it lies on the party who has 
been guilty of the fraud to sever the disposition which is affected by the fraud from 
that which is not affected by the fraud.’290 In light of the fact that it is often claimed 
that, if secret trusts are dehors the will, they are express inter vivos trusts, it is also 
notable that, in Re Tyler,291 secret trusts were expressly distinguished from ‘trust[s] 
created inter vivos’.292 Overall, in the face of so many authorities, it can scarcely be 
in doubt that secret trusts arise dehors the will. It is no less well-established that 
secret trusts are not express inter vivos trusts, but are trusts arising through 
operation of equity, imposed for the prevention of fraud. This explains why, despite 
assertions to the contrary,293 the Law of Property Act 1925, s53(1)(b) does not affect 
secret trusts. 
 
It will be recalled that in 2.2.3, above, it was argued that the authorities seem to 
suggest that category one parol agreement trusts have never been regarded as 
express or resulting trusts, but that, until the mid-twentieth century, they were never 
referred to judicially as constructive trusts. A similar trend can be observed in respect 
of secret trusts, albeit that the shift in nomenclature came later. In Kasperbauer, 
                                                          
289The reason being that, according to counsel for the defendant, it was unclear what proportion of the residue 
was to form the subject matter of the secret trust.  
290(n 99) 213 (Turner LJ). 
291[1967] 1 WLR 1269, Ch 
292ibid 1275 (Pennycuick J). 
293See, for example, McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 46); Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud’ (n 44). 
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Healey and De Bruyne, as well as in Paragon Finance v Thakerar,294 secret trusts 
were described as constructive trusts. It is also notable that, in both of the authorities 
in which inter vivos category two parol agreement trusts were enforced, they were 
held to be constructive trusts. These findings are consistent with the classification of 
the trust in Bannister, and also add weight to the previous suggestion that, prior to 
the twentieth century, if a trust was found to have arisen for the prevention of fraud, 
no further classification or justification were necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Summary 
The authorities overwhelmingly attribute the enforcement of category one and two 
parol agreement trusts to the prevention of fraud. B has never been permitted to rely 
on either s53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925 or s9 of the Wills Act 1925 as an 
engine of fraud.  Furthermore, there is little room for doubt that trusts within both of 
these categories are enforced in order to prevent the kind of fraud which would arise 
if B were permitted to renege on the parol agreement upon which A relied when 
devising his or her property or transferring it inter vivos. It is apparent from numerous 
authorities that, whether or not B had dishonest designs, and whether B might profit 
from any deviation from the parol agreement, are of no consequence whatsoever. It 
seems that, historically, category one and two parol agreement trusts were regarded 
not as express, resulting or constructive trusts, but as trusts arising out of equity’s 
                                                          
294[1999] 1 All ER 400, CA, 409 (Millett LJ). 
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jurisdiction to prevent fraud. What is opaque at this point, however, is the reason why 
category one and two parol agreement trusts began to be described as constructive 
trusts in the twenty-first century. 
 
As far as secret trusts are concerned, as well as confirming that the prevention of 
fraud is the underlying reason why all secret trusts are recognised, this chapter has 
shown that much of the confusion surrounding the dehors the will theory has 
stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the meanings of 'testamentary 
disposition' and 'will', as applied by the judiciary, and thus of s9. If the narrower 
meaning proposed here is accepted, all of the authorities cited here can be 
reconciled with one another. The fraud theory and the dehors the will theory are not 
mutually exclusive. Rather, are both necessary to explain why secret trusts are 
enforced. The trust which arises for the prevention of fraud is dehors the will and 
dehors the ambit of s9 of the Wills Act, just as in cases of inter vivos category two 
parol agreement trusts of land, equity imposes a constructive trust which is dehors 
the deed of conveyance, and dehors the ambit of s53(1)(b) of the Law of Property 
Act 1925. It can thus be seen that both inter vivos and post mortem category two 
parol agreements are theoretically indistinguishable, being enforced for the same 
reason and pursuant to the same legal mechanism.  
 
A final point to make is that the findings of this chapter strongly suggest that category 
one and two parol agreement trusts are also theoretically justifiable and explicable 
on exactly the same grounds. This raises the distinct possibility that all parol 
agreement trusts may be enforceable pursuant to a common doctrine. It is 
anticipated that the next chapter of this thesis, which is concerned with those parol 
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agreement trusts which arise when A is not a party to the parol agreement, will shed 
light on this issue, as well as on the other unanswered questions which remain at 
this point in the thesis 
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Chapter 3: Category Three Parol Agreement Trusts and ‘Hybrid’ Cases1 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter is concerned primarily with the line of cases epitomised by 
Rochefoucauld v Boustead,2 and Pallant v Morgan,3 i.e. those in which A transfers 
property to B subject to a parol agreement entered into between B and C pursuant to 
which B will hold some or all of the land for the benefit of C. Unlike the parol 
agreement trusts considered in the previous chapter, in none of the category three 
parol agreement trusts does A convey to B in reliance on the parol agreement. 
Usually, in fact, A is not a party to the parol agreement, and may not even be aware 
of its existence.  
Cases such as Rochefoucauld, in which the parol agreement relates to the entire 
beneficial interest in the property, are often treated separately from those in the 
Pallant line, in which the parol agreement relates only to part of the property. In both 
instances, A has transferred the land to B (usually, A has sold to B), and in both 
instances, prior to his acquisition of the land, B agreed with C that C would have an 
interest in the land. It is therefore arguably rather arbitrary to separate the two lines 
of cases purely according to the extent of the beneficial interest which C is promised. 
Accordingly, the cases in both lines are to be treated, for the purposes of this thesis, 
as category three parol agreement trusts. 
                                                          
1 This chapter contains material published in G Allan, ‘Ceylon Coffee, the Comtesse and the Consignee: A 
Historical Reappraisal of Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ (2015) 36 JLH 43; G Allan, ‘Once a Fraud, Forever a 
Fraud: the Time-Honoured Doctrine of Parol Agreement Trusts’ (2014) 34 LS 419; G Allan, ‘AM v SS: Fraud 
and Uncertainty’ [2015] 4 Conv 340. 
2 [1897] 1 Ch 196, CA. 
3 [1953] Ch 43, Ch 
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Category three parol agreement trusts pose certain theoretical difficulties, for in this 
class of cases, it may not be immediately obvious where any fraud lies. It cannot be 
said that the victim of the fraud is A, because in such cases s/he is not a party to the 
agreement, and cannot therefore be said to have been deceived into disposing of 
his/her property. On the other hand, C, who was a party to the parol agreement, did 
not have an interest in the property at the time of the parol agreement so cannot 
easily be considered to have been deprived of it if the parol agreement is not 
honoured. Modern explanations tend to centre around the idea that the trust will only 
be enforced if C has demonstrably relied to his/her detriment on the parol 
agreement,4 or because B has gained dishonestly as a result of his/her broken 
promise.5 Fraud is rarely cited as the underlying reason for equity’s intervention in 
these circumstances, especially in attempts to demonstrate that all cases within this 
class are united by common principles.6 
Prior to considering these issues, however, this chapter will seek to establish the 
extent to which Rochefoucauld truly belongs within this category of parol agreement 
trusts. This chapter will provide a full account and analysis of the facts and factual 
background of the Rochefoucauld through the use of all extant law reports,7 
                                                          
4 In K Gray and SF Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th edn, OUP, Oxford, 2008) 882, it is stated that there must be 
a ‘change of position or detrimental reliance… in order that a constructive trust should arise in English law’. See 
also S Gardner, ‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’, in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting Trusts 
(Hart, Oxford, 2009) 68 (Gardner explains the detriment as a ‘reliance loss’); N Hopkins, ‘The Pallant v 
Morgan Equity’ [2002] Conv 35; Y K Liew, ‘Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897)’, in P Mitchell & C Mitchell 
(eds), Landmark Cases in Equity (Hart, Oxford 2012). 
5See B McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts Arising on a Receipt of Property Sub Conditione’ (2004) LQR 667; 
Hopkins ‘The Pallant v. Morgan “Equity”’ (n 4). 
6For example, McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 5) 676; Gardner, ‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’ (n 4) 
68. 
7 In addition to the ICLR report, the following reports were used: (1896) 65 LJ Ch 794; (1896) 74 LT 783, Ch; 
[1896] All ER Rep Ext 1911, CA; (1896) 66 LJ Ch 74, CA. Also, ‘De La Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ The 
Times, 24 June 1896 (CA); ‘De La Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ The Standard, 28 April 1898 (CA) 3. The 
following reports concerning the Comtesse de la Rochefoucauld’s divorce from her first husband were also 
used: Cavendish v Cavendish and Rochefoucauld, The Times, 18 June 1866 (Ct for Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes); Cavendish v Cavendish and Rochefoucauld (1868) 19 TLR 497. Finally this report of the liquidation of 
John Boustead’s firm was utilised: Re Price, Boustead, and Co., The Times, 30 July 1879, (Ct of Bankruptcy). 
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contemporary newspaper reports and archive materials which have, other than in 
this thesis and the article based on this research, never before been cited in relation 
to any discussion of Rochefoucauld.8 This necessity arises because, despite 
Rochefoucauld’s status as a long-standing leading authority,9 there is no consensus 
regarding from whom the conveyance to B was executed, whether A was party to the 
parol agreement, exactly why B’s conduct amounted to a fraud in the eye of equity, 
and whether the trust that was imposed was express or constructive.10 It is not even 
accepted by all modern authorities that Rochefoucauld ought to be regarded, from a 
modern perspective, as a case involving fraud.11 It is thus submitted that the 
conclusions to the research question may only be reached by either supporting or 
rejecting the principles arising from such a central authority as Rochefoucauld, and 
neither is possible without full awareness of the facts of this extraordinary case 
There are several further aims of this chapter. As with the previous two chapters, the 
extent to which the prevention of fraud and the instrument of fraud principle are 
relevant to the enforcement of category three parol agreement trusts will be 
analysed, as will the degree to which the authorities provide clarification on the 
nature of fraud in equity. Furthermore, there is a small handful of cases which are 
evidently parol agreement trusts, but which cannot be placed squarely within any of 
                                                          
8 The Baring Archive, London holds many documents which have proven to be of great value. I would like to 
extend my gratitude to Ms Lara Webb of the Baring Archive for her unfailingly efficient, polite and helpful 
assistance, and for allowing me to utilise her extensive knowledge of the Archive for the benefit of my research. 
Furthermore, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam holds some documents that are of critical importance to establishing the 
facts of Rochefoucauld. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Mr Harmen Snel and Mr Goran Pravilovic, 
both of the Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, for their similarly invaluable assistance. 
9 For some recent examples of Rochefoucauld being cited, see Crossco No. 4 v Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1619, [2012] 2 All ER 754 [93] (Etherton LJ); De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 1519, 
[2010] 2 FLR 1240 [51] (Patten LJ); Samad v Thompson [2008] EWHC 2809 (Ch), [2008] NPC 125 [128] 
(Sales LJ); Singh v Anand [2007] EWHC 3346 (Ch) [44] (Norris J); Banner Homes Group Plc. v Luff 
Developments Ltd. [2000] Ch. 372, CA, 383 (Chadwick LJ). 
10 See below, 3.5.1. 
11 See, for example, McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 5) 676; Samad (n 9). 
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three categories of parol agreement. The extent to which these ‘hybrid’ cases 
illuminate the research questions of this thesis will also be examined in this chapter. 
Another significant aim of this chapter is to consider the proper classification of 
category three and hybrid parol agreement trusts. This discussion will assume 
particular pertinence in this chapter because, in Rochefoucauld, Lindley LJ described 
the trust as ‘clearly an express trust within the meaning of that expression as 
expressed in Soar v Ashwell.’12 This statement is noteworthy because 
Rochefoucauld is the only case which has been discovered for the purposes of this 
thesis in which a parol agreement trust was (seemingly) described by the court as an 
express trust. Particular attention will thus be paid to the Court of Appeal’s 
classification of the trust in Rochefoucauld and to the significance of the court’s 
reasoning to the modern law and the findings of this thesis. This analysis should also 
facilitate an assessment of whether the treatment in this thesis of cases in the 
Rochefoucauld and Pallant lines as theoretically indistinguishable is justified. 
3.2 Analysis of the Facts of Rochefoucauld v Boustead 
3.2.1 Why are the facts of Rochefoucauld unclear? 
Rochefoucauld is a superficially straightforward case. The defendant, Boustead, to 
whom certain estates had been conveyed by mortgagees in an absolute form but 
subject to a parol agreement that he would take as trustee, was held to have taken 
on trust for the Comtesse de la Rochefoucauld, who was the plaintiff. His defence 
that s7 of the Statute of Frauds 1677, which required that declarations of trusts of 
land be ‘manifested and proved by some Writing’, had not been complied with was 
                                                          
12 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 208 (Lindley LJ). 
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rejected on the ground that Boustead could not be permitted to use the statute as an 
instrument of fraud.13 Boustead’s other two main defences,14 namely that the 
considerable delay on the part of the Comtesse in commencing the action offended 
both the statutory limitation period of the day15 and the doctrine of laches16 were also 
unsuccessful. The former was rejected on the ground that the trust fell within the 
exception to the limitation period that applied to express trusts,17 and the latter 
because Boustead had, at one point, encouraged the Comtesse not to sue and 
because none of the Comtesse’s actions suggested abandonment of her claim.18 
There are several aspects of Rochefoucauld, however, that are not so 
straightforward. Firstly, the precise facts of the case are difficult to ascertain. The law 
reports do not make clear exactly why, by whom, or by which legal mechanism the 
estates were sold, nor is it obvious to what extent the Comtesse was a victim of 
circumstance or an active protagonist in securing the sale. A complicating factor is 
that Ceylon was, and still is, subject to Roman-Dutch law. 19 The Roman-Dutch rules 
relating to mortgages and sales by mortgagees in the nineteenth century were very 
different from those in common law jurisdictions.20 In view of these difficulties, it is 
perhaps not surprising that several different versions of the facts have been 
                                                          
13 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 206 (Lindley LJ). 
14 Boustead pleaded two other defences. His first defence, which was rejected outright, was a flat denial that he 
had agreed to take as a trustee. He also argued that any beneficial interest that the Comtesse may have possessed 
did not survive his bankruptcy. This defence was rejected on the ground that s49 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 
did not prohibit claims by beneficiaries against the bankrupt’s estate (ibid 209 (Lindley LJ)). Additionally, he 
argued that the Statute did not apply in Ceylon, to which the Court of Appeal’s response was essentially that as 
the action was being brought in an English court, then the English law applied (ibid 206 (Lindley LJ)). 
15 See below, 3.5.1.1 for a brief explanation of the manner in which the limitation period operated in the 
nineteenth century. 
16 The doctrine based on the maxim that delay defeats equity. 
17 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 208-209 (Lindley LJ). 
18 ibid 211 (Lindley LJ.) 
19 See R W Lee, ‘The Fate of the Roman-Dutch Law in the British Colonies' (1906) 7 Journal of the Society of 
Comparative Legislation 357 359. It was assumed in Liew, ‘Rochefocuauld v Boustead’ (n 4), in P Mitchell & C 
Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in Equity (Hart, Oxford 2012) that the mortgage was an English-style 
mortgage. 
20 See below, 3.2.2.2. Liew, ‘Rochefocuauld v Boustead’ (n 4) mistakenly presumed that the mortgage was akin 
to an English mortgage. 
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propagated.21 The conveyance has been variously described as amounting 
essentially to an assignment from the Comtesse to Boustead subject to the parol 
trust in her favour,22 as an assignment executed by the mortgagee in reliance on the 
parol agreement between the Comtesse and Boustead, 23 as an assignment to 
Boustead subject to, but executed by the mortgagee independently of, the parol 
agreement, 24 as an assignment by the mortgagee pursuant to a power of sale,25 and 
as an assignment to Boustead subject to a parol agency agreement made between 
Boustead and the Comtesse.26 
Much of this uncertainty can be attributed to the fact that that the ICLR report of 
Rochefoucauld27 does not seem to explain all relevant circumstances with a 
sufficient degree of precision for a full account of the facts of the case to be gleaned. 
Furthermore, many issues which would likely have been widely-known at the time of 
the judgment, such as, for example, the manner in which land in the colonies was 
customarily mortgaged and subsequently dealt with, have since been obscured by 
the passage of time.  
Whilst the research for this section of the thesis was being conducted, it became 
increasingly apparent that the facts of Rochefoucauld are far more complex than has 
previously been appreciated. Therefore, a very detailed narrative and analysis is 
                                                          
21 The conveyance has been described as amounting essentially to an assignment from the Comtesse to Boustead 
subject to the parol trust in her favour (see Philip H. Pettit, Equity & The Law of Trusts (10th edn, OUP, Oxford, 
2006) 96; J D Feltham, ‘Informal Trusts and Third Parties’ [1987] Conv 246, 247), and as an assignment 
executed by the mortgagee in reliance on the parol agreement between the Comtesse and Boustead (see Gardner, 
‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’ (n 4) 68); McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 5) 274-675. It has also been 
described as an assignment to Boustead subject to, but executed by the mortgagee independently of, the parol 
agreement (see T G Youdan, ‘Formalities for Trusts of Land, and the Doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead’, 
(1984) 43 CLR 306, 328-329). 
22Pettit, Equity & The Law of Trusts (n 21); Feltham, ‘Informal Trusts’ (n 21). 
23 Gardner, ‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’ (n 4) 674-675. 
24 Youdan, ‘Formalities’ (n 21) 328-329. 
25 Liew, ‘Rochefocuauld v Boustead (n 4). 
26 Adaicappa Chetty v Asaicappa Chetty (1921) 2 22 NLR 417 (PC). 
27 Rochefoucauld (n 2). 
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presented here. It is submitted that such an approach is justifiable on the grounds 
that Rochefoucauld represents perhaps the most important of all of the authorities 
covered in this thesis, and has a unique position as the only authority covered here 
which is so opaque in terms of its facts and judgment. Rochefoucauld is, as will be 
seen, an exceptional case which warrants exceptional treatment. 
3.2.2 The factual background to Rochefoucauld 
  
3.2.2.1 The Comtesse de la Rochefoucauld’s family background and divorce 
The estates which were eventually sold to Boustead were Ceylonese coffee 
plantations which were known as the Delmar Estates (hereafter, the ‘Estates’). They 
were originally owned by the plaintiff’s uncle (and adoptive father), the Baron de 
Delmar. The Baron had mortgaged the Estates to Barings in 1857. When, in 1861, 
the plaintiff inherited the Estates, they were still encumbered by the mortgage. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff (not yet a Comtesse) had married a George Cavendish in 
1848.28 It should here be noted that, in the nineteenth century, Ceylon operated a 
system of registration of title deeds.29 The plaintiff was registered owner of the 
Estates, for she had inherited them in her own right, independently of her husband.30 
In 1865, Cavendish filed for divorce, pursuant to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, 
s45, on the ground of the plaintiff’s ‘adultery with Count Gaston de la 
                                                          
28 Times (London, 18 October 1848), 7. 
29 See generally E J Taylor, ‘Registration of Title Deeds Under Roman-Dutch Law’ (1886) 2 LQR 347. 
30 See the will of the Baroness de Delmar, Baring Archive, HC6.3.22.3, 1859. Under Roman-Dutch law, 
however, it was possible for a woman to retain ownership of, and control over, her property after marriage. See 
R W Lee, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (1st edn, OUP, Oxford, 1914) 91. It is apparent from a deed 
which transferred the mortgage from Barings to another mortgagee (Baring Archive, HC6.3.7, 1864) that the 
Comtesse had the power to deal with the estates unfettered by her husband. 
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Rochefoucauld’,31 whom she had met in 1857.32 A decree absolute was granted in 
December 1867.33 The plaintiff married the Count on 20 August 1870,34 as a result 
of which she became Comtesse de la Rochefoucauld.  
Cavendish then petitioned the court to apply some or all of the property of the 
marriage settlement for the benefit of himself and their children. The court went 
further than this; on July 31 1868, the Judge Ordinary ordered ‘certain property in 
Ceylon [the Estates] and in [a] Dutch company brought into the settlement by the 
respondent to be assigned by her to two trustees’.35 It seems that the Comtesse did 
not take kindly to the 1868 decree. Fortunately for her, she had numerous influential 
friends in France, the most notable of whom was the Emperor of France, Napoleon 
III.36According to one report, ‘[o]n the Continent strong views were taken of the 
injustice of that judgment and Mrs. Cavendish [i.e., the Comtesse] was not only 
created Baroness Delmar in her own right, but steps were taken to put the estates 
outside the reach of the Divorce Court.’37  
Prior to analysing these ‘steps’, the nature of both the mortgage and the mortgagee 
to which it was assigned will be considered. 
                                                          
31 Cavendish v Cavendish and Rochefoucauld, The Times, 18 June 1866, 11.  
32 ibid.  
33 According to Cavendish v Cavendish and Rochefoucauld (1868) 19 TLR 497. 
34 <http://www.thepeerage.com/p56333.htm>accessed 25 July 2014. 
35 Cavendish (n 33) 497. The ‘Dutch Company’ mentioned may have been the Société Genéralé de Commerce 
et d’Industrie of Amsterdam (discussed below at 3.2.2.3). Although the Comtesse is not listed as a shareholder 
in the records of the Société (which are held by the Stadsarcheif, Amsterdam), she may have owned shares 
through a nominee, or possessed some other type of interest. Probably, the extent of any interest that she may 
have possessed in the Société is now impossible to ascertain. 
36 See H Rumbold, Recollections of a Diplomatist, Vol 1 (Edward Arnold, London 1903) 90-91. Note that the 
Comtesse’s original surname was ‘Rumbold’. The author of Recollections was her brother. 
37 De La Rochefoucauld v Boustead, Standard  (London, 28 April 1898) 3, CA. 
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3.2.2.2 The mortgage: its nature and assignment 
The Estates were mortgaged on 26 June 1857 in Ceylon for a sum of £50,000. The 
mortgage agreement, which describes the security as a ‘mortgage and 
hypothecation’, entitled Barings to manage the Estates, and assigned all produce of 
the Estates arising until 30 June 1863 to Barings, to be used in repayment of the 
interest and capital. It was agreed that this and any further outstanding sums would 
be repaid by 30 June 1863. 38 
The contemporary nature of Roman-Dutch mortgages was explained by Thomson: 
In the law of Ceylon, the English mortgage, which conveys the legal estate to 
the mortgagee, does not exist, but is replaced by a simple deed of 
hypothecation, which has the effect of tacking the debt to the property, so that 
a creditor obtains a right to follow it through whatever hands it may happen to 
pass, and may obtain a decree for its attachment and sale in satisfaction and 
discharge of the debt; so that by a very simple deed the Ceylon mortgage 
obtains all the advantages of the English mortgage, but with one exception, 
that the Ceylon mortgage, in general, gives to the mortgagee no power of sale 
on failure of interest or redemption ; but he must foreclose in court.39 
 
Thomson was almost certainly not using the term ‘foreclose’ in the technical sense; 
i.e. the cancellation of the mortgagor’s equity of redemption. Rather, this was a 
                                                          
38 A signed and sealed copy of the original 1857 mortgage deed is currently in the possession of the Baring 
Archive (Baring Archive, HC6.3.7, 1857). 
39 H W Byerley Thomson, Institutes of the Laws of Ceylon, Vol 1(1st edn, Trubner & Co, London, 1866) x. Note 
that Liew, ‘Rochefocuauld v Boustead (n 4) assumes that the mortgage was governed by principles of English 
law. 
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reference to the mortgagee’s power to obtain a court-sanctioned sale of the 
mortgaged land. Elsewhere, Thomson refers to the only purpose of a ‘foreclosure 
suit’ being to obtain a ‘sale in execution’ of mortgaged land,40 and also explains in 
detail the procedure for obtaining a sale in execution.41 In England, the most 
common mortgagee’s remedy at the time was ‘a bill for a foreclosure’.42 The Court of 
Chancery Procedure Act 1852 gave the Court of Chancery a general power to order 
a sale in response to a foreclosure suit.43 Perhaps, therefore, in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, it was customary to refer to any suit which could result in a 
judicial sale as a foreclosure suit. In 1915, Lee commented that, under Roman-Dutch 
law, ‘[f[oreclosure is unknown, and sale cannot be effected except with the consent 
of the debtor. The proper and only mode of realizing a mortgage is by obtaining a 
judgment of the court upon the mortgage debt and taking out a writ of execution 
against the property.’44 Lee’s comments appear irreconcilable with those of Thomson 
unless, as seems likely, Thomson was using the term ‘foreclose’ in the non-technical 
sense described above, whilst Lee was referring to technical foreclosures. The term 
‘foreclose’ is also used in reference to the sale of the Estates in Rochefoucauld45and 
in the correspondence of the interested parties,46 presumably also in this informal 
sense, for it was known to the Court of Appeal and the parties concerned that the 
Estates had been sold, and that no technical foreclosure had taken place. 
Differences in nomenclature aside, both Thomson and Lee concurred that the 
normal way of enforcing a mortgage in Roman-Dutch jurisdictions was to obtain a 
                                                          
40 ibid, 256. 
41 ibid, 349-355. 
42 J W Smith, A Manual of Equity Jurisprudence (5th edn, Stevens & Norton, London 1856 252-253. 
43 ibid., 253-254. 
44 Lee, An Introduction (n 30) 180-181. 
45 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 97. 
46 The attorneys of the Société in Ceylon, Robertsons, wrote to the Société on 22 July 1871 to explain that ‘the 
foreclosure of your mortgage is being proceeded with’ (Stadsarcheif, Amsterdam, inventory number 20 of 
archive 650, 1871).  
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judicial sale. The wording of the 1857 mortgage agreement, which makes no 
mention of any power of sale, nor of any conferment of legal title upon Barings, and 
the location in which the agreement was executed, both show that the mortgage was 
a Ceylonese mortgage subject to Roman-Dutch law. In 1863, the debt and mortgage 
were assigned by Barings to the Société Genéralé de Commerce et d’Industrie of 
Amsterdam (hereafter referred to as ‘the Société’) in consideration of £12,000.47 
Furthermore, the Comtesse granted to J.M. Robertson & Co. a power of attorney 
which empowered the Robertsons to take the produce of the Estates, and to sell the 
Estates, in furtherance of repayment of the debt.48  
3.2.2.3 The Société and its liquidation 
Little information about the Société can be gleaned from the law reports of 
Rochefoucauld, other than that the Société was in liquidation by 1871, and that the 
liquidators were apparently keen to call in the security. The Dutch name of the 
Société was the Algemeene Maatschappij voor Handel en Nijverheid NV. Extensive 
records concerning the Société  and its affairs are held in the Stadsarcheif 
Amsterdam.49 It was a bank founded in 186350 with the aim of promoting industrial 
development.51 Its majority shareholder from the outset was a French bank called 
Crédit Mobilier.52 The Société was not a success; it was embroiled in financial 
                                                          
47 See Baring Archive, HC6.3.7, 1864. 
48Robertsons had initially acted as agents in Ceylon of Barings (see Baring Archive, HC6.3.7, 1864), and 
continued to act in that capacity for the Société (see Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1871). 
49 For details relating to the Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, see n 8, above. 
50 The 1863 instrument transferring the debt and mortgage to the Société explains that the Société was known in 
the Netherlands as the Algemeene Maatschappij vor  Nijverheid en Handel [sic.]. The prospectus of the 
company (Stadsarcheif Amsterdam 650/4, 1863) makes it clear that the Société Genéralé de Commerce et 
d’Industrie of Amsterdam was also known as the Algemeene Maatschappij voor Handel en Nijverheid.  
51 M Wintle An Economic and Social History of the Netherlands 1800-1920 Demographic, Economic and Social 
Transition (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000) 105. 
52 Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/4, 1863. 
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scandals almost immediately,53 and, by 1864, it was already hopelessly insolvent. 54 
According to one source, part of the reason for the difficulties encountered by the 
Société was a ‘reckless policy… [of] over-investing in foreign securities’.55 It is 
distinctly possible that the Société’s purchase of the mortgage of the Estates was a 
result of these over-enthusiastic spending habits, especially as, from 1865, it was 
decided that the Société was to focus its operations on its affairs in the Dutch East 
Indies.56. In any event, in 1868, the Société’s president, Antide Martin, and its 
‘Secrétaire de la Direction’, Frans Müller, were appointed as its liquidators. 57 
Notably, Müller was a director of the Rotterdamsche Bank, which was active in the 
Dutch East Indies, from 1869 to 1882,58 also serving as its president 
The duration of the liquidation is difficult to ascertain for certain. The Société 
certainly failed eventually, and was wound up, although sources are not consistent 
as to precisely when this occurred.59  In fact, it seems that the Société came out of 
liquidation some time between 18 August 1872 and 15 October 1872,60 and it 
certainly produced ledger entries and current account records until 1878,61 although 
the scarcity of records from that period in the archive would suggest that its activities 
                                                          
53 Report to the Société’s annual general meeting of shareholders, 29 March, 1864, Stadsarcheiif Amsterdam, 
650/4, 1864. 
54 ibid. 
55 M Pohl and S Freitag, Handbook on the History of European Banks (European Association for Banking 
History, Aldershot 1994) 722. 
56 Report to the Société’s annual general meeting of shareholders, 29 March, 1864, Stadsarcheiif Amsterdam, 
650/4, 1864. 
57 Report of the resolutions of the Société’s annual general meeting of shareholders, 25 March 1868 
(Stadsarcheiif Amsterdam, 650/4, 1868). 
58 Nederlands Nationaal Archeif 2.18.33, PDF available at 
<http://www.gahetna.nl/en/collectie/archief/ead/index/eadid/2.18.33/anchor/descgrp-appendices-
odd/zoekterm/Leichlingen/aantal/20/open/descgrp-appendices-odd#descgrp-appendices-odd> accessed 10 June 
2014. 
59 According to R Narula and R van Hoesel (eds) Multinational Enterprises from the Netherlands (Routledge, 
London, 1999) 48, n 32, the Société was liquidated in 1864/67. According to Pohl and Freitag, European Banks 
(n 55) 722, the Société was wound up in 1868. 
60 Photocopies of 35 letters concerning the Delmar Estates sent  from J.M Robertson & Co to the directors of the 
Société between 13th May 1871 and 21 Feb. 1873 have been obtained from the Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20. 
The last letter addressed to the Société ‘in liquidation’ was sent on 18 Aug. 1872. All letters sent from 15 Oct 
1872 omit ‘in liquidation’ from the Société’s name. 
61 Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/26 and 650/27. 
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were much reduced after the commencement of the liquidation. Narula and van 
Hosel report that after the Société failed, one of its subsidiaries, the Nederlandsch-
Indische Spoorweg Maatschaapij ‘was carried on by private individuals’.62 Similarly, 
Pohl and Freitag report that ‘a few subsidiaries survived [the Société’s demise], such 
as the Netherlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, which, amongst other things, as a 
colonial agricultural bank, concentrated on the banking opportunities in the 
Netherlands Indies’.63 It therefore seems likely that the Société’s operations in 
Ceylon continued for several years after it entered liquidation, and that its activities in 
that part of the world were ultimately carried on by one or more of its subsidiaries or, 
indeed, by the Rotterdamsche Bank, with which the Société became very closely 
linked through Müller. 
3.2.3 The Sale of the Estates 
The law reports give relatively little information regarding precisely how and why the 
sale of the Estates came about. It is variously stated that they were sold ‘under a 
power of sale’,64 by the ‘liquidators’ of the company,65 by ‘the mortgagees’,66 and 
also that they were sold, but without reference to the identity of the seller.67 It is also 
stated that the Comtesse entered the parol agreement whereby Boustead would 
purchase the Estates as trustee for her because the Dutch company wished to call in 
the mortgage, and ‘[she was] not… in a position to find the money’.68 One of the 
reports also hints at some conspiracy, stating that ‘it was a great object of the plaintiff 
and her friends to prevent Mr Cavendish from deriving any benefit from these 
                                                          
62 Narula and van Hoesel Multinational Enterprises (n 59) 48, n32. 
63 Pohl and Freitag, European Banks (n 55) 722. 
64 Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1896) 74 LT 783, Ch, 783. 
65 ibid. 
66 Rochefoucauld (n 2) (196). 
67 Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1896] All ER Rep Ext 1911, CA, 914 (Lindley LJ). 
68 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 196. 
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estates’.69 From various sources, it has been possible to piece together a detailed 
account of the circumstances preceding and surrounding the sale of the Estates and 
the purchase thereof by Boustead.  
3.2.3.1 The facts leading to the sale 
On 9 November 1866, a solicitor named Hodgson, acting for Cavendish, wrote from 
London to Robertsons in Ceylon explaining that his client had presented a petition to 
the Divorce Court, warning that the court possessed a statutory power, ‘upon 
Divorce being pronounced for adultery of the wife, to settle her fortune as it may 
think reasonable for the benefit of the innocent party, and the children’.70 Hodgson 
commented that although the Comtesse had refused to acknowledge service of an 
official copy of the petition, such a copy had been served upon the Société. He 
provided reassurance that the Société’s rights as mortgagees would not be 
compromised by any order of the Divorce Court, but threatened that ‘no payment 
made by the Society to Mrs Cavendish in opposition to the order of the Court here 
would be recognised in any manner’.71 Hodgson also reminded Robertsons that ‘by 
the ordinance of your Government dated 23 December 1844 there will be no difficulty 
in carrying out the settlement whatever that may be.’72 The tenor of this letter 
suggests that Cavendish expected that the Divorce Court’s decree would be carried 
into effect irrespective of the several jurisdictions involved.  
Despite Hodgson’s letter, the Estates were never transferred to the English trustees 
in accordance with the 1868 decree. There is a wealth of correspondence from as 
                                                          
69 Rochefoucauld (n 67) 1914 (Lindley LJ). 
70 Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/17, 1866. The statutory provision to which Hodgson was referring was the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, s45.  
71 ibid. 
72 ibid. 
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early as August 1870, which indicates that, soon after the 1868 decree, the Société 
became extremely keen to realise its security73 by causing the Estates to be sold.74 
Furthermore, some time before 23 February 1871, the Comtesse revoked the power 
of attorney that had been granted to Robertsons in December 1863.75 Accordingly, 
Robertsons informed Müller that it would now act in the exclusive interests of the 
Société.76 
At around this time, the Comtesse began negotiations with a view to obtaining 
control over the Estates. These negotiations culminated in a written agreement of 1 
July 1871 between the Société on the one hand and two gentlemen by the names of 
Duff and Boustead on the other hand. 77 Duff was a friend of the Comtesse.78 Either 
Duff or the Comtesse’s agent in Ceylon, a Mr Sabonadière,79 brought the defendant, 
Boustead, with whom Sabonadière had had past business dealings, into the scheme 
on account of his experience as a manager and consignee of coffee estates.80  The 
agreement provided that the liquidators would sell the estates by auction.81 If there 
was no tender that bettered that of Duff and Boustead, the estates were to be sold to 
them for an amount sufficient to discharge the mortgage. There was no mention of 
any beneficial interest being vested in the Comtesse, even though she had reached 
an understanding with Boustead and Duff, probably through their agents in Ceylon, 
                                                          
73 The earliest references are from 7 and 28 Aug. 1870 (Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1870). 
74 The first specific reference to a sale in the available documentation appears in Robertson’s account, in a letter 
sent to the Société dated 13 May 1871 (Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1871), of a telegram sent by Müller to 
Robertsons whereby Müller had enquired urgently as to whether the sale of the Estates had been fixed. 
75 This information is contained in a telegram sent by Müller to the Société on 23 Feb 1871 (Stadsarcheif 
Amsterdam, 650/20, 1871). 
76 ibid. 
77 Rochefoucauld (n 67) 915 (Lindley LJ). 
78 ibid 1914 (Lindley LJ). Attempts to obtain further information about Duff have been fruitless. 
79 See Rochefoucauld (n 2) 209 (Lindley LJ). 
80 Rochefoucauld (n 67) 1914 (Lindley LJ). Boustead’s firm, Price, Boustead and Co. managed coffee 
plantations in Ceylon from London through the use of agents (see In Re Price (n 7) 4). 
81 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 198.  
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that they were to take as trustees for her, subject to a charge for repayment of their 
advances and expenses.82  
Prior to the agreement of July 1871, Duff and Boustead had planned to take an 
assignment of the mortgage from the Société. It was reported that Duff had objected 
to some of the details pertaining to the mortgage transfer, which is why it was agreed 
that he and Boustead would instead purchase the Estates from the Société.83 In fact, 
the Société had commenced legal action in Ceylon against the Comtesse, 84 the 
Comte85 and Cavendish, seeking a judicial sale of the Estates.86 Cavendish was a 
defendant seemingly on account of his claim to an interest in the Estates as 
annuitant under the Baroness’s will, rather than upon the 1868 decree.87 The first 
reference to the suit in the correspondence that has been obtained for the purposes 
of this part of the thesis appears in the letter from Robertsons of 13 May 1871.88  
The Société’s action to secure a judicial sale suggests that the agreement of July 
1871 was of little legal significance. This is because, once a sale of immovable 
property had been ordered by the District Court, the ‘fiscal’89 responsible for carrying 
into effect the court’s judgment was required by law to advertise details of the 
impending sale ‘in the Government Gazette, and in any other Ceylon newspaper’.90 
                                                          
82 Rochefoucauld (n 67) 1915 (Lindley LJ). 
83 ibid 1914 (Lindley LJ). 
84 Several of the letters from Robertsons to the Société refer to the suit being against the Comtesse. These 
include letters dated 18 Aug  1871, 27 Oct 1871 (Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1871) and 7 Feb 1872 
(Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1872).  
85 The Comte was made a defendant merely because he was the Comtesse’s husband at the time. This is made 
clear in a letter from Robertsons to the Société, dated 30 Oct 1872, (Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1872). 
86 This shows that the Comtesse did not voluntarily surrender her equity of redemption in favour of Boustead, as 
was suggested by Liew, ‘Rochefocuauld v Boustead (n 4). 
87 Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 30 Oct 1872, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1872.  
88 Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1871. 
89 The fiscals were (and are) officers of the courts in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) with responsibility, inter alia, for 
conducting sales in execution of immoveable property (Civil Procedure Code, 236-250). 
90 Thomson, Laws of Ceylon (n 39) 350. 
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Furthermore, ‘a sale in execution [was] an assignment by operation of law’,91 
conducted by the fiscal, who was responsible for conveying the land to the eventual 
purchaser.92 Therefore, any sale arising out of the Société’s suit in Ceylon would be 
conducted not by the Société on its terms, but by the fiscal who would sell to the 
highest bidder after public advertisement of the sale. 
By 12 February 1872, Robertsons, on behalf of the Société, had been granted 
sequestration of the Estates pending the final hearing.93 It should be noted that, 
although Robertsons regarded it as a formality,94 sequestration was not part of the 
usual procedure in a suit for a sale in execution. According to Thomson, 
sequestration would only be ordered if the court was persuaded that ‘the defendant 
[was] fraudulently alienating his property to avoid payment of the debt’.95 The 
sequestration, therefore, appears to be a sign that relations between the Comtesse 
and the Société had deteriorated. This is corroborated by suggestions by Robertsons 
that the Comtesse had caused delays in the litigation by refusing to admit accounts 
of sales of produce that had been produced on the Estates.96 
Interestingly, letters sent by Robertsons to the Société in April 1872 state that 
Cavendish was to be unrepresented in the Ceylon suit, and that, as against him, the 
case would be heard ‘ex parte’.97 It seems odd that Cavendish all but abandoned his 
pursuit of the Estates; earlier correspondence suggests that he was intent upon 
securing them for himself, and that he regarded them as ‘my own 
                                                          
91 ibid., 354. 
92 ibid., 353. This shows that the Société never obtained legal title to the Estates (c.f. Liew, ‘Rochefocuauld v 
Boustead (n 4). 
93 Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 12 Feb 1872, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1872.  
94 ibid. 
95 Thomson, Laws of Ceylon (n 39) 378. 
96 Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 12  Feb 1872, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1872. 
97 ibid. 
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property [underlining in original].’98 Despite his posturing, it seems that Cavendish 
lacked the funds to redeem the mortgage himself. On 15 January 1872, he wrote to 
Barings, requesting that they take an assignment of the mortgage from the Société in 
order to allay his fear that ‘the Estates will be irrecoverably lost to myself and my 
family’.99 The threat, he wrote, derived from the fact that the Société was ‘now 
foreclosing their mortgage’ as it was ‘anxious to wind up their affairs’.100 He also 
assured Barings that, should they take the mortgage, they would ‘only have to deal 
with the Trustees appointed by the Court of Chancery, by which you will perceive 
that you will have no dealings whatsoever with my former wife’.101 All evidence 
suggests Barings did not accede to his request, and his assumptions about the 
minimal potential for the future involvement of his ‘former wife’ seem to have been 
wishful thinking. 
3.2.3.2 The Ceylon trial and the sale of the Estates 
The Société’s Ceylon suit was heard in the District Court on 4 October 1872. 
Robertsons provided the Société with a detailed account of the trial.102 On the day of 
the hearing, The Comtesse and Comte ‘filed an admission of the debt’. The judge 
gave judgment against them and ordered that the Estates be sold. Owing to some 
technical details, judgment against Cavendish was reserved. Three months’ notice of 
the impending sale was given, longer than would usually be afforded, so that 
                                                          
98 Letter from Cavendish to the Société, 12 Feb 1872. See also letters from Cavendish dated 18 Oct and 11 Nov 
1871 (Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1872).  
99 Baring Archive, HC6.3.22.13, 1872. In a letter to the Société dated 11 Nov 1871, Cavendish had indicated 
that he was planning to ‘make enquiries from London Firms if they will pay [the debt owed to the Société] off’ 
(Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1871). 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid. Presumably, Cavendish was referring to the trustees of his marriage settlement. 
102 This account appears in a letter from Robertsons to the Société, 30 Oct 1872, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 
650/20, 1873. 
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Cavendish and another claimant103 could claim any interests that they possessed. 
The District Court’s decision in respect of the alleged annuities is unknown. As 
Robertsons did not report any details of any such judgment to the Société, it seems 
likely that either these claims were abandoned or that there was some sort of 
settlement reached. 
The Estates were sold on 18 and 19 February 1873. Again, a detailed account of the 
auctions was provided to the Société by Robertsons. 104 The actions were advertised 
and public,105 and were conducted by ‘the fiscals… under the authority of the 
court.’106 The sales were thus conducted in line with Thomson’s account of the 
process of sales in execution.107 On the date of the auctions, Robertsons took the 
debt to stand at £56,200108. The Société was interested in purchasing the Estates at 
the auction; 109 Robertsons was authorised by the Société to bid up to £56,200. 
Although the auctions were well-attended,110 Robertsons reported a paucity of 
bidders,111 attributing this to uncertainty surrounding the nature of Cavendish’s claim 
and rumours, which Robertsons regarded as unfounded,112 that the children of the 
Comtesse and Cavendish were planning to claim as beneficiaries of ‘an alleged 
                                                          
103 This other claim, by Mrs Arabin, a sister of Baroness Delmar (see Rumbold, Recollections (n 36) 139), of an 
annuity under the Baroness’s will, seems to have come to nothing. 
104 This account appears in a letter from Robertsons to the Société, 20 Feb 1873, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 
650/20, 1873.  
105 ibid. 
106 Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 13 Nov 1872, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1872.  
107 See above, 3.2.2.2. 
108 £53,700 plus £2,500 that Robertsons thought may have been claimable by Mrs Arabin owing to her annuity. 
This is explained in a letter from Robertsons to the Société, 20 Feb 1873, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 
1873. 
109 Note that, according to Thomson, Laws of Ceylon (n 39) 354, ‘[i]f the party who issued execution purchases 
any of the property, the amount is allowed in reduction of his claim ; and if it exceed his claim, he only pays the 
residue…’ Therefore, it would seem that the Société’s desire to purchase the Estates was not unusual. 
110 Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 20 Feb 1873, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1873. 
111 ibid. Each of the individual estates which together comprised the Estates were auctioned in individual lots. 
112 ibid. C.f. Liew ‘Rochefocuauld v Boustead’ (n 4), who suggests that the Estates would likely have sold in an 
open market for a great deal more than the sum which Boustead paid for them. 
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settlement’.113 Although Robertsons had valued the Estates at £70,000,114 they were 
all sold for £57,942 to Sabonadière, who purchased as agent of Boustead. There 
was considerable competition for just one of the Estates, the Delmar Estate,115 which 
was sold to Boustead for £13,700, even though Robertsons had valued it at 
£8,200.116  
At some point prior to the purchase, Duff had pulled out due to ill health and 
Boustead, wishing ‘to become the representative of the plaintiff Comtesse in England 
and the consignee of the produce of her estates’,117 had agreed that he would 
proceed alone. The Court of Appeal, being satisfied that Boustead had taken the 
Estates on the understanding that he was trustee for the Comtesse, did not deem it 
necessary to decide whether there was any written evidence signed by Boustead 
sufficient to satisfy s7, but Lindley LJ seems to have considered it likely that there 
was.118 He was probably correct. There was no obvious advantage to avoiding 
writing altogether; so long as there was no mention of the trust in the deeds that 
were registered,119 Cavendish could not have discovered the Comtesse’s beneficial 
interest. 
A final point to note is that Sabonadière informed Robertsons that Boustead had 
purchased the Estates for the Comtesse.120 This information may not have been 
considered by Robertsons or the Société as overly significant, for a telegram was 
                                                          
113 ibid. 
114 Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 24 Dec 1872, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1872. 
115 Note that this was one of the estates collectively referred to as the ‘Delmar Estates’. Others included Delta, 
Alwick, Kudnoya, Maguhapittia and Pahalateme (Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 20 Feb 1873, 
Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1873.). 
116 Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 20 Feb 1873, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1873. 
117 Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1896) 66 LJ Ch 74, 77. 
118 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 206. 
119 Notably, the standard wording for deeds of conveyance in Ceylon contained no provision for declarations of 
trust- see Taylor, ‘Registration of Title Deeds’ (n 29) 352. 
120 Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 19 Feb 1873, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1873. 
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sent by Robertsons to Müller on 19 February detailing the price for which each 
estate had been sold, and assuring him that the debt had been discharged,121 but 
the true identity of the Comtesse as purchaser was only reported to the Société by 
letter. Furthermore, the wording used by Robertsons to impart this information to the 
Société suggests that it was not known to Robertsons or the Société until the time of 
the auction. In the letter of 20 February 1873, Robertsons wrote that the Estates had 
been ‘bought for £31.100 by Mr J. R. Sabonadiere [sic] nominally for Mr. John 
Boustead but really (so Mr J.R. Sabonadiere informs us), for Mrs. Cavendish.’ 122 
3.2.3.3 Analysis of the facts surrounding the sale 
The archive materials have provided much significant information. References in the 
law reports to the mechanism of the sale are at worst inaccurate, and at best 
insufficiently specific. The sale was a sale in execution, and the Estates were sold 
and conveyed by the fiscals under the authority of the Ceylon court. 
The reason why the Estates were sold cannot be ascertained with certainty. There is 
much evidence suggesting that the sale represented a genuine attempt by the 
Société to realise its security. The general tenor and contents of the letters from 
Robertsons indicate strongly that the Société was much concerned with realising the 
security. There are numerous mentions of valuations, accounts and potential trial 
dates, but nothing is said of any arrangements with the Comtesse, and Boustead is 
not mentioned until after the auctions. Furthermore, the communications by telegram 
with Müller and Martin are all concerned with when the security might be realised 
                                                          
121 ibid. In this letter, Robertsons transcribed the contents of the telegram in question. 
122 Letter from Robertsons to the Société, 20 Feb 1873, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1873. Similar wording 
was used in the letter of 19 Feb 1873: ‘Mr Sabadoniere gave the name of John Boustead of London as the 
purchaser. He has intimated to us that the Estates are to be taken for the ultimate benefit of Mrs. Cavendish and 
her family’.  
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and for what value, suggesting, at the very least, indifference as to the Comtesse’s 
interests. It is also relevant that there were apparently hostile acts by the Comtesse 
towards the Société and vice versa. The most obvious interpretations of the 
Comtesse’s revocation of the 1863 power of attorney, the suit against the Comtesse, 
and the sequestration are that they are indicative of relations between the parties 
having deteriorated. Also, the Société’s authorisation of Robertsons to bid for the 
Estates calls into question the extent to which the Société was concerned whether 
the Comtesse obtained them. Finally, if the sale of the Estates was arranged by the 
Comtesse with the Société in order to throw Cavendish off the scent, this was a very 
risky strategy. Owing to the extent to which sales in execution were regulated, there 
is little that the Comtesse and the Société could have done to have ensured that 
Boustead was the successful bidder at the auction.  
This evidence notwithstanding, the possibility that the Comtesse, perhaps through 
her influential friends on the Continent, engineered the sale, or at least the transfer of 
the mortgage from Barings, cannot be ruled out. She may, for example, have had 
some means by which she could influence the Société’s French holding company, 
and she could have induced the Société to take the mortgage from Barings in 
anticipation of her divorce, although significantly, Cavendish seems to have 
acquiesced in the transfer of the mortgage.123 Furthermore, the apparent hostility 
between the Comtesse and the Société may be interpreted in a different manner. 
Her original solution, of having Duff and Boustead take an assignment of the 
mortgage, is likely to have been unsatisfactory to her as mortgages were required to 
be registered in Ceylon, and were thus open to public inspection.124 Therefore, a 
                                                          
123 Cavendish was a party to the deed of assignment, albeit ‘solely for the sake of conformity’ (certified copy of 
the deed, 28 Dec 1863, Baring Archive, HC6.3.7, 1684. 
124 Taylor, ‘Registration of Title Deeds’ (n 29) 349, 351 and 354-355. 
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judicial sale would likely have suited her needs. Her revocation of the 1863 power of 
attorney may have been intended to prevent Cavendish from obtaining a court order 
against Robertsons requiring them to comply with the 1868 decree and convey the 
Estates to the trustees. It is also possible that the suit and/or the sequestration were 
part of an elaborate (and expensive) ruse designed to convince Cavendish that the 
Estates were lost. A point worth noting is that the French Second Empire fell in 1870. 
It is possible that the Comtesse had sufficient influence to procure the transfer of the 
mortgage to the Société in 1863, but that by 1871, when the Société took steps to 
enforce its security, her political support had fallen away, at least in France.125 
One development that has not been mentioned thus far is that, according to one of 
the law reports, immediately upon obtaining the Estates free from the original 
mortgage, Boustead remortgaged them to the Société for £53,000.126 His initial 
outlay was therefore £4,942. It seems odd that the Société, having just sued the 
Comtesse, and knowing that Boustead had agreed to purchase the Estates for her, 
would lend £53,000 to him and become mortgagees of the Estates. The re-
mortgaging may thus be interpreted as evidence that the judicial sale was 
engineered by the Comtesse and the Société in order to thwart Cavendish’s designs. 
It is possible, however, that the re-mortgaging was motivated by genuine business 
considerations. The Société had seemingly come out of liquidation by 1873, and it 
continued trading for another five years. It is also very probable that, subsequent to 
the Société’s demise, its business interests in Ceylon were continued by subsidiaries 
or associated banks. The colonial interest rates were very favourable for lenders at 
                                                          
125 It seems that her husband’s influence was much reduced after the advent of the Third Republic (see n 73, 
above). Of course, France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war brought about the fall of her friend Napoleon III 
and the Second Empire. 
126 Rochefoucauld (n 67) 1915 (Lindley LJ). 
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the time,127 and the estates were capable of producing revenues of approximately 
£10,000 per year.128 Also, the Société was a mortgagee in possession prior to the 
sale to Boustead.129 After the sale, Boustead remained in possession (through 
agents) and managed the Estates. Therefore, the Société, having re-mortgaged to 
Boustead, would have been able to claim the revenues from the Estates without the 
trouble of managing them. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that a short term, high 
interest loan, secured by a mortgage granted on its own terms, rather than those of 
Barings, was an attractive business prospect for the Société. It should also be noted 
that, by 1878, Boustead had mortgaged the Estates to mortgagees other than the 
Société for more than £70,000.130 This strongly suggests that the mortgage granted 
by Boustead to the Société was a short term one, because had any significant sums 
been outstanding on the 1873 mortgage, there would have been insufficient equity in 
the Estates for them have been mortgaged for any sum approaching £70,000.  
The Comtesse’s admission of debt at the last minute seems extraordinary. One can 
only speculate as to her motives. Of course, the debt was outstanding, and the 
mortgage was indisputably valid, so she must have known that, had she not filed the 
admission, the court would almost certainly have found against her, presumably with 
increased costs. But she could have co-operated with the Société at the outset, and 
acquiesced in a sale of the Estates,131 thus avoiding what must have been a costly 
court action, and also the risk of losing the Estates at a public auction. Her record in 
                                                          
127 See Rochefoucauld (n 117) 75. 
128 According to the accounts of the 1870-71 season (sent by letter dated 18 Aug 1872 by Robertsons to the 
Société, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1871), the net profits were £9600. Cavendish’s letter to Barings (15 
Jan 1872, Baring Archive, HC6.3.22.13, 1872) also states that the profits from the Estates for ‘the last 3 years’ 
were ‘about £10000 per annum’.  
129 The letter from Robertsons to the Société of 12 Feb 1872 (Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1872) refers to 
the Société as ‘already being in possession as mortgagees’. 
130 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 198. 
131 According to Lee, An Introduction, (n 30), ‘The mortgaged property may be sold without an order of Court 
with the consent of the debtor ; but an agreement for extra-judicial sale contained in the mortgage deed will not 
be enforced if the debtor afterwards objects’. 
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respect of dealings with the English courts suggests a disdain for court orders; she 
may therefore have failed to take the suit seriously until the day of the trial. The 
suspicion remains, however, that she wanted the sale in execution to be ordered, as 
this would be an especially effective means of convincing Cavendish that the Estates 
were lost. This view is strengthened by the fact that she retained the services of the 
Deputy Queen’s Advocate of Ceylon from at least as early as 1871 until her 
admission of debt, at which time his services were released to the Société. This 
suggests that she did in fact take the proceedings in Ceylon seriously from the 
outset, and shows that she was prepared to pay for expert legal advice until the 
outcome that she desired had been ensured. Furthermore, assuming that she 
followed her advocate’s advice, it is difficult to believe that there was no compelling 
reason for leaving the admission of debt until the trial.132 
A final point to make is that the Comtesse is the person who stood to gain the most 
from the rumours which deterred bidders at the auction. There is no evidence that 
Cavendish was a bidder, and the Société was seemingly concerned only with 
repaying the debt. Furthermore, the rumours were essentially without foundation. 
Cavendish’s annuity was not large, and could only have been claimed had he 
outlived his former wife. As for the alleged claims of the children, they were probably 
founded on the 1868 decree, and likely could not have been pursued against an 
outsider purchaser under a judicial sale.133 Therefore, the possibility that the 
Comtesse, perhaps through Sabonadière, was responsible for propagating these 
rumours cannot be ruled out. 
                                                          
132 In a letter from Robertsons to the Société, 18 Aug 1871, Stadsarcheif Amsterdam, 650/20, 1871, it is stated 
that the Deputy Queen’s Advocate, Mr Cayley, had been retained by the Comtesse. 
133 Of course, following a sale in execution, the children could not have pursued their claim against any 
purchaser of the Estates other than the Comtesse herself.  
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Overall, there is no direct evidence that the Société, when obtaining the sale in 
execution, was motivated by anything other than a genuine intention to recall its 
security. It is submitted that the most likely explanation is that the Comtesse was a 
clever and determined opportunist. She had for many years assisted in managing 
the financial affairs of the Baron and Baroness, so she had much experience dealing 
in legal and financial matters.134 Thus, she may well have directly or indirectly 
engineered the transfer of the mortgage to the Société. When, after its change in 
management, the Société made clear its intentions to realise the security, she likely 
saw this as an opportunity to put an end to Cavendish’s attempts to obtain the 
Estates and obtain control of them free from his interference.  
3.2.4 The Aftermath of the Sale 
 
3.2.4.1 Cavendish abandons his claim 
The sale of the Estates to Boustead seems finally to have extinguished Cavendish’s 
hopes of acquiring them. Of course, the fact that no trust appeared in the deed of 
conveyance to Boustead means that, even if he had inspected the title deeds in 
Ceylon, he would not have discovered the trust. In 1874, the Comtesse and 
Cavendish reached a compromise, and the 1868 decree was lifted, at least in 
respect of his claim.135 There is no evidence that, after the sale, Cavendish sought to 
pursue his claim to the annuity. It is possible that he forfeited this interest under the 
1874 compromise. As has been indicated, however, the annuity was relatively 
insignificant, and it is quite possible that all of Cavendish’s threatened and actual 
                                                          
134 See Cavendish (n 31) 11. Furthermore, in Rumbold, Recollections (n 36) 92, the Comtesse is described as 
having been Baron Delmar’s ‘most trusted private secretary’. 
135 Rochefoucauld (n 67) 1914 ( Lindley LJ). 
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claims based on the annuity and the 1868 decree amounted to a bluff, particularly 
given that he seems not to have possessed the finances necessary to pursue any of 
his claims outside of England.  
3.2.4.2 Boustead’s betrayal and the fate of the Estates 
The Comtesse’s plans began to unravel soon after the sale to Boustead. The law 
reports provide detailed information here, which is based on correspondence to 
which the court had access. Boustead mortgaged the Estates on three occasions, in 
1876, 1877 and 1878 for a sum of over £70,000.136 In 1879, Boustead and Co was 
liquidated, and Boustead was declared bankrupt.137 Although he was discharged in 
1880, some parts of Estates were, in that year, conveyed to his trustee in bankruptcy 
and subsequently sold. It seems that other parts of the Estates had, by this time, 
already been sold by mortgagees.138 The parts which were retained were sold at 
some time after 1882.139 The precise point at which Boustead decided to abandon 
the parol arrangement cannot be pinpointed, but it does seem that he initially 
recognised the Comtesse’s interest. The two remained in communication throughout 
the 1870s, and Boustead made regular payments to the Comtesse out of the profits 
of his firm, prior to its liquidation, despite his having mortgaged the Estates without 
her knowledge or consent.140 After Boustead’s bankruptcy, the Comtesse wished to 
claim the Estates from his trustee in bankruptcy,141 but was persuaded by her 
solicitor and by Boustead, that it might be better to avoid any potentially expensive 
litigation and instead wait and see whether Boustead could reach some sort of 
                                                          
136 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 198. 
137 Rochefoucauld (n 67) 1913; In Re Price (n 7). 
138 Rochefoucauld, ibid 1913. 
139 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 210. 
140 ibid 198. 
141 See Rochefoucauld (n 2) 198. 
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settlement with his creditors and retain the parts of the Estates that had not already 
been sold.142 Although Boustead was initially optimistic that such a settlement could 
be reached, on 25 November 1892, he wrote to the Comtesse telling her that his 
previous advice not to ‘despair’ was no longer appropriate.143 Other than a letter that 
the Comtesse sent, dated 17 December 1887, to Boustead’s solicitor claiming 
ownership of the Estates, there were no further developments until 24 October 1894 
when the Comtesse commenced the action in the English courts. 
3.2.4.3 The coffee rust fungus 
Boustead’s behaviour must be understood in the context of a biological catastrophe 
which ravaged Ceylon’s coffee plantations. In 1869, a fungus which attacks coffee 
plants was discovered in Ceylon. This ‘coffee rust fungus’ intermittently devastated 
Ceylonese coffee plantations during the early 1870s144. The fungus initially affected 
some estates to a far greater extent than others, and had the peculiar quality of 
appearing to die out only to return and check the recovery of the crops. Thus, 
entrepreneurs continued to purchase tracts of rainforest for conversion into coffee 
plantations, and in 1873, the year of the sale to Boustead, new land was selling at 
‘unprecedented prices’,145 whilst at the same time, ‘planters were expressing grave 
concern about the impact of the disease on their crops.’146 As the 1870s progressed, 
the fungus took hold, and by the mid-1880s, the coffee industry in Ceylon had been 
almost completely annihilated.147   
                                                          
142 Rochefoucauld (n 67) 1918 (Lindley LJ). 
143 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 199. 
144 See generally J S Duncan, In the Shadows of the Tropics: Climate, Race and Biopower in Nineteenth Century 
Ceylon (Ashgate, Aldershot 2007) Chapter 7, entitled ‘Landscapes of Despair: The Last Years of Coffee’.  
145 ibid 172. 
146 ibid. 
147 See Rochefoucauld (n 2) 199.  
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The fungus, which was the root cause of Boustead’s bankruptcy and the collapse of 
his firm,148 was apparently slow to inflict terminal damage upon the Estates, but the 
consequences were devastating when it finally took hold. In Boustead’s letter of 
November 1882, he explains that, by then, the fungus had ‘reduce[d] the annual 
yield from the 50,000 tons at which it once stood to 14,000 tons estimated for the 
coming year’.149 Given the initially unpredictable nature of the fungus, it may well 
have been that Boustead mortgaged the Estates in second half of the 1870s in the 
hope that the Ceylon coffee industry would recover and, even after his bankruptcy, it 
may not have been unreasonable for him to have hoped for an improvement. Once 
the gravity of the catastrophe finally became clear to Boustead, it may well have 
been that he decided to keep for himself whatever funds he had managed to salvage 
from the bankruptcy and the liquidation of his firm.  
3.2.2.1 The Comtesse’s delay 
In 1894, the Comtesse commenced an action to recover the proceeds of sale of the 
Estates from Boustead, whose presence in London provides a ready explanation as 
to why she sued in the English courts. It seems at first odd that the Comtesse, 
having fought so hard to keep the Estates from falling into Cavendish’s hands, 
abandoned her claim for many years. Her reasons were addressed by Lindley LJ in 
response to Boustead’s defence of laches. Lindley LJ concluded that she had been 
encouraged until at least 1882, in part by Boustead, to refrain from litigating in the 
hope that he could retain the Estates.150 He also held that she had done nothing to 
                                                          
148 ibid 198-199. 
149 ibid 199. 
150 ibid 210. 
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suggest that she had abandoned her right, and that, because lapse of time alone 
would not permit the court to invoke the doctrine of laches and deny relief, there was 
no need to examine her ‘excuses… for not instituting proceedings sooner.’151 Her 
counsel claimed that in ‘1884 the Comtesse could not get solicitors to take up the 
case on account of her impecunious position’.152 It may well have been that she had 
other reasons, however. It is perhaps significant to note that Cavendish died in 
1889.153 Despite the Divorce Court’s decree having been lifted in 1874, Cavendish 
may still have possessed the right to the annuity if he outlived the Comtesse. 
Additionally, it is not inconceivable that he might have commenced some legal action 
against the Comtesse if he had discovered the manner in which she had deceived 
him into thinking the Estates lost. It would therefore have been prudent on the 
Comtesse’s part to refrain from suing, particularly in the English courts, until after 
1889. It is also worth noting that the Comtesse’s daughter was a co-plaintiff in the 
action. There is no evidence that the 1868 decree was lifted in respect of the claims 
of the Comtesse’s children. Furthermore, it was noted in one of the law reports that 
the daughter ‘was interested in a sum charged on the Comtesse’s interest in the 
estates by order of the Divorce Court’.154 It is therefore not inconceivable that the 
daughter became aware that her mother was, or claimed to be, the beneficial owner 
of the proceeds of sale of the Estates and either requested to join as co-plaintiff or 
pressured her mother to sue. 
                                                          
151 ibid 212 ( Lindley LJ). 
152 ibid 203. 
153 <http://thepeerage.com/p1028.htm#i10276> accessed 25 July 2014. 
154 Rochefoucauld (n 117) 75. 
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3.2.5 Conclusions on the factual analysis of Rochefocuauld 
The research undertaken for the purposes of this part of the thesis has revealed that 
the facts of Rochefoucauld were reported rather imperfectly, and that no subsequent 
commentators accurately discovered the facts until the research elucidated above 
was carried out. Perhaps the most significant finding is that, contrary to what was 
reported, the Estates were sold by officers of the District Court in Ceylon as a result 
of the Société having successfully sued the Comtesse for a sale in execution. The 
conveyance of the Estates was a conveyance by operation of law, executed by the 
fiscal. In no sense was it a conveyance from the Comtesse. Had Boustead indicated 
to her that he planned to purchase the Estates for himself, in defiance of the parol 
agreement, there is little that she could have done to have prevented him. Lacking 
the funds to redeem the mortgage, she could not have prevented the suit against the 
will of the Société, and once the court had ordered the sale, she could not have 
prevented the Estates from being sold at auction even with the Société’s 
acquiescence. Of course, as has been established, the Comtesse did, at least 
ultimately, wish the sale to Boustead to go ahead. She clearly relied on the parol 
agreement with Boustead as crucial to her designs. But it cannot be said that she 
transferred the land to Boustead in reliance on the parol agreement. Neither can it be 
said that the Société conveyed the land in reliance on the agreement. The evidence 
suggests that the sale was procured by the Société in order to realise its security 
and, in any case, neither the auction nor the sale were conducted by the Société. 
This shows that the fraud which prompted equity’s intervention does not depend on 
the transferor having relied on, or even been aware of, the parol agreement. 
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Putting these findings within the context of the rest of the chapter, Rochefoucauld 
falls clearly into the third category of parol agreement trusts. A (the fiscals of the 
Ceylon District Court) conveyed the land to B (Boustead) subject to a parol 
agreement entered into between B and C (the Comtesse) whereby B would take as 
trustee for C. A was almost certainly unaware of the parol agreement, and was 
certainly not influenced by it.  
3.3 The Extent to Which the Prevention of Fraud Underpins the Enforcement of 
Category Three Parol Agreement Trusts 
3.3.1 Equitable fraud within the context of cases within the Rochefoucauld line 
The first case within this line is one in which the court refused to issue a decree in 
C’s favour. In Bartlett v Pickersgill,155 property was sold by a vendor to Pickersgill 
subject to an oral agreement made between Bartlett and Pickersgill that Pickersgill 
would hold the property on trust for Bartlett. Henley LK held that because the 
defendant had provided the purchase money, there could be no resulting trust and 
that, as the mere refusal by the defendant to perform the parol agreement did not 
amount to a fraud, s7 of the Statute of Frauds prevented the oral agreement from 
being enforced. In James v Smith,156 Kekewich J found himself bound by Bartlett, 
albeit obiter. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that, in Rochefoucauld at first 
instance, Kekewich J refused to rule in C’s favour. 
Kekwich J’s judgment was famously overturned on appeal. The Court of Appeal 
famously justified the enforcement of the trust against Boustead on the ground that: 
                                                          
155 (1759) 1 Eden 515, 28 ER 785. 
156 [1891] 1 Ch 384, Ch. 
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the Statute of Frauds does not prevent the proof of a fraud; and that it is a 
fraud on the part of a person to whom land is conveyed as a trustee, and who 
knows it was so conveyed, to deny the trust and claim the land himself.157 
As is discussed in detail below, the existence and legitimacy of the principle that the 
Statute of Frauds could not be used as an instrument of fraud was extremely well 
established by 1896.158 Other than stating that the case was ‘one of fraud’,159  
however, Lindley LJ declined to elaborate on what sort of conduct amounted to 
fraud. The fact that circumstances antecedent to, and surrounding, the sale of the 
Estates were not reported fully in the law reports suggests that much of what has 
been explained here was unknown to the judges involved. It may however be that 
the judges had more awareness of what happened than is revealed in the reports, 
but considered that some of the details were unimportant to their decision-making 
process.160 Furthermore, at first instance, Kekewich J ruled that some evidence 
which the Comtesse had wished to adduce, which was to be provided by Duff’s 
solicitor, concerning the negotiations involving Duff and Boustead, was privileged.161 
This may account in part for the lack of detail in the reports.162  
Fortunately, however, Lindley LJ cited several authorities in support of his assertions 
regarding the fraud issue, and to demonstrate that Bartlett was no longer good law. 
Moreover, most of these authorities, being cases concerning category one parol 
agreement trusts, have been covered above in Chapter Two of this thesis. Lindley LJ 
                                                          
157 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 206 (Lindley LJ). 
158 Lindley LJ makes this point himself, ibid 206. See Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
159 ibid 207 (Lindley LJ). 
160 ibid 205. Lindley LJ commented that ‘the circumstances under which the Delmar estates were conveyed to 
the defendant are to be gathered from the verbal testimony of the plaintiff, the defendant, and Mr. Duff, and a 
mass of correspondence both before and after the conveyance.’ In De La Rochefoucauld v Boustead, The Times, 
24 June 1896 (Ch) 17, it is reported that ‘there was a vast amount of correspondence, which had been gone into 
at great length’. It is perhaps unlikely that this correspondence did not refer to the nature of the sale. 
161 Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1896) 65 LJ Ch 794, 794. 
162 Note that this point was not contested in the appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
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cited Booth v Turle,163 Davies v Otty (No 2),164 Haigh v Kaye,165 and Re Duke of 
Marlborough166 in support of his judgment. Lindley LJ explained that these 
authorities were cases of fraud because, prior to the conveyance, the plaintiff and 
the defendant had orally agreed that the plaintiff would take the beneficial interest in 
the land upon completion of the conveyance. The fraud lay in the defendant 
knowingly reneging upon the agreement after having taken the conveyance. The 
Court of Appeal evidently did not regard as significant the fact that, in these cases, 
but unlike in Rochefocuauld itself, A transferred the land in reliance on the parol 
agreement. This very strongly suggests that the justification for the enforcement of 
the trust in Rochefoucauld is identical to the justification for the enforcement of 
category one parol agreement trusts, and that fraud which prompts equity’s 
intervention in cases of this type, and which, according to Rochefoucauld, drives the 
principle that equity will not permit a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud, 
does not depend on the transferor having been hoodwinked into transferring his 
land. 
Further strengthening these conclusions is the fact that in Booth, Davies and Haigh, 
as well as in Rochefoucauld itself, Lincoln v Wright167 was expressly followed. In this 
case, the plaintiff’s land was sold to Wright by a mortgagee in exercise of a power of 
sale. The mortgagee had been threatening to exercise the power, so Wright and the 
plaintiff had orally agreed that Wright would buy the land and subsequently allow the 
plaintiff to remain in possession and retake title once the purchase money had been 
repaid to Wright. The defendant, Wright’s next-of-kin, sought to evict the plaintiff. It 
                                                          
163 (1873) LR 16 Eq 182, Ct of Chancery. 
164 (1865) 35 Beav 208, 55 ER 875. 
165 (1872) LR 7 Ch App 469. 
166 [1894] 2 Ch 133, Ch. 
167 (1859) De G & J 16, 45 ER 6. 
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was held that the parol agreement between the plaintiff and Wright amounted to an 
equitable mortgage, notwithstanding that the formality requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds had not been complied with.168 Turner LJ stated that: 
the Statute of Frauds was not made to cover fraud. If the real agreement in 
this case was that as between the Plaintiff and Wright the transaction should 
be a mortgage transaction, it is in the eye of this Court a fraud to insist on the 
conveyance as being absolute, and parol evidence must be admissible to 
prove the fraud.169 
Turner LJ’s judgment is striking in its similarity to that of Lindley LJ, particularly in 
respect of the routine manner in which the defendant’s conduct, in similar 
circumstances, was deemed a fraud.170 Also notable for the purposes of the 
arguments advanced in this thesis is the fact that Turner J emphasised the need to 
find a parol agreement. A mere declaration of trust by A or B is evidently insufficient 
to justify the imposition of a parol trust of land. It seems to have been widely 
understood in the nineteenth century that entering into a parol agreement of this 
nature prior to the conveyance and knowingly reneging thereupon after the 
conveyance amounted to a fraud.171  
                                                          
168 Equitable mortgages (except for those created by deposit of title deeds) fell within the scope of s4 of the 
Statute of Frauds, and therefore were required to be agreed in writing and signed by the grantor. 
169 Lincoln (n 167) 22 (Turner LJ). Note that Knight Bruce LJ upheld the parol agreement on the grounds that it 
had been partly performed, but he also suggested (21) that, were it not for the part performance, the Statute still 
would not have applied. 
170 Although Knight Bruce LJ held that the agreement could be enforced pursuant to the doctrine of part 
performance he also agreed with Turner LJ that the defendant could not rely on the Statute of Frauds because his 
conduct amounted to ‘an unjustifiable attempt to defeat or evade a fair agreement’. 
171 W Swadling ‘The Nature of the Trust in Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts (Hart, Oxford, 2009) 106 argues that the fraud in Rochefoucauld was not Boustead ‘reneging 
on his promise’, but his ‘reliance on the statute’. Rochefoucauld itself and the other authorities cited in this 
section suggest otherwise. Boustead’s conduct amounted to a fraud, and the statute could not be utilised as a tool 
to legitimise this fraud. 
 106 
 
Another case which seems to fall within the Rochefoucauld line is ex parte Norton.172 
The case concerned a yacht which belonged to Sir Richard Mansel (C). He 
mortgaged it and in 1880, it was sold by the mortgagee (A). It was purchased at the 
sale by Norton (B, who, at the time, was solicitor and ‘confidential advisor’ of 
Mansel). In 1883, C filed a liquidation petition. The trustees in liquidation claimed that 
the yacht had been purchased by B on secret trust for C. The Registrar upheld the 
trustees’ claim. B appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground 
that the evidence showed that B had bought the yacht for C and that, even if the 
evidence had not shown this to have been the case, C was beneficially entitled to the 
yacht on account of the ‘confidential relations’ between them and ‘other 
arrangements’. Interestingly, the case was referred to as a ‘secret trust’, although the 
context in which it arose was clearly different from the factual background to 
conventional secret trusts. Although there might have been a declaration of express 
trust, this would seem unlikely, because, as in Rochefoucauld, prior to the transfer to 
B subject to the trust, neither B nor C had title to the yacht. It would therefore seem 
very likely that this represents an unusual example of a trust arising out of a parol 
agreement which, like that in De Bruyne, did not concern land. 
It should at this point be reiterated that in neither Rochefoucauld nor Lincoln was the 
question of detrimental reliance raised, nor was the question of whether the plaintiffs 
could have obtained the land via other means had the parol agreement not been 
entered into even mentioned. A recent example of a case within this class in which 
issues concerning detrimental reliance were raised is Samad v Thompson.173 The 
defendants, Thompson and his wife, can be regarded as B. The claimant, C wished 
                                                          
172 The Times, May 12 1884 (CA) 5. 
173 (n 9). 
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to purchase some land from A, but he had a very poor credit rating as a result of a 
previous period of imprisonment, and was thus unable to obtain a secured loan to 
assist with his purchase. It was therefore agreed between B and C that the land 
would be purchased in B’s names. The purchase would be facilitated by obtaining a 
loan by mortgaging the land in the names of B. C would pay the initial deposit and 
would meet the mortgage repayments and all other associated costs. Once the 
mortgage was discharged, B would convey the land to C. The purchase went ahead 
as planned but, having secured title, B sought to renege on the parol agreement and 
retain the land for themselves. Although B was held to be trustee for C, Sales J 
downplayed the role of fraud as explained in Rochefoucauld, holding instead that the 
‘foundation’ of C’s claim was his ‘significant acts of detrimental reliance’,174 and that 
the case was to be determined on the principles relating to ‘common intention’ 
constructive trusts of the family home.175 It is submitted here, however, that, as 
Samad is indistinguishable on its essential facts from Rochefoucauld, Sales J ought 
to have been bound by higher authorities to recognise the centrality of fraud to his 
reasoning.176 
3.3.2 Equitable fraud within the context of cases within the Pallant line 
The cases in this line are sometimes described as being authorities concerned with 
the ‘Pallant v Morgan equity’. They are cases in which B and C, both being 
interested in obtaining different parts of a single estate, agree that B will purchase 
the land from A and then forfeit part of it in C’s favour. It should be noted that here, 
the parol agreement might potentially amount to an oral contract for the sale of land. 
                                                          
174 ibid 128 (Sales J). 
175 See below, 5.2 for discussion of ‘common intention’ constructive trusts. 
176 The same applies to Cox v Jones [2004] EWHC 1486 (Ch), [2004] 2 FLR 1010 in which it was held that B 
had purchased a flat on behalf of C. 
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Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677 required such contracts to be in writing. A 
similar provision is now found in s2(1) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1989.177 Hence, the statutory provision which, but for equity’s 
intervention, could render the parol agreement ineffective is s2(1) of the 1989 Act 
rather than s53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925. In Chattock v Muller,178 it was 
made clear that s4 of the Statute of Frauds could not stand in the way of the court’s 
jurisdiction to relieve in cases of fraud. It should be noted, however, that the parol 
agreements in cases in this line tend to concern agreements to enter into future 
contractual agreements. Hence, the parol agreement is usually too vague to amount 
even to a parol contract. 
The earliest case in this line is Chattock v Muller,179 in which B and C, having both 
been interested in purchasing different parts of the same estate, agreed that B would 
purchase the estate in his own name from A and would subsequently sell certain 
parts thereof to C, although the exact extent of these parts was not entirely clear. 
Malins VC held that: 
[B] had lulled [C] into not making an offer for the estate... [B] was all the time 
leading [C] to believe that if he bought the property [C] should have the part 
he wanted. Otherwise he ought to have told [C] not to rely upon him, and that 
if he wanted any part of the estate he must bid in competition with him… [B] 
was… no longer at liberty to change his mind.180  
                                                          
177 The only material difference is that the 1989 Act, a2(5) expressly exempts ‘resulting, implied or constructive 
trusts’ from the ambit of s2(1). There was no similar provision in the Statute of Frauds. NB: prior to the 1989 
Act taking effect, contracts for the sale of land were governed by s40 of the Law of Property Act 1925. There 
was no provision in the 1925 Act which was the equivalent of s2(5). 
178(1878) LR 8 Ch D 177 
179ibid. 
180(n 178) 180 (Malins VC). 
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He went on to state that B’s denial of the agreement amounted to ‘[a] flagrant breach 
of duty, which in this Court has always been considered as a fraud’181  
The next case is Pallant v Morgan,182 in which the purchase was at an auction, to 
which both B and C dispatched agents. Although discussions between B and C had 
already taken place, it was only at the auction that it was finally agreed that C's agent 
would refrain from bidding so long as B would subsequently sell part of the land to 
C.183 Harman J, following Chattock,184 held B to be trustee for the prevention of 
fraud.185 The fraud lay in B reneging on the parol agreement upon which C had 
relied. It is notable that B's agent had authority to bid up to £3,000 and C's only to 
£2,000. It is therefore arguable that C did not suffer any detriment as he would have 
been outbid had he not entered into the arrangement. This, however, was not 
deemed relevant by the court. 
In recent years, ‘joint purchase’ trusts have been enforced in cases where the 
agreement did not relate to land, most notably Banner Homes v Luff 
Developments,186 in which the parol agreement related to C’s acquisition of some 
shares in a wholly owned subsidiary of B. The subsidiary purchased the land in 
question. Chadwick LJ, giving Court of Appeal’s judgment, did not mention fraud, 
and held that a constructive trust over the shares arose out of the ‘Pallant v Morgan 
equity’, which applies to joint purchase cases when C’s reliance on the parol 
                                                          
181ibid.  
182(n 3).  
183In respect of the parol agreement, s40 of the 1925Act was mentioned by the defence but not actually relied 
upon. This section, since repealed and replaced by s2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989, required that contracts for the sale of land were required to be in writing signed by the relevant parties.  
On the facts, it was held that there was no agreement sufficiently certain to be specifically enforced, so the 
section would not have been relevant even had it been pleaded. 
184This makes it odd that Chattock is often ignored when the joint purchase cases are discussed. See, for 
example Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752. 
185Pallant (n 3) 88 (Harman J).  
186 (n 9).  
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agreement causes ‘advantage to [B], or detriment to [C]’.187 It is submitted, however, 
that the principles governing such cases had long been settled and that there is no 
logical justification for separating the joint purchase cases from cases such as 
Rochefoucauld on the ground that the former, unlike the latter, involve a parol 
agreement relating to part rather of, rather than the whole, beneficial interest in the 
property.188 Furthermore, it should be noted that, in Bannister v Bannister, it was held 
by the Court of Appeal that Chattock had been decided on the same principles as 
Booth, Marlborough and Rochefoucauld. 189 It is therefore submitted that the most 
plausible explanation for equity’s intervention in the ‘joint purchase’ cases is the 
prevention of fraud. 
3.3.2.1 Agency: an alternative explanation for the ‘Pallant v Morgan equity’ cases  
It should be recognised that the ‘joint-purchase cases’ are sometimes asserted to be 
conceptually distinct from cases such as Rochefocuauld on the ground that B’s 
liability springs from his breach of a fiduciary relationship.190 There is some historical 
support for this view. In Chattock, Malins VC stated that B had ‘unquestionably 
purchased [part of the estate] as the agent of [C].’191 It is thus not unreasonable to 
regard at least some of the joint purchase authorities as cases of agency. What is 
not always appreciated, however, is that, in the nineteenth century, the boundaries 
between agreements giving rise to agency and agreements giving rise to trusts were 
apparently not well-defined. For example, in Rochefoucauld, a case almost always 
regarded as one concerning a trust and not an agency agreement, the plaintiff’s case 
                                                          
187ibid 398 (Chadwick LJ).  
188For an example of the ‘joint purchase’ cases being separated on principle, see Hopkins ‘The Pallant v. 
Morgan “Equity”’ (n 4).  See also Crossco (n 9) [88] (Etherton LJ). 
189Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133, CA. 
190 Crossco (n 9) [95] (Etherton LJ). See also Du Boulay v Raggett (1989) 58 P & CR 138, Ch. 
191 Chattock (n 178) 181. See Hopkins ‘The Pallant v. Morgan “Equity”’ (n 4) for examples. 
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was that B ‘had bought the property as agent for her’.192 Moreover, in Adaicappa 
Chetty v Asaicappa Chetty,193 Rochefoucauld was described as a case in which ‘it 
was clearly proved that the person who purchased the property was acting as the 
agent of the other party.’194 Furthermore, in Chattock, Malins VC cited Booth v Turle 
as an authority,195 even though that case was decided purely on trust principles by 
Malins VC himself with no mention of any agency agreement. This peculiar lack of 
precision is understandable when it is considered that nineteenth century equity 
judges considered a breach of an agency agreement which involved the agent 
misappropriating trust property to be a fraud. Thus, if A conveyed title to land to B in 
circumstances where B had orally agreed to take as agent for C, and then B sought 
to keep the land for himself in defiance of the agency agreement, this was a fraud, 
and a trust would be enforced in favour of C. It was not open to B to argue that the 
lack of written evidence prevented the finding of a trust; to do so would be to use s7 
as an instrument of fraud.196 Indeed, according to Bowstead and Reynolds on 
Agency, this is still the position in the modern law.197 
As for the most appropriate explanation of the ‘joint purchase’ cases in the modern 
law, it has been pointed out by Hopkins there are question marks as to the extent to 
which fiduciary duties could and should be imposed in commercial contexts.198 
Furthermore, the same author has highlighted that the requirements necessary to 
prove a fiduciary relationship and a breach thereof are not the same as those 
                                                          
192 Rochefoucauld (n 67) 1913. 
193 (n 26). 
194 ibid 420 (Viscount Haldane, delivering the Board’s judgment). 
195 (n 178) 180. 
196 See the explanation offered by Jessel LJ in Cave v Mackenzie (1877) 46 LJ Ch 564, 567. See also Liew, 
‘Rochefocuauld v Boustead (n 4). 
197 P Watts and F Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014) 67. 
198 Hopkins (n 4) 46. 
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necessary to establish a constructive trust through other means.199 Although the 
application of fiduciary duties within a commercial context is outside of the scope of 
this thesis, it is tentatively suggested that, in cases in which the parol agreement can 
be proven to have created an agency relationship, there is no objection to the 
imposition of a trust on the ground of a breach of fiduciary duty. This should not, 
however, obscure the weight of authority behind the proposition that, regardless of 
whether or not a pre-existing fiduciary relationship can be established, B may be 
made trustee in the ‘joint purchase’ cases on the ground of fraud. Although it has 
been held that, in commercial situations, even when there is no agency relationship, 
fiduciary duties may arise on the rather vague basis of ‘particular and special 
features’,200 it would seem that the uncertainties involved in establishing such non-
agency fiduciary relationships mean that this avenue for relief does not compare 
favourably with a solution based on the settled principles discussed in this thesis. 
3.4 Fraud in Cases of ‘Hybrid’ Parol Agreement Trusts 
3.4.1 Young v Peachy 
The earliest of these cases is Young v Peachy,201 an important case which has been 
referred to several times already in this thesis. Young represents somewhat of a 
hybrid between category 2 and 3 parol agreement trusts. Here, the father (B) of a 
married woman (C) became concerned that her husband (A), who took in right of 
her, would be declared bankrupt and that her interest in some land would 
consequently go to his creditors. He persuaded the daughter and the husband to 
assign the interest in his favour, subject to a parol agreement that he would resettle 
                                                          
199 N Hopkins, ‘The Pallant v Morgan Equity- Again: Crossco No 4 Ltd v Jolan Ltd’ [2012] Conv 327, 331. 
200E.g. Crossco (n 9) [88] (Etherton LJ). 
201 (1741) Atk 254, 26 ER 557. 
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the interest upon the daughter for her own separate use, thus insulating it from any 
future claims by the husband’s creditors. The transfer was completed, but the father 
was himself declared bankrupt without having resettled the interest. The daughter’s 
heirs successfully claimed the interest. As Lord Hardwicke explained, there had been 
‘a great many cases, even since the statute of frauds, where a person has obtained 
an absolute conveyance from another, in order to answer one particular purpose, but 
has afterwards made use of it for another, that this court has relieved under the head 
of fraud’.202 Owing to the matrimonial property laws of the day, C had no interest in 
the property immediately prior to the conveyance. As A had transferred to B in 
reliance on an agreement between A and B that she should take an interest, C’s 
position in Young can be equated with that of C in cases such as Staden v Jones. 
Unlike in Staden, however, C was a party herself to the parol agreement and is very 
likely to have relied upon it. In this latter respect, her position bears some similarities 
with that of C in cases such as Rochefoucauld. 
3.4.2 Neale v Willis 
Another interesting case is Neale v Willis,203 in which a husband purchased the 
matrimonial home in his sole name using, in part, money which had been loaned to 
him by his mother-in-law on the understanding that the land would be purchased in 
the joint names of himself and his wife. The wife later successfully claimed a 
beneficial interest in the land. The Court of Appeal applied Bannister, which involved 
the same ‘kind of fraud’.204 Here, however, A (the vendor) conveyed the land to B 
(the husband) subject to a parol agreement made by B with D (the mother-in-law) 
that C (the wife) would take an interest. In Bannister, A relied on the parol agreement 
                                                          
202 ibid 257. 
203 (1968) 19 P & CR 836, CA. 
204 ibid 840 (Diplock LJ). Denning LJ also followed Bannister. Sachs LJ agreed with both. 
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when conveying the land to B, so the parol agreement was a factor in inducing the 
conveyance to be made by A. Contrarily, in Neale, A had nothing to do with the parol 
agreement. The parol agreement with D, however, facilitated the conveyance. D 
clearly relied on the parol agreement, as she entered into contractual relations with B 
on the strength thereof. It was therefore a fraud for B to renege upon this parol 
agreement and take the conveyance in his sole name. Neale, therefore, is significant 
because it demonstrates the readiness of the courts to apply a long-established 
doctrine of equity to novel circumstances. This provides compelling evidence that all 
of the types of parol agreement trusts considered in this thesis are enforced pursuant 
to a single doctrine. 
3.4.3 AM v SS: the most recent case of a parol agreement trust 
3.4.3.1 The facts and judgment 
AM v SS205 is the third hybrid case. It is, at the time of writing, the most recent case 
in which a parol agreement trust was enforced, and it is also significant and 
interesting in several respects. The case concerned a matrimonial dispute. The 
husband (B) was part of a family of considerable means, the affairs of which were 
presided over by his father (D), a formidable patriarch described by Coleridge J as ‘a 
very rich man’.206 The purpose of the hearing was to establish the beneficial 
ownership of land which, according to the wife, belonged beneficially to B.  
The land was registered in B’s name. B’s sister (C), who was the Intervenor in the 
hearing, claimed, alongside B and D, that the property was beneficially hers. The 
circumstances surrounding B’s family becoming involved with the land were as 
                                                          
205 [2014] EWHC 2887 (Fam). 
206 ibid [31]. In AM v SS [2014] EWHC 685 (Fam), concerning further issues arising from the divorce, Coleridge 
J [29] alluded in some detail to the father’s domineering nature. 
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follows: C and her husband found the land and passed the relevant details to B. The 
vendor (A) then conveyed the land to B, the purchase money being provided by D. 
Afterwards, C wrote a letter to D, expressing her gratitude towards him, and 
proceeded to supervise some major refurbishments to the land. Thereafter, C 
regarded herself as the owner of the land.207 Coleridge J accepted that one of the 
reasons for this peculiar arrangement was that D disapproved of C’s choice of 
husband, and wished for the land to be out of his son-in-law’s reach in the event of 
any future divorce proceedings. It was held that B had taken the land as constructive 
trustee for C, so that the wife’s claim that B was beneficial owner was rejected. 
Although counsel referred Coleridge J ‘to many of the recent cases on resulting and 
constructive trusts’,208 including authorities concerned with ‘common intention’ 
constructive trusts,209 he identified De Bruyne as the most relevant authority, also 
mentioning Rochefoucauld and Bannister as being relevant. He quoted extensively 
from De Bruyne, citing Patten LJ’s comments regarding equitable fraud and parol 
agreement trusts,210 before concluding that the situation in AM ‘precisely fit[ted] the 
analysis in De Bruyne v De Bruyne’.211 Accordingly, B took as constructive trustee 
for the C on the ground that, having taken title subject to an agreement to hold the 
land for the benefit of C, it would have been ‘wholly unconscionable’212 for B to have 
done otherwise. The reason for the informal nature of the arrangements, being 
based on an erroneous assumption (i.e. that the property would be put out of reach 
of C’s husband), was immaterial to the finding of a constructive trust. At no point was 
                                                          
207 She lived in the Property with her family, equipped the Property, assumed responsibility for all outgoings and 
took rent when it was temporarily leased. 
208 (n 205) [22]. 
209 Coleridge J mentioned specifically [23] ‘Lloyds Bank v Rossett [1990], Oxley v Hiscock [2004], Stack v 
Dowden [2007] [and] Kernott v Jones [2011]’.  
210 De Bruyne (n 9) [51]. 
211 (n 205) [26]. 
212 ibid.  
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it claimed or held that any trust had been evidenced in writing, as per the 
requirement of s53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act. 
3.4.3.2 The significance of AM v SS to this thesis 
AM is an especially informative authority because it involves a very recent 
application of equity’s fraud-based jurisdiction to a novel factual scenario. It also 
sheds light on the nature of the fraud which is the catalyst for equity’s raising of a 
trust. Of all of the parol agreement trust cases, AM is most similar to Neale. In both, 
D demonstrably relied on the parol agreement, and B knew this to be so. Unlike in 
Neale, however, in AM, D actually purchased the land in B’s name. Usually, the 
purchase of land in the name of another would trigger the application of resulting 
trust principles or a presumption of advancement. AM thus shows how 
circumstances sufficient to raise a trust for the prevention of fraud will override any 
presumptions relating to resulting trusts, thereby bolstering the conclusions reached 
above, at 2.2.3.2, regarding the relationship between resulting trusts and category 
one parol agreement trusts. AM also shows how equity’s ability to intercede on the 
ground of fraud in cases concerning parol agreement trusts, in terms of the range of 
scenarios to which it may apply, is still evolving and is very much a part of the 
modern law of property, despite its ancient origins. 
Strangely, in AM, Coleridge J did not mention Neale. Instead, he essentially 
permitted D to take the place of A in the reasoning supplied by Patten LJ in De 
Bruyne (perhaps because, unlike in Neale, in which B entered into a contract with D 
in order to obtain some of the purchase money, in neither AM nor De Bruyne did B 
purchase the trust property). This substitution is justifiable on the ground that D 
wholly facilitated the sale, and he did so in reliance on the agreement that B would 
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hold the property for C’s benefit. Therefore, any attempt by B to avoid performing the 
agreement would have amounted to a fraud on D, as well as on C. Coleridge J’s 
flexible approach is congruous with that of Patten LJ in De Bruyne, for Patten LJ 
cited cases distinguishable on their facts from De Bruyne, such as Rochefoucauld, in 
direct support of his analysis.213  
AM is also significant as supporting the view that the prevention of equitable fraud 
justifies the imposition of the trust in cases of its type. Furthermore, AM is a useful 
authority concerning the nature of equitable fraud as has been elucidated thus far in 
this thesis. Coleridge J held that B was a constructive trustee for the prevention of 
fraud, even though he made no attempt whatsoever to renege upon the parol 
agreement. As has been emphasised throughout the course of this thesis, there are 
several similar authorities,214 but AM goes further than most because B’s claim was 
that he was bound by the trust arising out of the parol agreement.215 As Coleridge J 
emphasised, the trust in AM was borne out of equity’s response to the danger of 
fraud. It is also notable that Coleridge J did not consider whether C’s renovation work 
or other contributions amounted to detrimental reliance. This provides support for the 
proposition that, in cases concerning parol agreement trusts, it is not necessary to 
prove detrimental reliance or loss by C.  
3.5 The Classification of Category Three Parol Agreement Trusts 
The proper classification of parol agreement trusts in the third category is rather 
difficult. Resulting trusts can be ruled out immediately. As a general rule, a resulting 
trust could only return the property to A. It is possible that C could acquire an interest 
                                                          
213 De Bruyne (n 9) [51] (Patten LJ). 
214 See especially De Duke of Marlborough (n 166); Young v Peachy (n 196); Bannister (n 189); Norris v Frazer 
(1873) LR 15 Eq 318. 
215 De Bruyne (n 9) is similar in this respect. 
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under a resulting trust on the ground that he or she contributed directly towards the 
acquisition of the property (as C had done in Samad), but according to long-settled 
principles of resulting trusts, C’s share would necessarily be quantified according to 
his proportional contribution to the purchase of the land. None of the cases covered 
in this section were decided on this basis. 
The vexed question of whether category three trusts are express or constructive 
trusts cannot reasonably be approached without detailed consideration of the 
classification of the trust in Rochefoucauld for, as has been mentioned above, 
Rochefoucauld is the only case concerning a parol agreement trust in which the 
classification of the trust was considered in detail. Moreover, it is the only such case 
in which the trust was apparently described by the court as an express trust. 
Furthermore, it has been strongly argued by Swadling that the trust in 
Rochefoucauld should be classified as an express trust in the modern law.216 In 
order to ascertain the meaning behind the Court of Appeal’s apparent classification 
of the trust as express, a historical analysis will be carried out so that Lindley LJ’s 
words can be understood within their proper context. It is anticipated that this 
analysis might also help to illuminate an important question which has been raised in 
the previous two chapters, namely that of why none of the trusts considered in this 
thesis were judicially identified as constructive trusts until the twentieth century at the 
earliest.  
                                                          
216 Swadling, ‘The Nature of the Trust’ (n 171). 
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3.5.1 The classification of the trust in Rochefoucaud 
3.5.1.1 Why was the classification a pertinent issue in Rochefoucauld? 
It might be recalled that, in Rochefoucauld, one of B’s defences was that C’s lengthy 
delay in bringing her action meant that her claim was time-barred by the statutory 
limitation period. This defence raised, for the first time in the English courts, the 
question of whether a trust arising out of a parol agreement pursuant to the 
instrument of fraud principle should be classified as an express or constructive trust. 
By virtue of the Trustee Act 1888, s8(1)(a), the limitation period of six years217 
applied to actions against trustees. The provisions of s8 did not apply, inter alia, to 
claims ‘to recover trust property or the proceeds thereof, still retained by the 
trustee’.218 Because this was a claim against a trustee to recover the proceeds of the 
sale of the estates, s8 did not apply, and the Court of Appeal applied the law which 
had been developed prior to the enactment of the 1888 Act, the relevant statutory 
provision being the Judicature Act 1873, s25(2), which stipulated that no limitation 
period applied to claims by beneficiaries ‘for any property held on express trust, or in 
respect of any breach of such trust’.219 
                                                          
217 The statutory limitation period which applied in respect of trusts was six years (or twenty years, in respect of 
claims of title to realty). The means by which this came about was rather complex. The original source of the six 
year period was the Limitation Act 1623, s3. Although this subsection did not expressly apply to actions in 
respect of trusts, the courts of equity, having reached the view that the general intention of Parliament was that 
stale claims were not to be permitted, held that, by analogy with the Limitation Act, the limitation period of six 
years applied in respect of claims against trustees, although not express trustees. Eventually, the Trustee Act 
1888, s8(1) provided statutory confirmation that the limitation period prescribed in the Limitation Act 1623 
should apply to trustees. See Taylor v Davies [1920] AC 626, PC for a general explanation. 
218 Trustee Act 1888, s8(1). 
219 The law of limitations as applied to trustees in the nineteenth century was complex. It seems that s8 of the 
1888 Act partially repealed s25(2) of the Judicature Act because the limitation period could, after the enactment 
of s8, clearly be relied upon by all trustees in respect of claims for breach of trust. As s8 did not apply to claims 
to recover ‘trust property, or proceeds thereof’ from the hands of trustees, it seems that, in respect of actions to 
recover trust property, s25(2) remained in force. This is the view taken in A R Rudall, and J W Greig, The Law 
of Trusts and Trustees under the Trustee Act 1888, The Trust Investment Act 1889 ,The Trustee Act 1893 
Amendment Act 1894, and the Judicial Trustees Act 1896, (2nd edn, Jordan & Sons, London 1898) 7. Section 
25(2) appears to have been enacted as mere confirmation of a rule to the same effect, developed by the Court of 
Chancery (see Rudall and Greig, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, 5 for further detail on this point), whereby 
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It was held in Rochefoucauld that ‘[t]he trust which the plaintiff has established is 
clearly an express trust within the meaning of that expression as expressed in Soar v 
Ashwell.’220 B’s defence of the statutory limitation period was therefore unsuccessful. 
Although the Court of Appeal was setting a new precedent on this point, Lindley LJ’s 
judgment suggests that the Lords Justices regarded the issue as straightforward. 
Without analysing the state of the law in the late nineteenth century and earlier, it is 
difficult to see why this was so. Also, it is not immediately apparent whether Lindley 
LJ regarded the trust as an express trust or a trust that was not an express trust but 
was to be treated as such. 
3.5.1.2 The trust in Rochefoucauld cannot have been an express trust 
In Rochefoucauld, the Court of Appeal held that ‘the plaintiff has proved that the 
estates in question were conveyed to the defendant on May 27, 1873, upon trust for 
her’.221 This means that the trust, if an express trust, must have been declared 
before legal title was vested in Boustead. Lindley LJ stated that in order for s7 of the 
Statute of Frauds be complied with, ‘it is sufficient if the trust can be proved by some 
writing signed by the defendant [italics added]’.222 This shows that the only potential 
settlor of the trust, if it was express, was Boustead.  
At the time at which B made the declaration of trust, he had no title to the Estates. 
He thus lacked the capacity to settle the Estates on trust. According to the version of 
events accepted by the Court of Appeal, he indicated to C that when he obtained 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
time would run against constructive trustees but not express trustees. It seems that Lindley LJ applied the law in 
this manner. He stated (Rochefoucauld (n 2) 208) that Boustead was ‘not able to claim the benefit of s.8 of the 
Trustee Act, 1888… and the statute which is applicable is the Judicature Act, 1873… s. 25, sub-s. 2’. The 
Trustee Act 1888 was certainly in force at the time of the judgment, for s8(3) of the same Act stipulated that the 
provisions were to ‘apply to actions or other proceedings commenced after the First day of Jan., One thousand 
eight hundred and ninety’. The Comtesse’s action was originally commenced in 1894. 
220 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 208 (Lindley LJ). 
221 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 205 (Lindley LJ). 
222 ibid 206 (Lindley LJ). 
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legal title to the estates, he would hold them on trust for her. The Court of Appeal 
held that the trust arose as a result of this agreement, which was reached prior to B 
obtaining the Estates.223 There are no authorities to suggest that written evidence 
created before the alleged trustee obtained title to the property could satisfy s7.224 
For this reason, it is unlikely that Lindley LJ regarded the trust as an express trust in 
the usual sense of the phrase. Although Swadling argues that, when read as a 
whole, Lindley LJ’s judgment can only reasonably be read as recognising the trust as 
an express trust,225 it should be noted Lindley LJ described the case as an ‘express 
trust’ at only one other point in his judgment, and this was only after he had qualified 
the use of this term by explaining what he meant by an express trust within the 
context of the considerations in the case.226 
3.5.1.3 How were parol trusts recognised under the instrument of fraud principle 
classified in 1896? 
In order to understand the meaning of Lindley LJ’s words, it is necessary to consider 
how, at the time of the judgment of Rochefocuauld, trusts arising out of parol 
agreements were usually classified. According to the analysis in Chapter Two of this 
thesis, parol agreement trusts were generally regarded prior to the twentieth century 
as trusts arising for the prevention of fraud. Nineteenth century judges did not 
ordinarily deem it necessary to categorise parol agreement trusts as express, 
                                                          
223 This is made clear in Rochefoucauld (n 117) 76. Note that one of the Comtesse’s assertions was that the 
correspondence between Boustead and her after the conveyance provided sufficient written evidence to satisfy 
s7. Lindley LJ, whilst conceding that this could well have been the case, found it unnecessary to make any 
definitive ruling on this issue because of the fraud. 
224 The circumstances in which s7 could be satisfied are covered comprehensively in Lewin, A Practical 
Treatise, 56. 
225 Swadling, ‘The Nature of the Trust’ (n 171). 
226 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 212. It might also be noted that Lindley LJ observed (196) that the instrument of fraud 
principle allowed ‘proof of a fraud,’ (described as proof of the trustee having knowingly taking subject to the 
trust and then denying it), as opposed to proof merely of the trust. This is not consistent with his having viewed 
the trust as a normal express trust. The instrument of fraud principle was explained in the same terms, as 
allowing proof of the fraud, by Turner LJ in Lincoln v Wright (n 167). 
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constructive or resulting. Because the prevention of fraud was a ground for equitable 
intervention and an established reason for the recognition and enforcement of a 
trust, no further classification was required. This was explained in detail by Lord 
Hardwicke LC in Young v Peachy.227 Here, the plaintiffs originally claimed that B’s 
assignees in bankruptcy held the interest for them by way of ‘a trust resulting by 
operation of law’.228 Lord Hardwicke explained that:  
the question is, whether… here is either a trust resulting by operation of law 
for the benefit of the daughter… or whether there is not a ground… to direct 
that the assignees, under the commission of bankruptcy… shall execute a 
reconveyance under the head of fraud.229 
Lord Hardwicke held that ‘there was no such trust [resulting by operation of law]’,230 
but that the plaintiffs ‘had proper ground to be relieved under the head of fraud’.231 
The Statute of Frauds could not be relied upon by the defendant because ‘if that 
objection should be allowed, the statute would tend to promote frauds rather than 
prevent them’.232 The defendant was therefore found to be a trustee233 and ordered 
to convey the relevant property to the plaintiffs. 
                                                          
227 (1741) 2 Atk 254. 
228 ibid 256.  
229 ibid 257. 
230 ibid (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
231 ibid 257. 
232 ibid 258. 
233 It should be noted that the only ground upon which the Court of Chancery could order a party to convey land 
to another was that the former had been held to be a trustee. See Beckford v Wade (1805) 17 Ves Jun 87, 34 ER 
34, 96 (Grant MR). 
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3.5.1.4 Why Further Classification of Parol Agreement Trusts was Unnecessary: the 
narrow interpretation of ss7 and 8 of the Statute of Frauds. 
If parol agreement trusts were understood in the nineteenth century and earlier not to 
be express trusts, it may seem odd that the courts did not classify them as 
constructive trusts so as to fall within the ambit of s8 of the Statute of Frauds, which 
exempted from the effect of s7 ‘a Trust or Confidence [which] shall or may arise or 
result by the Implication or Construction of Law or bee [sic] transferred or 
extinguished by an act or operation of Law’. After all, since the coming into force of 
the Law of Property Act 1925, parol agreement trusts have frequently been held to 
have been constructive trusts exempted from the requirements of s53(1)(b) of the 
Law of Property Act by virtue of s53(2) of the same Act. 
What must be understood, however, is that whilst sections 7 and 8 of the Statute of 
Frauds were in force, the courts did not interpret s8 as applying to constructive 
trusts. Rather, s8 only exempted from the requirements in s7 some of the types of 
trusts which would now be classified as resulting trusts. This limited interpretation of 
s8 was implied in early cases,234 and was stated expressly by Lord Hardwicke in the 
leading authority of Lloyd v Spillit:235 
in that Statute there is an Exception of Trusts arising by Operation of Law. But 
his Lordship said, that those have been but of two Kinds, either where the 
Conveyance has been taken in the Name of one Man, and the Purchase 
Money paid by another, or where the Owner of an Estate has made a 
voluntary Conveyance of it, and made a Declaration of the Trust with regard to 
                                                          
234 E.g. Kirk v Webb (1698) Prec Cha 84, 24 ER 41; Bellasis v Compton  (1693) 2 Vern 294, 23 ER 790. 
235 (1740) Barn Ch 334, 27 ER 689. 
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one Part of the Estate, and has been silent with regard to the other Part of 
it.236 
The Lord Chancellor went on to explain, however, that ‘[w]here there has been a 
Fraud in gaining a Conveyance from another, that may be a Reason for making the 
Grantee in that Conveyance to be considered merely as a Trustee.’237 
This restrictive interpretation of s8 needs to be explained in light of the Statute of 
Uses 1536. Prior to the Statute, the Court of Chancery recognised that certain 
transactions, such as purchases of land in the name of a third party, would give rise 
to a resulting use. In such instances, the third party would take legal title for the use 
of the true purchaser. The Statute of Uses converted such resulting uses into legal 
estates by automatically vesting legal title in the true purchaser.238 Once trusts came 
to be recognised by the Court of Chancery, the circumstances that would have given 
rise to resulting uses at common law were recognised by the Court of Chancery as 
giving rise to trusts by ‘strict analogy to the rule of the common law.’239 It is thus 
likely that Lord Hardwicke interpreted s8 of the Statute of Frauds, with its use of the 
phrase, ‘by the Implication or Construction of law [italics added]’ to extend only to 
those trusts that were recognised in equity by analogy with common law, as opposed 
                                                          
236 ibid 388 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
237 ibid. 
238 The process whereby uses became legal estates is explained in F W Sanders, Essay on Uses and Trusts, and 
on the Nature and Operation of Conveyances at Common Law, and of Those Which Derive Their Effect from the 
Statute of Uses (1st American from 4th English edn, Small, Philadelphia 1830) 86. See also W Roberts, A 
Treatise on the Statute of Frauds as it Regards Declarations in Trust, Conveyances and Contracts, The 
Execution of Surrenders, Proof of Wills and Codicils (Riley, New York 1807) 91-96. 
239 George Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, Vol 1 (Lea and Blanchard, Philadelphia 
1846) 512. Note that this statement was originally made in Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox 92, 30 ER 42, 93 (Eyre 
CB). The italics were added by Spence. 
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to trusts other than express trusts which arose according to the doctrines of 
equity.240  
Consideration of the work of early commentators sheds light on the question of 
whether Lord Hardwicke did indeed interpret s8 as applying only to trusts recognised 
by analogy with common law. Of early jurists, Fonblanque, Roberts and Lewin, 241 for 
example, were in agreement that Lord Hardwicke interpreted s8 in this manner, 
although Sanders appears to have disagreed at least to some extent with Lord 
Hardwicke, as he included trusts such as that in Keech v Sandford242 in his section 
on ‘trusts, arising from the operation or construction of equity’ which fell within the 
ambit of s8.243 
The fact that numerous types of trusts of land other than those identified by Lord 
Hardwicke were recognised without written evidence is difficult to reconcile with his 
Lordship’s interpretation of s8. Fonblanque therefore disagreed with Lord 
Hardwicke’s interpretation, explaining that his ‘construction of [s8] of the Statute of 
frauds restrains it to such trusts as arise by operation of law, except in cases of 
fraud, whereas it clearly extends to such as are raised by construction of equity’.244 
Roberts, on the other hand, considered that ‘[s]ome other words probably 
accompanied this observation of the Lord Chancellor’.245 
                                                          
240 I would like to express my gratitude to one of the anonymous reviewers of Allan, ‘Ceylon Coffee’ (n 1) for 
suggesting to me this possible interpretation of Lord Hardwicke’s view of the meaning of ss7 and 8 of the 
Statute of Frauds. 
241J Fonblanque and H Ballow, A Treatise of Equity with the Addition of Marginal References and Notes, Vol 1 
(Byrne, Dublin, 1793) 121; Roberts, A Treatise on the Statute of Frauds (n 233) 96; T Lewin and F A Lewin, A 
Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts by (the Late) Thomas Lewin, Esq (7th edn, Maxwell, London, 1879) 176-
179. 
242 (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61. 
243 Sanders, Essay on Uses (n 238), n (c). 
244 Fonblanque and Ballow, A Treatise of Equity’ (n 236) 121. See also Roberts, A Treatise on the Statute of 
Frauds (n 238) 96. 
245 Roberts, A Treatise on the Statute of Frauds (n 238) 96. 
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It is submitted, however, that the most convincing interpretation of the meaning of s8 
is that of Lewin.246 He thought that Fonblanque and Roberts had erred in assuming 
that the ‘seventh or enacting clause embraces all trusts indiscriminately, and that 
such as arise by operation of law are only saved from the act by virtue of the 
subsequent language contained in the eighth section.’247 Lewin noted that s8 
referred only to ‘conveyances’, whilst resulting trusts were routinely imposed on 
devises. He therefore concluded that s7 only applied to those trusts capable of being 
manifested and proven by writing, and that ‘[t]he aim of the legislature [in enacting 
s7] was, not to disturb such trusts as were raised by maxims of equity’.248 The 
reason, according to Lewin, for the enactment of s8 was simply to confirm that 
resulting trusts arising by analogy with law upon apparently absolute conveyances 
(for example, when an apparently absolute conveyance is deemed to be subject to a 
resulting trust) did not need to comply with s7. 
Lewin’s explanation sits well with other observations by Lord Hardwicke such as, for 
example, his acceptance in Young v Peachy of a trust imposed for the prevention of 
fraud as an alternative to a ‘trust resulting by operation of law’.249 In Willis v Willis,250 
his Lordship stated that the Statute of Frauds ‘requires that all declarations of trusts 
should be in writing, otherwise absolutely void, except such as arise by operation or 
construction of law’, but also that ‘[t]here is another way of taking a case out of the 
statute, and that is by admitting parol evidence within the rules of this court’.251 Lord 
Hardwicke’s view, therefore, appears to have been that trusts arising according to 
the rules of equity fell outside of the ambit of s7 without needing to be saved by s8. 
                                                          
246 See Lewin, Law of Trusts (n 241) 176-179. 
247 ibid 177-178. 
248 ibid 178. 
249 Young v Peachy (n 201) 256 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
250 (1740) 2 Atk 71. 
251 ibid 71 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
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This provides an explanation for the otherwise curious fact that s8 of the Statute of 
Frauds was cited in numerous early authorities concerning what are now regarded 
as resulting trusts,252 but not in cases concerning that would now be described as 
constructive trusts.253 It can therefore be seen that there was no need in the 
nineteenth century and earlier for the courts to classify inter vivos parol agreement 
trusts arising under the instrument of fraud principle as constructive trusts. They 
were recognised under an established head of equity, and no added legitimacy 
would have been gained by recognising them as constructive trusts of land because 
the latter were also understood to arise under established rules of equity, were 
nothing to do with s8.  
3.5.1.5  Constructive trusts and the Victorian statutory limitation period 
As has been demonstrated, by the time of Rochefoucauld, a relatively clear judicial 
definition of constructive trusts had emerged from the courts as a result of the need 
to classify trustees for the purposes of applying the limitation period. Most of the 
authorities are concerned with the distinction between express and constructive 
trusts; perhaps resulting trusts were, on the whole, so readily distinguishable from 
express trusts as to obviate the need for litigation.254 The leading late nineteenth 
century authority on the classification of trusts for limitation purposes is Soar v 
Ashwell,255 in which the Court of Appeal considered whether a solicitor of a trustee 
                                                          
252 See, for example, Gascoigne v Thwing (1685) 1 Vern 366, 23 ER 526; Kirk (n 229); Lloyd (n 230); Ryall v 
Ryall (1739) 1 Atk 59, 26 ER 39; Davies v Otty (No. 2) (n 164). 
253 See, for example, Pye v George (1710) 2 Salk 680, 91 ER 578; Marlow v Smith (1723) 2 PW 198, 24 ER 
698; Mackreth v Symmons (1808) 15 Ves Jun 239, 33 ER 778; and Saunders v Dehew (1892) 2 Vern 271, 23 ER 
775. These are cases concerning purchasers with notice. See also Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 
ER 225 and Palmer v Young (1864) 1 Vern 276, 23 ER 468 for examples of cases of fiduciaries renewing leases 
in their own name. 
254 Although not all commentators necessarily saw it this way- see P Matthews, ‘The Words which are Not 
There: a Partial History of the Constructive Trust, in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart, 
Oxford, 2009); L A Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (Pitman, London 1957). 
255 [1893] 2 QB 390. 
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who retained trust property was, for the purposes of the limitation period, to be 
treated as an express or constructive trustee.256 Bowen LJ explained that ‘[a] 
constructive trust is one which arises when a stranger to a trust already constituted is 
held by the Court to be bound in good faith and in conscience by the trust in 
consequence of his conduct and behaviour’.257 Similarly, Lord Esher MR stated that 
when a ‘breach of the legal relation relied on, whether such breach be by way of tort 
or contract, makes, in the view of a Court of Equity, the defendant a trustee for the 
plaintiff, the Court of Equity treats the defendant as a trustee become so by 
construction, and the trust is called a constructive trust.’258 According to these 
definitions, parol trusts which were recognised to prevent the Statute of Frauds being 
used as an engine of fraud were clearly not constructive trusts. 
3.5.1.6  How the Victorian courts dealt with trusts which were neither express nor 
resulting 
The Court of Appeal in Soar recognised that the dividing line between express and 
constructive trusts was not always easy to ascertain. Accordingly, it was held that 
there was a group of trusts which were neither express trusts, nor trusts where the 
trustees ought to be permitted to avail themselves of the limitation period. Such 
trusts were sometimes described, as ‘actual trusts’, a definition which also included 
express trusts, but did not include constructive trusts. The reason why the limitation 
period applied to claims against constructive trustees was essentially one of policy. 
As Bowen LJ explained, in actions seeking, after a period of many years, to have a 
person declared a constructive trustee, ‘conflicts of evidence are possible or 
probable, and to deny to the person to be charged the shelter or benefit of a period 
                                                          
256 It was held that the solicitor was to be treated as an express trustee. 
257 Soar (n 255) 396 (Bowen LJ). 
258 ibid 393 (Lord Esher MR). 
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of limitation would be obviously dangerous and unjust.’259 Where a person had 
knowingly taken the property as a trustee, or knowingly assumed the role of trustee, 
the dangers highlighted by Bowen LJ would not apply. This explains Bowen LJ’s 
statement that ‘‘[i]t has been established beyond doubt by authority binding on this 
Court that a person occupying a fiduciary relation, who has property deposited with 
him on the strength of such relation, is to be dealt with as an express, and not merely 
a constructive, trustee of such property.’260 Note here that Bowen LJ did not quite 
state that such trusts are express trusts. Rather, he qualified his classification by use 
of the words ‘dealt with as’. Lord Esher MR, after having defined express and 
constructive trusts in similar terms to those used by Bowen LJ, summed up the 
prevailing standpoint by stating that: 
 
[t]here are cases not falling strictly within either of those thus enunciated, 
some of which have been treated by the Courts of Equity as within the class in 
respect of which a Statute of Limitations will not be allowed to be vouched, 
and some within the class in respect of which such a statute may be 
vouched.261 
 
                                                          
259 ibid 396 (Bowen LJ). 
260 ibid 397 (Bowen LJ). 
261 ibid 393-394 (Lord Esher MR). 
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3.5.1.7  Summary of the relevant law as it would have been understood in 1896 
To recap, when the Court of Appeal, in Rochefoucauld, came to consider what type 
of trust bound B, so as to determine the applicability of the limitation period, the state 
of the law was as follows: 
1) there were numerous types of trusts arising according to the rules of equity 
that were routinely imposed on realty without any need for written evidence; 
2) such trusts were recognised and enforced not because they fell within the 
exemption in s8, but because they were not the type of trusts which were 
regulated by s7; 
3) some such trusts had been defined as constructive trusts for the purposes of 
applying the limitation period; 
4) other such trusts were treated as express trusts for the purposes of the 
limitation period because, although they were trusts which had not been 
created in the usual manner in which express trusts were created, the trust 
property had been deposited in the defendant as a trustee; 
5) there was no authority regarding whether trustees of parol trusts imposed for 
the prevention of fraud could avail themselves of the limitation period; 
6) it had long been recognised that the prevention of fraud was sufficient reason 
for the court to declare that a defendant, who had knowingly obtained a 
conveyance of land subject to a parol trust, had taken that property in a 
fiduciary capacity as a trustee. 
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3.5.1.8  How the Court of Appeal’s classification of the Trust in Rochefoucauld 
should be understood 
In light of the above, it is no surprise that the Court of Appeal reached the conclusion 
that the trust in Rochefoucauld was ‘an express trust within the meaning of that 
expression as expressed in Soar v Ashwell.’262 It is submitted that, on the basis of 
the above reasoning, Lindley LJ and his colleagues are most unlikely to have 
regarded the trust as an express trust. That the trust was not a true express trust, but 
one arising for the prevention of fraud, was no bar whatsoever to the Court of 
Appeal’s decision that the trust was to be treated as an express trust; the Court of 
Appeal had ruled only three years previously that certain types of trusts that were not 
express trusts should be treated by the courts as express trusts when adjudicating 
upon the applicability of the limitation period. Thus, although Rochefoucauld 
provided a new precedent on this point, the evidence indicates that this aspect of the 
case was not controversial or difficult. 
3.5.1.9 Summary and ramifications of these findings 
It is submitted that the above analysis of Rochefoucauld has demonstrated 
unequivocally that, during the nineteenth century and earlier, inter vivos parol 
agreement trusts such as Rochefoucauld were regarded not as express, resulting or 
constructive trusts, but as trusts arising out of equity’s jurisdiction to prevent fraud. It 
should be noted that, of the ‘joint purchase’ cases, neither Chattock or Pallant were 
expressly held to be cases in which constructive trusts were enforced. Instead, the 
trusts in both were seemingly classed as trusts arising for the prevention of fraud. 
This analysis is strongly supported by the tentative conclusions to this effect which 
                                                          
262 Rochefoucauld (n 2) 208 (Lindley LJ). 
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were reached in Chapter Two of this thesis in respect of parol agreement trusts 
falling within the first and second categories. 
3.5.2 Summary regarding the proper classification of category three parol 
agreement trusts  
It has now been established that Rochefoucauld and other category three parol 
agreement trusts were once regarded as trusts arising for the prevention of fraud, 
with no further classification necessary. The authorities indicate that, as in the other 
categories of parol agreement trusts, fraud would seem to lie in any deviation by B 
from the parol agreement because B had knowledge of C’s reliance on the parol 
agreement. The ramifications of the conclusion that all types of parol agreement 
trusts are enforced to prevent fraud will be considered in the next chapter. 
Another significant issue arising from this chapter is that, although there are many 
authorities in which category three parol agreement trusts were classified as trusts 
arising out of equity’s jurisdiction to intercede in cases of fraud, in the later cases, the 
trusts were enforced as constructive trusts. According to modern classifications, this 
would seem to be entirely appropriate. The trusts clearly arise out of B’s undertaking, 
made at a time when B had no title to declare an express trust. What is yet to be 
established is precisely when and why parol agreement trusts began to be classified 
as constructive trusts when they had previously not been so classified.  
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Chapter 4 The Doctrine of Parol Agreement Trusts and the Principle that 
Equity Will Not Allow a Statute to be used as an Instrument of Fraud1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the findings resulting from the 
research and analysis contained in previous chapters, and to resolve any 
uncertainties or questions which remain outstanding. The extent to which a common 
justification based on fraud can apply to all of the kinds of trusts discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three will be analysed, as will the proper classification of these 
trusts. In light of this analysis, it will be argued that the research undertaken for the 
purposes of addressing the research questions of this thesis has uncovered a 
distinct doctrine of equity pursuant to which all of the categories of parol agreement 
trusts are enforced. This doctrine may conveniently be referred to as the doctrine of 
parol agreement trusts.  
There is a clear overlap in some instances between scenarios to which the doctrine 
of parol agreement trusts may apply and the domain of contract law. Accordingly, 
this chapter will explore the juxtaposition between the doctrine uncovered here and 
the law of contract. 
Finally, this chapter will examine the relationship between the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts and the principle that equity will not allow a statute to be used as 
an instrument of fraud. This aim is important because the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts and the instrument of fraud principle are frequently confounded so 
                                                          
1 This chapter contains material published in G Allan, ‘Once a Fraud, Forever a Fraud: the Time-Honoured 
Doctrine of Parol Agreement Trusts’ (2014) 34 LS 419. 
 134 
 
that the instrument of fraud principle is seen as the reason for the enforcement of 
some types of parol agreement trusts without any recognition of any separate 
doctrine of parol agreement trusts. The need to disentangle the instrument of fraud 
principle from the doctrine of parol agreement trusts is even more acute given that 
the instrument of fraud principle is often regarded as archaic and unconstitutional. 
Therefore, the extent to which the doctrine of parol agreement trusts and the 
instrument of fraud principle sit easily with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
will also be analysed critically 
4.2 Reliance-based Fraud: a Common Justification for the Enforcement of 
Parol Agreement Trusts 
4.2.1 B’s knowledge of the other party’s reliance binds his/her conscience 
If the conclusions reached thus far are correct, in all of the categories of parol 
agreement trusts considered in Chapters Two and Three, equity’s intervention is 
justified on the ground that B took the property with B’s conscience affected so that 
for B to deal with the property otherwise than in accordance with the parol 
agreement would amount to a fraud. The parol agreement will normally have been 
expressly entered into, but in appropriate circumstances, the court may infer that the 
parties must tacitly have reached an agreement.2 Whether B’s conscience was so 
affected may be determined by ascertaining whether s/he knowingly took the 
property in circumstances in which the parol agreement was relied upon by the party 
with whom it was made (either A or C, depending on the scenario). If B has 
knowingly taken subject to such reliance, then any breach of the parol agreement 
                                                          
2 An obvious example would be the established rule that if B remains silent upon being asked by A to perform 
the secret trust, B’s agreement will be inferred (Moss v Cooper (1861) 1 J & H 352, 70 ER 782). Note also that 
it is widely accepted that even a declaration of an express trust may be construed or inferred from the conduct of 
the parties. See Re Kayford [1975] 1 WLR 279, Ch. 
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constitutes a fraud. This is so regardless of whether or not B would gain, or A or C 
(as the case may be) would suffer any loss or detriment, as a result of such a 
breach. In this respect, the position taken in this thesis differs from other ‘reliance-
based’ explanations for equity’s intervention, which tend to focus on the 
consequences of the reliance (i.e. on gain and loss/detriment).3 Equity’s intervention 
in these cases takes the form of the imposition of a trust which prevents B from 
perpetrating a fraud by restraining him/her from dealing with the property in any 
manner inconsistent with the parol agreement. 
4.2.1.1 The courts’ consistency revisited 
In order to emphasise the consistency of the courts across the various categories of 
parol agreements when explaining the nature of fraud, below are some selected 
judicial quotes from the previous chapters or from cases cited in the previous 
chapters. These quotes range in date between 1741 and 2014, and have been 
selected from all varieties of parol agreement trusts: 
[B] had lulled [C] into not making an offer for the estate... [B] was all the time 
leading [C] to believe that if he bought the property [C] should have the part 
he wanted. Otherwise he ought to have told [C] not to rely upon him, and that 
if he wanted any part of the estate he must bid in competition with him… [B] 
was… no longer at liberty to change his mind.4  
The concept of fraud in equity is much wider and can extend to 
unconscionable or inequitable conduct in the form of a denial or refusal to 
                                                          
3 See especially S Gardner, ‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’, in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting 
Trusts (Hart, Oxford, 2009); Y K Liew ‘Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897)’, in P Mitchell & C Mitchell (eds), 
Landmark Cases in Equity (Hart, Oxford 2012). 
4Chattock v Muller (1878) LR 8 Ch D 177, 180 (Malins VC). Note that Malins VC, 181, specifically cited 
‘fraud’ as the underlying source of equity’s jurisdiction to intercede.  
 136 
 
carry out the agreement to hold the property for the benefit of [C] which was 
the only basis upon which the property was transferred [to B].5 
If a person [i.e. B] who takes a conveyance to himself, which is absolute in 
form, nevertheless has made a bargain that he will give a beneficial interest to 
[C], he will be held to be a constructive trustee for it for [C].6 
Here is evidence, from the parties themselves, that the transaction was not 
what the deed purports it to be: this introduces Hunt's evidence; and he 
accounts for its being made an absolute conveyance, and makes it clear that 
[B] were intended to be trustees, and that it was a pious fraud, as it was 
thought better they should not appear such: and [A] may clearly come for a 
redemption.7 
It is, we think, clearly a mistake to suppose that the equitable principle on 
which a constructive trust is raised against [B] who insists on the absolute 
character of a conveyance to himself for the purpose of defeating a beneficial 
interest, which, according to the true bargain, was to belong to [A], is confined 
to cases in which the conveyance itself was fraudulently obtained. The fraud 
which brings the principle into play arises as soon as the absolute character of 
the conveyance is set up for the purpose of defeating the beneficial interest.8 
[T]he Statute of Frauds was not made to cover fraud. If the real agreement in 
this case was that as between the [C] and [B] the transaction should be a 
mortgage transaction, it is in the eye of this Court a fraud to insist on the 
                                                          
5 AM v SS [2014] EWHC 2887 (Fam) [25] (Coleridge J). 
6 Neale v Willis (1968) 19 P & CR 836, CA, 839 (Lord Denning MR). Note that Lord Diplock, 840, specifically 
cited ‘fraud’ as the underlying source of equity’s jurisdiction to intercede. 
7 Cripps v Jee (1793) 4 Bro CC 472, 29 ER 994, 476 (Arden MR). 
8 Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133, CA, 136 (Scott LJ), cited with approval in Staden v Jones [2008] 
EWCA Civ 936, 2 FLR 1931 [30] (Arden LJ). 
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conveyance as being absolute, and parol evidence must be admissible to 
prove the fraud.9 
 
[T]he fraud thus committed by [B] in inducing [A] to die intestate, upon the 
faith of the [B]'s representations that he would carry all such wishes as were 
confided to him into effect.10 
 
[A], at least when his purpose is communicated to and accepted by the [B], 
makes the disposition to him on the faith of his carrying out his promise, and it 
would be a fraud in him to refuse to perform that promise.11 
 
[F]or the .... prevention of fraud, [equity] engrafts the trusts on the devise by 
admitting evidence which the statute would in terms exclude, in order to 
prevent [B] from applying property to a purpose foreign to that for which he 
undertook to hold it.12 
 
[T]here have been a great many cases, even since the statute of frauds, 
where [B] has obtained an absolute conveyance from [A and/or C], in order to 
answer one particular purpose, but has afterwards made use of it for another, 
that this court has relieved under the head of fraud; for a practice of this sort is 
a deceit and fraud which this court ought to relieve against.13 
 
                                                          
9 Lincoln v Wright (1859) De G & J 16, 45 ER 6, 22 (Turner LJ). 
10  McCormick v Grogan (1869) LR 4 HL 82, 88 (Lord Hatherley). 
11 Re Fleetwood (1880) 15 Ch D 594, 607 (Hall VC). 
12 Blackwell v Blackwell [1929] AC 318, HL, 336 (Viscount Sumner). 
13 Young v Peachy (1741) 2 Atk 254, 26 ER 557, 558 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
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These quotes, which are deliberately mixed in terms of chronology and categories, 
are representative of the vast bulk of authorities concerning parol agreement trusts. 
It is submitted that the consistency in reasoning amply justifies the conclusions made 
in this part of this thesis regarding the nature of fraud in equity as it applies to the 
enforcement of parol agreement trusts of all types. It should be noted that, although 
it has been demonstrated here that fraud in equity is far wider in its ambit than the 
same at common law, this does not mean that equity acts in an arbitrary fashion 
when invoking its general jurisdiction to prevent fraud within the context of parol 
agreement trusts. Rather, as the above quotes and explanations show, the meaning 
of ‘fraud’ within this context can be gleaned with a great degree of precision. 
 
4.2.1.2 Proving reliance 
Now that it has been established what is meant by ‘fraud’ for the purposes of the 
authorities covered in this thesis, is necessary to explain how, on the facts of any 
given case, the courts determine whether or not it is proper to intercede on the 
ground of fraud. To this end, it seems that the courts have developed fixed 
requirements for each type of parol agreement trust in order to ensure that parol 
agreement trusts are only enforced when the courts are satisfied that the parol 
agreement has been relied upon and B must have known this to be the case. Once 
this has been established, any deviation from the parol agreement by B would 
amount to a fraud, and it is competent for equity treat B as having taken as a trustee 
in order that s/he can be prevented from acting inconsistently with what has been 
agreed. Again, it should be noted that this approach is in keeping with the rule of 
general application that equity does not act in an arbitrary manner.14 Here, it is 
                                                          
14See Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swan 402, 36 ER 670. 
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pertinent to recall the words of Lord Hardwicke, quoted above in Chapter Two, that 
‘every breach of promise is not to be called a fraud’.15  
4.2.1.1.1 Cases in which A was party to the parol agreement 
In category one and two parol agreement trusts, the fact that A entered into the parol 
agreement with B and subsequently executed the conveyance or will in B’s favour is 
sufficient to show reliance because, but for A’s reliance on the parol agreement, the 
transfer in B’s favour is not readily explicable. It is thus unnecessary for it to be 
demonstrable that any tangible level of detriment or loss would have been suffered in 
the event of the parol agreement not being carried out, or that B would thereby gain 
personally. Of course, in some of these cases, the grantor will have lost his land if 
the parol agreement is not adhered to, and B might gain personally if the parol 
agreement is not performed. It is not, however, necessary to prove this. This shows 
why the prevention of ‘fraud on the testator’ has long been accepted as a sufficient 
reason for the enforcement of secret trusts. It could be argued that, if A is dead by 
the time B reneges upon the parol agreement, s/he suffers no tangible loss, 
regardless of what subsequently happens to the property. Furthermore, as has been 
seen, secret trusts are readily enforceable even when B would not gain personally 
from failure to perform. These considerations are, however, immaterial to the 
question of whether B knew that A relied on the parol agreement. The fact that fraud 
does not arise in response to any loss suffered by A also explains why, in inter vivos 
cases such as Staden v Jones,16 a resulting trust in favour of A (assuming A is still 
alive) would not prevent the fraud. 
                                                          
15Whitton v Russell (1739) 1 Atk 448, 26 ER 285, 449 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
16 (n 8). 
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4.2.1.1.2 Cases in which C was party to the parol agreement 
In category three parol agreement trust cases, A is not a party to the parol 
agreement, has not conveyed the land in reliance on the parol agreement, and 
usually has no awareness of it. A’s reliance or lack thereof is thus immaterial to the 
enforcement of the trust. C, on the other hand, is a party to the parol agreement. As 
C has not conveyed any land in reliance on the parol agreement, his/her reliance 
must be proven in a different way. This is done by proving that C wished to acquire 
the land in question or an interest therein. In every single case of a parol agreement 
trust within category three, it is demonstrable that C wished to acquire the property, 
or at least a share therein, for himself or herself, but that, upon the parol agreement 
being entered into with B, s/he refrained from engaging in alternative attempts to 
secure this acquisition.17 Once this can be proven, the court may safely conclude 
that C relied on the parol agreement and that B was aware of this. It is not necessary 
to consider whether C would have actually been able to acquire the property by 
different means had B indicated that s/he was not intending to honour the parol 
agreement, just that C relied on the parol agreement. This explains why in Pallant v 
Morgan, B’s ability to bid higher than C was irrelevant, as was the fact that, in 
Rochefoucauld, C’s impecuniosity was likely to have prevented her from successfully 
acquiring the land without B’s assistance. 
                                                          
17In addition to Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 196 and Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43, CA, 
the other cases within this line are Banner Homes v Luff Developments Ltd  [2000] Ch 372, CA; Chattock (n 4); 
Cox v Jones EWHC 1486 (Ch), [2004] 2 FLR 1010; Holiday Inns v Broadhead (1974) 232 EG 951, CA; Island 
Holdings Ltd v Birchington Engineering Ltd (unreported), 7 July 1981; Lincoln (n 9); Samad v Thompson 
[2008] EWHC 2809 (Ch), [2008] NPC 125; Time Products Ltd v Combined English Stores Group Ltd 
(unreported,) 2 December 1974; Kearns Brothers Ltd v Hova Developments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2968; Du 
Boulay v Raggett (1989) 58 P & CR 138, Ch. 
 141 
 
4.2.2 Why is B’s knowledge of the reliance upon the parol agreement sufficient 
justification for its enforcement? 
The answer to the difficult question of why mere reliance on a parol agreement by A 
or C is sufficient to justify the imposition of a trust when B was cognisant of this 
reliance may be established by reassessing the reasons for equity’s intervention in 
cases of fraud. Arguments that loss, detriment or gain are necessary ingredients of 
the types of trusts discussed here may respectfully be categorised as being founded 
on the assumption that B’s culpability is dependent upon the consequences of any 
failure of his/hers to honour the agreement. What much of the case law seems to 
indicate, however, is that the aim of equity in deeming breaches of the parol 
agreement fraudulent was, historically, to regulate conduct. The courts apparently 
took the view that to breach a parol agreement that had been relied upon in the 
manner explored above was so intolerably unjust as to amount to fraud, even in 
cases in which the breach was unintentional.18 The root of equity’s disdain for such 
conduct seems to be that the parties had informally reached what the promisee 
believed to be an honest agreement and that the apparently genuine nature of this 
agreement had precluded the possibility of the arrangement from being drawn up in 
a more formal fashion, or of alternative arrangements being made.  
Support for this view can be gleaned from Lincoln v Wright, in which Turner LJ 
explained that ‘[i]f the real agreement’ was that the conveyance was not to be 
absolute, ‘it is…a fraud to insist on the conveyance as being absolute, and parol 
evidence must be admissible to prove the fraud.’19 Similarly, Knight Bruce LJ stated 
that there was ‘an absence of plain dealing… that an unjustifiable attempt to defeat 
                                                          
18E.g. Re Duke of Marlborough [1894] 2 Ch 133, Ch; Drakeford v Wilks (1747) 3 Atk 539, 26 ER 1111; Norris 
v Frazer (1873) LR 15 Eq 318; Cripps (n 7). 
19Lincoln (n 9) 22 (Turner LJ).  
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or evade a fair agreement [italics added] ha[d] been unsuccessfully made’.20 Lincoln 
has been followed several times,21 and numerous other cases involving inter vivos 
dispositions seem to have been decided for the same reasons.22 The same 
considerations seem to apply to secret trusts cases. In Barrow v Greenough, for 
example, it was stated that, when a court is deciding whether to enforce a secret 
trust, ‘[t]he question is, whether the confidence, that the Defendant would perform 
the trust he undertook, did not prevent the testator from making a new will.[italics 
added]’23 This view was endorsed in McCormick v Grogan, in which Lord Hatherley 
referred to the ‘fraud thus committed by the heir in inducing the testator to die 
intestate [italics added], upon the faith of the heir’s representations that he would 
carry all such wishes… into effect.’24 
Although these authorities go some way towards explaining what equity finds 
objectionable about reneging on a parol agreement that has been relied upon, it 
could reasonably be argued that they do not fully explain exactly why such conduct 
has been deemed to amount to a fraud. In fact, there is surprisingly little exploration 
of this issue, even in the early cases. It seems to have long been accepted that the 
proposition that such conduct is fraudulent was beyond question, probably because 
both inter vivos and post mortem parol agreement trusts have been enforced since 
                                                          
20Lincoln (n 9) 21 (Knight Bruce LJ). It is notable that Lincoln is a case in which the land was sold by a 
mortgagee under a power of sale to the defendant’s father. The land could have been purchased by the father 
with or without the parol agreement, and it was made clear that the plaintiff, being impecunious, could not have 
purchased the land for himself. Therefore, it is arguable that, in breaching the parol agreement, the defendant 
would have gained nothing that could not have been gained without the parol agreement, and also that any 
breach of the parol agreement would have deprived the plaintiff of nothing.  
21Most notably in Rochefoucauld (n 17). 
22For example, in Davies v Otty (No 2) (1865) 35 Beav 208, 55 ER 875, the trust was enforced, inter alia, 
because it was ‘not honest for [B] to keep the land’ 
23Barrow v Greenough (1796) 3 Ves Jun 152, 30 ER 943, 154 (Arden MR). See also Newburgh v Newburgh 
(1820) 5 Madd 364, 56 ER 934, 366 (Leach VC). 
24McCormick (n 10) 88 (Lord Hatherley). See also Drakeford (n 18) 541 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
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well before the Statute of Frauds.25  
What little discussion exists in the early case law supports this hypothesis. In Young 
v Peachy, Lord Hardwicke described the fraud of B in failing to carry out the parol 
agreement as ‘dolus malus’.26 Famously, in Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen,27 the 
same judge sought to categorise equitable fraud into five types. Whilst four of these 
species required a detailed justification, Lord Hardwicke merely said of the first that 
‘fraud, which is dolus malus, may be actual, arising from facts and circumstances of 
imposition; which is the plainest case’.28 It appears that his Lordship thought cases 
involving dolus malus to be such obvious cases of fraud that no further explanation 
was required. Interestingly, dolus malus is an expression that was used in Roman 
law. Ill intent was originally a necessary ingredient of dolus malus,29 but, by the time 
of Lord Hardwicke, merely taking legal title with notice of a previously existing 
equitable interest was considered to be dolus malus.30 In Young itself, B’s failure to 
perform the parol agreement was sufficient to count as dolus malus, without the 
need for the court to enquire into his state of mind. Interestingly, Lupoi has recently 
argued that much English trust law, including cases like secret trusts in which ‘a 
successor who pleads the lack of formalities in order not to perform an informal 
confidence’, derive from continental civil legal systems.31 Furthermore, according to 
Lupoi, such a defence was regarded as ‘”propter dolum et mendacium” of the party 
                                                          
25 See Young v Peachy (n 13) 275 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Chamberlaine v Chamberlaine (1678) 2 Freem 34, 22 
ER 1041, 35 (Lord Nottingham LC). 
26(n 13) 257. 
27(1751) Ves Sen 125, 28 ER 82. 
28ibid 55 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
29‘Labeo defined “dolus malus” as any pretence, deceit, or means employed for the purpose of circumventing, 
deceiving or ensnaring another’ at Dig 4, 3, 1, 2 cited in W L Burdick The Principles of Roman Law and their 
Relation to Modern Law (Clark, New Jersey, reprint, 2004) 498. See also E Descheemaeker The Division of 
Wrongs, A Historical Comparative Study (OUP, Oxford 2009) 71-72. 
30See Le Neve v Le Neve (1747) 3 Atk 646, 26 ER 1172, 654-655 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
31M Lupoi ‘Trust and Confidence’ (2009) 125 LQR 253, 271 
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who sheltered behind the lack of legal formalities’.32  
Overall, then, it is arguable that, according to eighteenth century equity, any failure 
by B to perform an agreement that, to B’s knowledge, had been relied upon by A or 
C, was a fraud because it was dolus malus. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that this reasoning may have been borrowed by the early Chancellors from 
the civil law so that that by the 18th century, when parol agreement trusts were first 
considered at length in the law reports, equity’s classification of such conduct as 
fraudulent was thoroughly entrenched. 
 
4.3 The Classification of Parol Agreement Trusts: Analysis and Conclusions 
4.3.1 Parol agreement trusts were not historically classified as constructive 
trusts 
It appears from Chapters 2 and 3 that, historically, parol agreement trusts were not 
referred to as constructive trusts. Moreover, as was shown in 3.5, above, inter vivos 
parol agreement trusts did not fall within the judicial definitions of constructive trusts 
which were laid down for the purposes of determining the applicability of the 
limitation periods. Furthermore, it has been argued that, in the nineteenth century 
and earlier, s8 of the Statute of Frauds was only interpreted as exempting from the 
ambit of s7 those trusts which arose by analogy with common law resulting uses, 
whilst s7 simply did not apply, and was never intended to apply, to trusts arising out 
of equity’s general jurisdiction to declare trusts in appropriate circumstances (e.g. 
pursuant to equity’s jurisdiction to intercede in all cases of fraud). Because inter 
                                                          
32ibid 273. Lupoi equates the meaning of this phrase with ‘fraud’. It should be noted that ‘dolus malus’ was 
frequently abbreviated to simply ‘dolus’. See Descheemaeker, The Division (n 29) 71. 
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vivos parol agreement trusts were seen as trusts arising out of equity’s general 
jurisdiction, there was no reason for the courts to consider trying to bring them within 
the ambit of s8, and certainly no reason to classify them as constructive trusts. 
In Blackwell v Blackwell,33 Viscount Sumner explained in similar terms, and without 
reference to constructive trusts, why the statutory formality requirements did not 
apply to secret trusts: 
the doctrine of equity, by which parol evidence is admissible to prove what is 
called "fraud" in connection with secret trusts, and effect is given to such 
trusts when established, would not seem to conflict with any of the Acts [italics 
added] under which from time to time the Legislature has regulated the right 
of testamentary disposition. A Court of conscience finds a man in the position 
of an absolute legal owner of a sum of money, which has been bequeathed to 
him under a valid will, and it declares that, on proof of certain facts relating to 
the motives and actions of the testator, it will not allow the legal owner to 
exercise his legal right to do what he will with his own. This seems to be a 
perfectly normal exercise of general equitable jurisdiction.34 
It can thus be seen that, historically, neither inter vivos nor post mortem parol 
agreement trusts were seen as being subject to the statutory formality requirements 
in sections 5 and 7 of the Statute of Frauds or s9 of the Wills Act. 
Parol agreement trusts were not the only type of trust which arose out of equity’s 
general jurisdiction. There were many types of trusts which could be engrafted onto 
wills or conveyances of land without falling foul of the statutory formality 
requirements. The courts, not being under any pressure to justify these trusts as 
                                                          
33 (n 12). 
34 ibid 334. 
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falling within the ambit of s8, did not become concerned with labelling any of these 
trusts as constructive trusts unless it became necessary to apply the limitation 
period. In this context some trusts arising out of equity’s general jurisdiction were 
described as constructive trusts (for example, in respect of questions concerning the 
limitation period, the following have been described as constructive trustees: trustees 
de son tort;35 ‘agents [who] receive and become chargeable with some part of the 
trust property’;36 recipients of property who were other than equity’s darling).37 As 
has been seen, however, parol agreement trustees were not regarded by the courts 
as constructive trusts for this or any other purpose. 
 
During the course of the nineteenth century, commentators began to take an 
academic interest in classifying trusts. There were numerous attempts, therefore, by 
nineteenth century jurists to classify further trusts arising through the application of 
equity’s general jurisdiction, with decidedly inconsistent results. For example, 
Spence included as examples of constructive trusts those arising in cases such as 
Keech v Sandford38 and purchases of land with notice, but he also included 
purchases ‘by a man, or by his directions, and with his own money, the conveyance 
in fact being take in the name of another’.39 Meanwhile, Story regarded ‘implied 
trusts arising from the presumed intention of the parties’40 as resulting trusts, which 
he viewed as distinct from ‘those implied trusts (or perhaps, more properly speaking, 
those constructive trusts) which are independent of any such intention and are 
                                                          
35 Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251 (Lord Selborne LC). 
36 ibid 252-252. 
37 Portlock v Gardner (1842) 1 Hare 594, 66 ER 1168; Soar v Ashwell [1893] 2 QB 390, CA, 405 (Kay LJ). 
38 (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 ER 223. 
39 G Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, Vol 1 (Lea and Blanchard, Philadelphia 
1846), 510. 
40 J Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in England and America, vol 2 (2nd edn, 
Little & Brown, Boston, 1834) 604. 
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forced upon the conscience of the party by the mere operation of law’.41 Lewin 
followed a similar classification to that of Story.42 Hill, on the other hand, contrary to 
Spence, Story and Lewin, and contrary to the authorities, classified parol trusts 
arising for the prevention of fraud as constructive trusts.43 Perhaps the inconsistency 
is epitomised by the fact that Underhill stated in his 1894 edition that ‘[r]esulting 
trusts… are clearly constructive’,44 whereas in 1912, the same author explained that 
‘resulting trusts… are sometimes constructive, and sometimes express in the sense 
of being intentional’.45  Perhaps this discombobulation is not surprising. As 
Alexander explained, the last quarter of the nineteenth century was a period in which 
the classification of trusts was only just beginning to be viewed seriously by 
commentators,46 and considerable changes, which eventually culminated in 
something akin to the modern classification system, were beginning to take shape.47 
One matter upon which most commentators agreed, however, was that parol trusts 
enforced pursuant to the instrument of fraud principle were not constructive trusts.48 
 
In summary, the analysis in this section very strongly supports the findings of 
Chapters Two and Three of this thesis in relation to the classification of parol 
                                                          
41 ibid. 
42 See F A Lewin, A Practical Treatise on The Law of Trusts by (the late) Thomas Lewin, Esq, Vol 1 (8th edn, 
Blackstone, Philadelphia 1888) 130 and 165. 
43 J Hill, A Practical Treatise on the Law Relating to Trustees: Their Powers, Duties, Privileges, and Liabilities 
(Stevens and Norton, London 1845) 122-123 and 141. 
44 A Underhill, A Practical and Concise Manual of the Law Relating to Private Trusts and Trustees (4th edn, 
Butterworths, London 1894) 13. 
45 A Underhill, The Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees (7th edn, Butterworth, London 1912). 
46 G S Alexander, ‘The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800-1914’, (1987) 5 LHR 303, 338. 
Alexander noted that, prior to 1875, ‘legal scholars paid virtually no attention to [the] topic [of classification].’ 
For further examples of the inconsistent labelling by nineteenth century commentators of the different categories 
of trusts other than express trusts, see P Matthews, ‘The Words which are Not There: a Partial History of the 
Constructive Trust, in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart, Oxford, 2009), 13-14. 
47 As Alexander (ibid, 342-439) pointed out, the transformation culminated in Costigan’s classification of trusts, 
according to which trusts such as that in Rochefoucauld fell squarely within the category of constructive trusts. 
Alexander was referring to G P J Costigan, ‘Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting and Constructive’ 
(1914) 27 HLR 437, 461, n 45. 
48 Only Hill dissented on this point. See n 43 and accompanying text, above. 
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agreement trusts: these trusts were not, prior to the twentieth century, regarded as 
constructive trusts by either the judiciary or the academic community. 
 
4.3.2 The express trust fallacy 
Although parol agreement trusts were not historically thought to be constructive 
trusts, it is submitted that it is entirely fallacious to suggest that parol agreement 
trusts are express trusts. The reasons, gleaned from the analysis in the previous 
chapters of this thesis, may usefully be summarised as follows: 
1) there is no case in which a parol agreement trust was held by a court to be an 
express trust (Rochefoucauld included, see the reasoning above, 3.5.1); 
2) the requirements for parol agreement trusts are inconsistent with the 
requirements for express trusts because parol agreement trusts, unlike 
express trusts, need not satisfy all of the three certainties. There is an almost 
total absence of references in the case law regarding parol agreement trusts 
to the normal requirements for express trusts, such as the three certainties. 
Parol agreement trusts frequently involve a promise by B to convey the 
property to A or C, as opposed to a distinct promise by B to hold the property 
on trust for A  or C.49 It is well established that certainty of intention cannot be 
construed out of mere promises to convey or transfer title.50 Furthermore, 
both Russell v Jackson51 and Pallant provide examples of parol agreement 
trusts being recognised in circumstances in which there was insufficient 
certainty as to the subject matter of the parol agreement to satisfy the 
                                                          
49 E.g. Re Duke of Marlborough (n 18); Ali v Khan [2002] EWCA Civ 974, [2009] WTLR 187. 
50 Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR 18 Eq 11; Jones v Lock (1865) 1 Ch App 25. 
51 (1852) 10 Hare 204, 68 ER 900. 
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requirement of certainty of subject matter as it applies to express trusts.   The 
court must be able to decree a constructive trust in order to give effect to what 
was agreed, so the agreement must be sufficiently clear to show that B 
agreed to transfer property to, or hold for the benefit of, A or C.52 It would thus 
seem that the parol agreement must identify the party who is to benefit with 
sufficient precision to satisfy the test for certainty of objects, although the 
nature of most parol agreement trusts means that the beneficiary (i.e. A or C) 
is usually clearly identified, so there are no authorities concerning the 
application of the test for certainty of objects to parol agreement trusts;  
3) parol agreement trusts have variously been described by the courts on 
numerous occasions as trusts arising out of equity’s general jurisdiction to 
which statutory formality requirements are irrelevant, 53 as constructive 
trusts,54 as trusts implied by the courts,55 as trusts (in the case of secret 
trusts) which not part of A’s testamentary disposition,56 as trusts created by 
the court to prevent fraud,57 and as trusts which are not express trusts;58 
4) parol agreement trusts are enforced when no valid declaration of express trust 
has been made. Examples are as follows: 
a. the ‘declaration of trust’ is made by B at a time at which he has no title 
to the property and thus no capacity to declare any trust thereof. All of 
the category three parol agreement trusts are examples of such trusts, 
for in none of these cases does B (or C, for that matter) have any title 
                                                          
52 This explains decisions such as Re Snowden [1979] Ch 528, Ch and Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd 
[2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752, in which neither was established. 
53 Blackwell (n 12). 
54 E.g. Bannister (n 8); Healey v Brown [2002] WTLR 849, Ch; De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 519, 
[2010] 2 FLR 1240; Staden (n 8); Samad (n 17); AM v SS (n 5).  
55 Re Spencer’s Will (1887) 57 LT 519. 
56 E.g. Briggs v Penny (1849) 3 De G & S 525, 64 ER 590; Re Maddock [1902] 2 Ch 220, CA. 
57 Stickland v Aldridge (1804) 9 Ves Jun 517, 32 ER 703. 
58 Re Tyler [1967] 1 WLR 1269, Ch. 
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to the property in question at the time at which B undertakes to take the 
property as a trustee for C. Once it is understood that the trust arises 
out of B’s undertaking, not out of any request by A as to how B is to 
take the property, it can be seen that all parol agreement trusts are 
cases which support this argument. This explains why in Staden, 
where there was a written undertaking by B to perform the trust, and 
De Bruyne59 where the trust property was not land and an express trust 
could have been declared without written evidence, the trusts were 
expressly enforced as constructive trusts arising for the prevention of 
fraud rather than as express trusts;  
b. the ‘declaration of trust’ is a mere promise to reconvey. This applies 
especially to category one parol agreement trusts. Here, B promises to 
reconvey the land to A. Even if it can be accepted that B has capacity 
to declare an express trust (perhaps because he repeats his 
undertaking upon receipt of the property), a promise to transfer 
property cannot amount to a self-declaration of trust, and does not 
satisfy the requirement for certainty of intention;60 
5) in cases of parol agreement trusts in which the declaration of an express trust 
is regulated by a statutory formality requirement, it would arguably be 
unconstitutional for the courts to recognise an express trust in apparent denial 
of the statute. This aspect is explored in more detail below, at 4.6; 
6) it would seem that the duties and powers of parol agreement trustees fall 
below those of express trustees. 61 For example, no case has been 
                                                          
59 (n 54). 
60Richards (n 50); Jones v Lock (n 50). 
61 The idea of there being a hierarchy of trusts with differing levels of duties placed on trustees has been 
explored by several commentators. For example, J Glister, ‘Mutual Intention and Quistclose Trusts’ (2012) 6 J 
 151 
 
discovered as a result of the research conducted for this thesis in which a 
parol agreement trustee was held liable, for example, for breach of a duty to 
invest, or in which a parol agreement trustee was called upon to exercise a 
power of maintenance or advancement. 
 
4.3.3 The prevention of fraud is a classification of trust in its own right: overall  
observations 
In 3.5.1.3, above, it was argued that, at the time of the judgment in Rochefoucauld, 
inter vivos parol agreement trusts were not, and had never been, classed as express 
trusts, resulting trusts, implied trusts or constructive trusts. Instead, a trust arising out 
of equity’s jurisdiction to prevent fraud was seen as falling within a classification of its 
own, quite distinct from express trusts or any other type of trust implied by equity or 
by analogy with the common law. Only when read in light of this understanding of the 
historical classification of trusts can Viscount Sumner’s observations in Blackwell, 
which are by far the most detailed judicial utterances regarding the nature of secret 
trusts, be fully appreciated. In addition to the quote in 4.3.1, above, his Lordship 
insisted that: 
[f]or the prevention of fraud equity fastens on the conscience of the legatee a 
trust, a trust, that is, which otherwise would be inoperative; in other words it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Eq 221, 225-227 explores this idea. According to Glister, a ‘non-equity’s darling constructive trustee’ owes no 
duties as such, but can be forced to surrender the trust property of its traceable proceeds. Glister’s next level 
concerns cases such as knowing recipients and some types of resulting trustees who become trustees ‘when 
recipients take property with knowledge of another’s interest’- such trustees owe a duty not to dispose of the 
property, and a positive duty to convey when called upon according to the rule in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 
Beav 115, 49 ER 282 but no other duties. Thirdly, Glister states that some trustees, such as express trustees, who 
have accepted the office of trusteeship, owe a full range of duties. He also states that, sometimes, when 
appropriate, resulting and constructive trustees, may owe some of the duties associated with the third tier of 
trusteeship. It is, in fact, argued below, that parol agreement trustees and knowing recipients are probably best 
understood as falling within Glister’s second tier, albeit owing some of the duties usually associated with 
trustees of the third type. 
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makes him do what the will in itself has nothing to do with; it lets him take 
what the will gives him and then makes him apply it, as the Court of 
conscience directs.62  
His Lordship went on to explain that a ‘resulting trust’ in favour of the testator’s 
estate would arise ‘as the result of the application of equitable doctrines to a portion 
of the testator's estate’.63 As has been mentioned already in this thesis, his Lordship 
then went on to state that secret trusts, like resulting trusts, are the product of the 
court’s ‘exercise of a general equitable jurisdiction,’64 and is thus not regulated by the 
Wills Act.  
To a modern reader, it might seem as if his Lordship was skirting around the issue; 
today’s jurist might question why Lord Sumner did not describe the secret trust as a 
constructive trust, which is, of course, a close cousin of the resulting trust. The 
answer is simple; his Lordship almost certainly did not understand the phrase 
‘constructive trust’ as it is understood today, and did not regard secret trusts as 
constructive trusts. The description of secret trusts as trusts arising out of equity’s 
jurisdiction to prevent fraud, which was part of equity’s general jurisdiction to impose 
trusts such as secret trusts and resulting trusts according to its own principles of 
fraud and presumed intention, is entirely consistent with the findings of this thesis in 
respect of how Lindley LJ and his colleagues regarded the trust in Rochefoucauld. It 
is only as a result of the extensive analysis necessary to explain the classification of 
the trust in Rochefoucauld that the lucidity and orthodoxy of Viscount Sumner’s 
explanation can be fully appreciated. It is therefore unsurprising that his Lordship’s 
observations have been interpreted in such a wide variety of ways. Hence the 
                                                          
62 Blackwell (n 12) 335 (Viscount Sumner). 
63 ibid 338. 
64 ibid 339. 
 153 
 
conclusion that was tentatively suggested in 2.3.8.2, can, in light of the analysis of 
other species of parol agreement trusts, be confirmed. It is therefore submitted that, 
for several centuries, both inter vivos and post mortem parol agreement trusts were 
classified as trusts arising to prevent fraud. Historically, no parol agreement trusts 
were classified as express trusts, resulting trusts or constructive trusts.  
 
4.3.4 Taylor v Davies: the point at which parol agreement trusts began to be 
classified as constructive trusts. 
This part of the thesis deals with the seemingly mystifying question of when and why 
parol agreement trusts came to be regarded as constructive trusts.  The point at 
which the definition of constructive trusts was expanded to include parol agreement 
trusts can be traced to the Privy Council case of Taylor v Davies,65 in which, in 
response to a question concerning the application of the limitation period, it was 
recognised for the first time,66 that there are two categories of constructive trust, one 
of which includes parol agreement trusts.67 It is useful to consider the context within 
which this decision was reached. 
Taylor is a Canadian case. The Canadian Limitation Act 1914, s47, which 
incorporated wording found in the Trustee Act 1888, s8, stipulated that trustees could 
rely on the limitation period, and defined ‘trustee’ as including ‘a trustee whose trust 
arises by construction or implication of law as well as an express trustee’, but 
                                                          
65[1920] AC 636, PC. 
66Taylor v Davies (ibid) has been cited as the source of the rule that there are two types of constructive trusts on 
several occasions in the higher courts. See, for example, Clarkson v Davies [1923] AC 100, PC; Paragon 
Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400, CA; Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 
10, [2014] AC 1189. 
67In Taylor (n 65) 651 (Viscount Cave), Rochefoucauld was expressly identified as a case concerning a 
constructive trust. It was held that constructive trusts such as that in Rochefoucauld were to be treated, like 
express trusts, as trusts within the statutory exemption to the limitation period. 
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exempted from the limitation period, inter alia, claims for the recovery of ‘trust 
property, or proceeds thereof, still retained by a trustee’. The defendant, to whom a 
partnership firm had mortgaged its premises, was appointed an ‘inspector’ in relation 
to the firm’s insolvency, pursuant to the Assignments and Preferences by Insolvent 
Persons Act R S Ont 1897, c 147. Whilst occupying this fiduciary office, the 
defendant accepted a release from the equity of redemption in satisfaction of the 
debt, although proper notice was not given to creditors. Several years later, having 
discovered that the value of the land had vastly increased, the plaintiff, who was wife 
of a deceased partner, sought to have the release set aside. Lord Cave stated that 
the defendant ‘was beyond question in a fiduciary relation to the general body of 
creditors and was disabled (under the ordinary rules of equity) from becoming a 
purchaser of any part of the estate or making any other arrangement with the 
assignee for his own benefit, except upon the condition of making full disclosure of 
all material facts within his knowledge; giving full credit for the value of his bargain; 
and obtaining the consent of the creditors’.68 The case was thus one of self-
dealing.69 
 
The defendant pleaded the limitation period as a defence. The plaintiff argued that, 
as a constructive trustee, the defendant was a trustee within the meaning of the Act, 
and thus within the statutory exemption. Accordingly, it was necessary for the Board 
to consider the nature of constructive trusts. The Board deemed trusts arising ‘by 
construction of law’ to be synonymous with ‘constructive trusts’70 and it was held the 
Canadian legislation in respect of the applicability of the limitation period to trustees 
                                                          
68 ibid 647 (Viscount Cave). 
69 C.f. Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10 [23] (Lord Sumption), where it was described as a 
case of knowing receipt. 
70 See Taylor (n 65) 651 (Viscount Cave), citing Soar v Ashwell [1893] 2 QB 390, CA, 393 (Lord Esher MR). 
This is contrary to the historical construction of the term in respect of s8 of the Statute of Frauds. 
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had an effect identical to that of the English Trustee Act 1888, from which the 
provisions quoted above were taken.71 Furthermore, it was held that this legislation 
had not altered the long-established law in respect of claims against trust property or 
property derived from the same. Lord Cave expressly mentioned Rochefoucauld, 
saying of trustees such as Boustead and those in other similar cases such as Soar 
and Burdick v Garrick,72, that: 
 
[t[hese persons, though not originally trustees, had taken upon themselves 
the custody and administration of property on behalf of others; and though 
sometimes referred to as constructive trustees,[italics added] they were, in 
fact, actual trustees, though not so named. It followed that their possession 
also was treated as the possession of the persons for whom they acted, and 
they, like express trustees [italics added], were disabled from taking 
advantage of the time bar.73 
 
It was accordingly held that the exception referred ‘not to a case where a person 
having taken possession of property on his own behalf, is liable to be declared a 
                                                          
71 Section 1(3) of the Trustee Act 1888 defined ‘the expression “trustee”’ as including ‘a trustee whose trust 
arises by construction or implication of law as well as an express trustee.’ The wording of the exemption was 
taken from s8(1) of the Trustee Act 1888 (see n 130 and accompanying text, above). The argument of the 
plaintiff in Taylor, that the defendant was a trustee within the definition in s1(3), and that therefore a claim 
against him for trust property was exempted from the statutory time bar, was apparently not raised in the English 
courts at the time in respect of constructive trustees, presumably because the law as understood in England 
seems to have been that the provisions of s8 did not apply at all to any claims ‘to recover trust property, or the 
proceeds thereof, still retained by a trustee [whether express or constructive]’, and that therefore the default 
position in respect of such claims was the old law, which, by analogy to the Statute of Limitation 1623, 
subjected actions against constructive trustees to the limitation period. Lord Cave approached this decidedly 
tricky issue in a slightly different manner, holding that, notwithstanding the statutory definition of the term 
“trustee”, the exemption did not apply to all trustees, only to express trustees and certain types of constructive 
trustee.  
72 (1870) LR 5 Ch App 233. 
73 Taylor (n 65) 651 (Viscount Cave). 
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trustee by the Court; but rather to a case where he originally took possession upon 
trust for or on behalf of others.’74 The exception therefore applied: 
 
not only to an express trustee named in the instrument of trust, but also to 
those persons who under the rules explained in Soar v Ashwell and other 
cases are to be treated as being in a like position; but… it does not apply to a 
mere constructive trustee of the character [accepted as a constructive trustee 
in the nineteenth century and before].75 
 
The defendant, as a constructive trustee outside of the meaning of the statutory 
exemption, was able to rely successfully on the time bar. A constructive trustee within 
the meaning of the statute, such as Boustead, would not have been accorded this 
defence. The importance of the judgment for present purpose lies in it marking the 
turning point in the classification of trusts such as that in Rochefoucauld. It was 
thereafter recognised that there are two types of constructive trust, and that one of 
the categories included the types of trusts being considered here.76 
 
4.3.5 The significance of the enactment of the Law of Property Act 1925, s53(2) 
The re-classification of parol agreement trusts as constructive trusts from the early 
1920s onwards acquires particular significance when it is recalled that within a few 
years of Taylor, the Law of Property Act 1925 was enacted. It is currently accepted 
                                                          
74 ibid 653. 
75 ibid. 
76 The view that Taylor is authority for the proposition that there are two types of constructive trusts has been 
endorsed by the courts on several occasions. In Clarkson (n 66) 111-112 (Lord Scott Dickson), it was stated by 
the Board that ‘[t]he effect of the Limitations Act on a claim arising under a constructive trust was considered in 
the case of Taylor v. Davies… and it was there laid down that there is a distinction between a trust which arises 
before the occurrence of the transaction impeached and cases which arise only by reason of that transaction.’  
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that inter vivos parol agreement trusts are classified as constructive trusts for the 
purposes of s53(2) of the 1925 Act, which expressly exempts ‘constructive trusts’ 
from the effect of s53(1)(b).77 The predecessor of s53(2) was s8 of the Statute of 
Frauds. At first glance, s8 seems to have been identical in effect to s53(2). Section 8 
exempted trusts that ‘shall or may arise or result by the Implication or Construction of 
Law’ from the effect of s7. As has been seen, however, the judicial consensus was 
that s8 only exempted only what would now be considered as resulting trusts, and 
did not exempt constructive trusts of any type. The repeal of s8 and its replacement 
with s53(2) seems to have been a watershed. Possibly as a result of Parliament 
having been influenced by uncertainty expressed by jurists regarding the proper 
meaning of s8,78 this new provision expressly included ‘constructive trusts’, as 
distinct from resulting trusts, within its ambit, and it therefore had a meaning distinct 
from that of its predecessor. Here, it is useful to note that, within the context of the 
proper interpretation to be given to the meaning of s53(1)(c), the House of Lords 
held in Grey v Inland Revenue Commissioners79 that the 1925 Act was more than a 
mere consolidating Act; rather, it was ‘with a number of other Acts, the culmination of 
a body of legislation by which a large part of the law of real and personal estate was 
profoundly altered’.80 Consequently, the courts began to hold that inter vivos parol 
agreement trusts, which had recently been reclassified as constructive trusts, were 
exempt from the effect of s53(1)(b) by virtue of s53(2). The contrast between pre- 
and post-1926 cases is stark. Of the former, there is no single unequivocal example 
                                                          
77See generally Bannister (n 8). Also, Samad (n 17) [118] (Sales J). 
78Although the judiciary seems to have been in agreement as to the meaning of s8, there was some dispute and 
discussion amongst jurists. See Lewin A Practical Treatise (n 42) 297-300. 
79 Grey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 1, HL. 
80 ibid 13 (Viscount Simonds). 
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of such a trust being enforced by virtue of s8.81 In the latter cases, the enforcement 
of inter vivos parol agreement trusts pursuant to s53(2) is commonplace.82  
Whilst the enactment of s53(2) provided the courts with an obvious reason to hold 
that inter vivos parol agreement trusts are constructive trusts, there was no such 
catalyst in relation to secret trusts. The Wills Act contains no exception to s9 which is 
comparable to s53(2), so even after Taylor, there was rarely any pressing reason for 
the courts to actually hold secret trusts to be constructive trusts. Thus, the indistinct 
classification of secret trusts as trusts imposed for the prevention of fraud persisted 
for far longer; the first judgment in which a secret trust was upheld explicitly as a 
constructive trust was in 2002,83 over fifty years after an inter vivos parol trust was 
first held to be a constructive trust.84 This explains why Viscount Sumner’s 
comments in Blackwell, which was decided only three years after the coming into 
force of the 1925 Act, were not influenced by the new nomenclature in s53(2). 
4.3.6 An unintended effect of s53(2) 
Although there are no direct authorities which suggest that the alteration in the 
classification of parol agreement trusts has effected any change in the underlying 
reason for their enforcement, an unfortunate consequence of the enactment of 
s53(2) has been that, at least in respect of inter vivos transactions, the courts began 
to impose constructive trusts in furtherance of parol agreements without mention of 
the word ‘fraud’. This seems to have been based on the unconsciously adopted view 
                                                          
81See 2.2.3 for a discussion of cases that are sometimes presumed to have been enforced pursuant to s8. The 
most equivocal case is Davies v Otty (n 21), in which the trust was enforced by virtue of s8, but apparently as a 
resulting trust based on a lack of consideration accompanying the offending conveyance. 
82See (n 77). 
83Healey (n 54). Secret trusts had occasionally previously been referred to as constructive trusts. See 
Kasperbauer v Griffith [2000] 1 WTLR 333, CA; Re Cleaver [1981] 1 WLR 939, Ch. 
84Bannister (n 8) seems to be the first example after the 1925 Act of a case involving an inter vivos parol 
agreement relation to land. 
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that s53(2) gives the courts carte blanche to enforce constructive trusts of land in 
order to give effect to parol agreements without reference to any underlying 
justification. This trend may provide an explanation for the decline in appreciation of 
the nature and significance of equitable fraud that occurred throughout the twentieth 
century.85 This decline, which spread to secret trusts,86 is arguably the ultimate 
source of much of the current discord in respect of trusts arising out of parol 
agreements.  
4.3.7 Can parol agreement trusts be enforced as resulting trusts? 
It will be recalled that, in part 2.4.2, the question of whether category one parol 
agreement trusts could be enforced as resulting trusts was considered, with the 
tentative conclusion that such an approach was undesirable. The findings of the 
chapters of this thesis which are concerned with other classes of parol agreement 
trusts considerably reinforce this conclusion. In the face of so many authorities that 
parol agreement trusts are, according to modern classifications, constructive trusts 
and have never been regarded as resulting trusts, it is submitted that there is no 
basis or justification for the enforcement of category one parol agreement trusts as 
resulting trusts. It was also suggested in 2.4.2 that the finding of a parol agreement 
ought to bind the court to displace any presumptions which could give rise to a 
resulting trust. This approach was recently followed in AM v SS.87 Overall, it is 
submitted that the trusts in cases such as Ali v Khan88 and Hodgson v Marks,89 
                                                          
85For example, in Bannister (n 8), the prevention of fraud is clearly cited as the reason for the imposition of the 
constructive trust.  By the time of Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, HL, the word ‘fraud’ seems to have fallen 
out of use. For example it was not used in any of the House of Lords cases of Pettitt v Pettit [1970] AC 777, HL, 
Gissing or Lloyd’s Bank v Rosset [1991] AC 107 (HL). 
86For example, the prevention of fraud was clearly held to be the reason for the enforcement of secret trusts in 
Blackwell (n 12), but by the time of Snowden (n 52), doubt was cast on the relevant of fraud. In Kasperbauer (n 
83), the word ‘fraud’ was not used. 
87 (n 5). 
88 (n 49). 
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when read in the light of the authorities on other categories of parol agreement 
trusts, should be seen as constructive trusts. 
 
4.4 A Newly Uncovered Equitable Doctrine: the Doctrine of Parol Agreement 
Trusts 
At this stage, a significant conclusion can be drawn, that is that a doctrine of equity, 
which may conveniently be referred to as the ‘doctrine of parol agreement trusts’, 
has been uncovered. The trusts in all of the scenarios considered above are 
recognised pursuant to this doctrine. By virtue of the doctrine, in appropriate 
circumstances, a constructive trust will be raised in order to prevent a party from 
perpetrating a fraud by refusing to give effect to an agreement. Usually, but not 
necessarily, the agreement has not been reached in a form which meets with 
statutory formality requirements. Three conditions must be satisfied in order for the 
doctrine to take effect: 
1) an agreement, which does not amount to a valid and enforceable contract,90 
must be reached between two parties whereby one of the parties promises 
that, upon receiving title to certain specified property, s/he will use it or part of 
it for a certain purpose; 
2) the promise cannot amount to a valid declaration of express trust (in such a 
case, the doctrine would be redundant), so the three certainties need not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
89 Hodgson v Marks [1971] Ch 892, CA 
90 For further exploration of this issue, see below at 4.5. 
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necessarily all be satisfied, but it must be possible for the promise to be given 
effect by the imposition of a trust;91 
3) the promisee must demonstrably have relied on the agreement, and the 
promisor must know this to be the case, so that it will be a fraud for the 
promisor to renege thereupon. There are several sets of fixed rules which 
have been formulated in order to determine whether, in any given scenario, 
reliance is present.92 
 
4.5 Relations between the Doctrine of Parol Agreement Trusts and the Law of 
Contract 
The first requirement of the doctrine of parol agreements trusts requires an 
agreement which does not amount to an enforceable contract. In light of this, the 
relationship between parol agreement trusts and the law of contract will be explored 
briefly with a view to stablishing whether the doctrine of parol agreement trusts 
impugns unduly on the law of contract.  
Although contracts and trusts are clearly legal concepts which are distinct from one 
another,93 lay-parties who wish to claim the benefit of agreements probably attach 
little credence to whether this is achieved through the principles of contract or trust 
law. Furthermore, the same set of circumstances which could potentially give rise to 
a contract might also give rise to a trust. As Glister and Lee put it, ‘contracts and 
                                                          
91This is explained particularly clearly in Bannister (n 8) 136 (Scott LJ). Thus, for example, if A transfers land 
to B subject to an agreement that B will use it for a non-charitable purpose, then the doctrine here could not 
apply.  
92See above, 4.2.1.2. 
93 See, for example Glister and J Lee, Hanbury & Martin, Modern Equity (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2015) 43. 
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trusts are not mutually exclusive.’94 It is perhaps also notable that past jurists have 
sometimes paid little heed to the distinction between trusts and contracts. For 
instance, Story cited cases involving both post mortem and inter vivos parol 
agreement trusts as examples of cases in which ‘it was held that the promise [made 
by B] should be specifically performed upon the ground of fraud’.95 As specific 
performance is a means by which contracts are enforced, this suggests that, in parol 
agreement trust cases, the parol agreement is enforced because it is a contract. 
Generally, however, parol agreement trust cases were not cited in chapters on 
specific performance96 in nineteenth century treatises, and are rarely cited today in 
commentaries on the law of contract. Interestingly, the term ‘contract’ was 
sometimes used in early secret trusts cases to refer to the parol agreement between 
A and B;97 evidently, in this context, ‘contract’ did not carry the precise meaning of 
the term at common law because, in the secret trust cases, C is not a party to the 
‘contract’.98 What is clear, however, is there are instances in which the doctrine of 
parol agreement trusts facilitates the enforcement of what would otherwise appear to 
be an unenforceable contract. 
The cases within the Pallant v Morgan99 line are cases in which the parol agreement 
may bear resemblance to an oral contract for the sale of land. In these cases, B 
promises that he will sell part of the land to C, or that he will reach an agreement to 
                                                          
94 Glister and J Lee, Hanbury & Martin, Modern Equity (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) 43. 
95 Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (n 40) 78. Cases cited include Young v Peachy (n 13); Oldham 
v Litchford (1705) 2 Freem 285, 23 ER 923; Sellack v Harris (1708) 20 Eq Ca Abr 46; Podmore v Gunning 
(1836) 8 Sim 644, 58 ER 985. 
96 See, for example, T Lewin, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees (3rd edn, London, Maxwell 
1857); A Underhill A Practical and Concise Manual of the law relating to trusts and trustees (4th edn, 
Butterworths, London 1894). 
97 See, for example, Stickland (n 57) 520 (Lord Eldon LC). In Drakeford (n 18) 540, Lord Hardwick LC spoke 
of B’s promise being made ‘in consideration’ of A’s bequest. 
98 Interestingly, P Jaffey, ‘Explaining the Trust’ (2015) 131 LQR 377 uses the term ‘contract’ to refer to an 
agreement (by an express trustee) to perform certain obligations which is recognised by equity when there is no 
‘contract’ according to the law of contract. 
99 (n 17). 
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that end with C, in consideration of C’s promise not to bid against B for that land. The 
enforcement of such a contract according to the principles of contract law would be 
contrary to s2(1) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. But 
successful invocation of the Pallant v Morgan equity does not depend upon the 
finding of a valid contract, or even of an oral contract which would have been a valid 
contract but for s2(1). In fact, if there is a valid written contract, then the Pallant v 
Morgan equity is redundant, for C is entitled to specific performance of the 
contract.100 This is apparent from several of the cases. For example, in Pallant v 
Morgan itself, it was held that the parol agreement amounted to ‘an agreement that 
there should be an arrangement between the parties on the division of the lot if he 
were successful’.101 Thus, specific performance was unavailable, and the 
eponymous equity was instead invoked. Similarly, Banner Homes Group plc v Luff 
Developments Ltd102 concerned what has been described as ‘a common intention to 
enter into a formal contract at some stage in the future’.103  It can thus be seen that 
the Pallant v Morgan equity is a means by which equity may, through the use of 
constructive trusts, give effect to agreements which cannot be recognised at 
common law as binding contracts. 
Parol agreement trusts have also been used historically to circumvent the doctrine of 
privity of contract. For example, in the case of an inter vivos category two parol 
agreement trust, such as Staden, A and B agree that A will transfer his/her interest in 
land to B in return for B’s promise to transfer ultimately the property to C.104 For the 
parol agreement trust to be enforced, there is no requirement for certainty of 
                                                          
100 For an example of this, see Chattock (n 4). 
101 (n 17) 49 (Harman J.) 
102 (n 17). 
103 M P Thompson, ‘Constructive Trusts and Non-binding Agreements’, [2001] Conv 265, 273. 
104 Note that the agreement, even if in writing, may well not satisfy the Law of Property Miscellaneous 
Provisions Act 1989, s2. Of course, according to s2(5), s2 does not affect ‘the creation or operation of resulting, 
implied or constructive trusts.’ 
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intention,105 and it may well not have been within the contemplation of the parties to 
create a trust (it is worth reiterating here that a promise to transfer property does not 
satisfy the requirement of certainty of intention). Rather, they are likely to have 
simply entered into an agreement which they believed to be enforceable. If the court, 
by means of a constructive trust, allows C to enforce the agreement, is this not a 
naked circumvention of the requirement for privity of contract?106 Similar 
considerations can apply to secret trusts. Indeed, in Drakeford v Wilks,107 Lord 
Hardwicke couched his explanation of a secret trust in terms which would resonate 
with contract lawyers: ‘if [A] has a conversation with [B], and [B] promises that, in 
consideration of [italics added] the disposition in favour of her, she will do an act in 
favour of a third person…’ 
This point was not lost on early commentators. For instance, Spence explained the 
juxtaposition between category two parol agreement trusts and the common law 
rules relating to contract law as follows: 
It seems that a promise made to a person, not a party to the consideration, 
but for whose benefit the stipulation is made, as well as to the party from 
whom the consideration proceeds, such third person may enforce it.108 
For this rule to apply, explained Spence, ‘the promise must be laid, in an action, as 
made to the third person.’109 But, significantly for present purposes, Spence further 
explained that ‘[i]t may be observed that a promise made to a testator alone, on the 
faith of which he omits to make a devise, will be enforced in equity, notwithstanding 
                                                          
105 See above, at 4.3.2. 
106 NB: the doctrine of privity of contract has been diluted by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
107(n 18). 
108 G Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, Vol 2. (Stevens & Norton, London, 1849) 
279.  
109 ibid, n (c). It is sometimes stated that the earliest case concerning a secret trust is Rookwood’s Case (1588) Cr 
Eliz 164. As Spence points out, however, Rookwood is simply an authority on the validity of consideration. 
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the Statute of Frauds.’110 Several cases concerning parol agreement trusts were 
cited in support of this assertion,111 and Spence went as far as to suggest that: 
the cases cited… as to not permitting a person to take fraudulent advantage 
of an act of Parliament made to supress fraud, which seem to be to some 
extent applicable to prevent an improper advantage being attempted to be 
taken of a rule of law.112 
All of this was, according to Spence, notwithstanding the general rule of equity that 
‘none can come here for a specific performance who does not come under the 
consideration of the contract.’113 
Spence’s analysis is valuable for the purposes of this thesis because it shows that 
equity has long possessed jurisdiction to recognise and enforce, for the prevention of 
fraud, trusts arising in situations in which, according to the rules of contract law at 
common law and in equity, the plaintiff would be denied relief for want of privity of 
contract. As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, however, the 
circumstances in which parol agreement trusts may arise have been carefully laid 
down. It would therefore not be reasonable to suggest that the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts impugns unduly upon the doctrine of privity of contract.  
It is also relevant to note that, within the specific context of third party rights in 
contract law, it has been recognised in several cases that the right to sue upon a 
contract is property which is capable of being subject to a trust. It is therefore 
possible to circumvent the doctrine of privity of contract through an arrangement 
whereby ‘a promisee may agree to hold his contractual right to sue a promisor on 
                                                          
110 ibid. 
111 E.g. Reech v Kennegal (1748) 1 Ves Sen 123, 27 ER 932; Sellack (n 95); Podmore (n 95). 
112 Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction, vol 2 (n 108) 279, n. (c). 
113 ibid 280. 
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trust for the third party and, as a beneficiary under a trust, the third party acquires a 
property right which he can assert against someone, such as the promisor, who 
interferes with it.’114 One difference between these cases and the cases on parol 
agreement trusts is that it is necessary to convince the courts that the parties 
intended to create a trust of the right to sue rather than merely enter into a 
contract,115 whilst, in order to invoke the doctrine of parol agreement trusts, it is 
merely necessary to show that A and B agreed that B would transfer the property in 
question to C. It might therefore be suspected that the doctrine of parol agreement 
trusts has more potential to undermine the doctrine of privity of contract. The answer 
to such a charge would be that cases like Staden are rare, for equity has exercised 
sparingly its jurisdiction to provide relief to third parties to inter vivos parol 
agreements through the imposition of trusts, and the requirements for secret trusts, 
which are stringent, have been very carefully stipulated. The probable reason for the 
scarcity of cases is that equity’s jurisdiction in relation to parol agreement trusts is 
based on the prevention of fraud and, as has been seen, not every breach of a 
promise or agreement amounts to fraud in equity. Furthermore, it might be noted that 
the doctrine of privity of contract has been eroded considerably by the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, to the extent to which some inter vivos category 
two parol agreement trusts might also be enforceable as contracts. 
Insofar as the doctrine of parol agreement trusts may serve to provide claimants with 
an avenue for relief in cases in which the parol agreement could potentially be 
viewed as an attempted contract which would not be enforceable according to the 
                                                          
114 E McKendrick, Contract Law; Text, Cases and Materials, (6th edn, OUP, Oxford, 2014), 975. As 
McKendrick points out, relevant authorities include Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company v Selfridge and Company 
Ltd [1915] AC 847, HL; Re Schebsman [1944] Ch 83, CA; Vandepitte v Perferred Accident Corp. of New York 
[1933] AC 70, PC; Les Affreteurs Reunis v Walford [1919] AC 801, HL.  
115 Schebsman, ibid. 
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rules of contract law, it should, it is suggested, be viewed in the same light as the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel. This is another doctrine of equity which provides 
claimants with an avenue for relief in instances in which the usual rules of common 
law (relation to consideration) have not been satisfied, but only in certain specific 
circumstances which have been carefully laid down by the courts.116 
In summary, the doctrine of parol agreement trusts is a doctrine by which the rules of 
equity facilitate the enforcement of bargains or agreements which would not amount 
to enforceable contracts at law and which might well not have been contemplated by 
the parties to be enforced as trusts. As such, the doctrine does, to some degree, 
encroach upon the law of contract. It is, however, by no means the only doctrine of 
equity to do so, and the extent of the encroachment is relatively minor. Furthermore, 
the strict requirements for the successful invocation of the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts means that there is little potential for the expansion of the doctrine 
of parol agreement trusts so as to further interfere with contract law. 
 
4.6 The Doctrine of Parol Agreement Trusts: the Relationship with the 
Instrument of Fraud Principle and the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
4.6.1 Introduction 
Although this thesis has demonstrated that the underlying reason for the 
enforcement of parol agreement trusts is the prevention of fraud, the relationship of 
the doctrine with the instrument of fraud principle has yet to be explored. This 
exploration is significant for two reasons in particular. Firstly, the constitutionality of 
                                                          
116On promissory estoppel, see Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] 1 KB 130 
(KB).  
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the instrument of fraud principle, and by association the enforcement of some types 
of parol agreement trusts, has repeatedly been called into question by modern 
commentators. For example, Low comments, within the context of a discussion of 
parliamentary sovereignty, that ‘a campaign of subterfuge appears to have been 
waged in relation to the so-called doctrine of Rochefoucauld v Boustead’.117 
Secondly, the relevance of the instrument of fraud principle to the modern law may 
be questioned, particularly in respect of inter vivos parol agreement trusts, to which 
s53(2) now applies. 
4.6.2 The historical judicial interpretation of the scope of statutory formality 
requirements 
4.6.2.1 The instrument of fraud principle is one of statutory interpretation 
It seems that in the nineteenth century and earlier, the principle that equity will not 
permit a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud was essentially a matter of 
statutory interpretation. Secret trusts cases in particular have led to many judicial 
observations about the relevance of statutory formality requirements to the court’s 
jurisdiction to prevent fraud. In Reech v Kennegal,118 Lord Hardwicke explained that 
'the statute should never be understood to protect fraud; and therefore whenever a 
case is infected with fraud... the court will not suffer the statute to protect it'.119  
Furthermore, in Walker v Walker120 the same Lord Chancellor explained, of the 
admission of parol evidence in cases of fraud, that ‘[t]he allowing any other 
construction upon the statute of Frauds and Perjuries, would be to make it a guard 
                                                          
117 K F K Low ‘Nonfeasance in Equity’ (2012) 128 LQR 63, n 122. See also p78. See also, see E Challinor 
‘Debunking the Myth of Secret Trusts?’ [2005] Conv 492, 297; P Critchley, ‘Instruments of Fraud, 
Testamentary Dispositions, and the Doctrine of Secret Trusts’ (1999) 115 LQR 631, 653-654; Gardner, 
‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’ (n 3) 64 and 68. 
118(n 111). 
119ibid 125. 
120 (1740) 2 Atk 98, 26 ER 461. 
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and protection to fraud, instead of a security against it, as was the design and 
intention of it.’121 For this reason, a ‘defence arising from the fraud and imposition of 
the plaintiff, and has nothing in the world to do with the statute of Frauds and 
Perjuries.’122 
Similarly, in Podmore v Gunning,123 Shadwell VC stated that ‘the very worst method 
of construing the Statute of Frauds would be that which would give rise to frauds 
instead of preventing them’.124 In Jones v Badley,125 much the same reasoning was 
applied by Lord Cairns, as he made clear that when discussing the relationship 
between secret trusts and: 
the Statute of Frauds, or, rather, the Statute of Wills, by which the Statute of 
Frauds is now in this respect superseded’, [the court] ‘does not violate the 
spirit of the statutes; but for the same end [italics added], namely prevention 
of fraud, it engrafts the trusts on the devise by admitting evidence which the 
statute would in terms exclude'126. 
Perhaps, then, the principle is better understood as that equity will not allow a statute 
intended to prevent fraud to be used as an instrument of fraud.127 Secret trusts 
cases involving the Mortmain Act 1736128 are instructive because, in such cases, 
testators generally attempted to hide behind the formality requirements of the Statute 
of Frauds as a means of facilitating dispositions that would otherwise have been 
rendered illegal by the Mortmain Act.  This prompted much judicial agonising about 
                                                          
121 ibid 100 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
122 ibid 9. 
123(n 95). 
124ibid 65. 
125(1868) LR 3 Ch App 362 
126 ibid 364 (Lord Cairns LC), citing Wallgrave v Tebbs (1855) 2 Kay & J 313, 69 ER 800, 322 (Page Wood 
VC).  
127 This point is made by S Wilson, Todd and Wilson’s Textbook on Trusts, (9th edn, OUP, Oxford 2009) 13, but 
is not widely accepted. 
128See above, 2.3.4.3.1 
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the intentions of Parliament, as is exemplified by Lord Eldon's approach in Stickland 
v Aldridge:129 
It would be a strong proposition, that the providence of the Legislature, having 
attempted expressly to prevent a disposition of land for purposes of this sort, 
was so short as to be baffled by such a transaction as is stated by this Bill...  It 
would be singular, if the Court would protect individuals, and would not act, to 
prevent a fraud upon the Law itself.130  
This again demonstrates that the intention of Parliament was paramount in the minds 
of the judges when relationship of parol agreement trusts with statutory formality 
requirements was under consideration.131 Similar reasoning was employed in inter 
vivos cases, which also show that the courts were keen that statutes passed to 
prevent fraud could not be employed for the opposite purpose. For instance, in Haigh 
v Kaye,132 James LJ stated that ‘it is clear that the Statute of Frauds was never 
intended to prevent the Court of Equity from giving relief in a case of a plain, clear, 
and deliberate fraud.’133 Malins VC was even more expansive in Booth v Turle,134 
stating that:  
it is clear that the conduct of the Defendant in attempting to avail himself of 
the legal assignment of the whole is fraudulent, and that he cannot protect 
himself by the Statute of Frauds in the commission of such a fraud. That 
                                                          
129(n 57). 
130ibid 519. 
131See also Boson v Statham (1760) 1 Cox 16, 29 ER 1041, 18-20; Wallgrave (n 126) 321-328; Adlington v 
Cann (1744) 3 Atk 141, 26 ER 885. 
132 (1872) LR 7 Ch 469 
133ibid 474 (Malins VC). See also Lincoln (n 9) 22 (Turner LJ); Rochefocuauld (n 17) 206 (Lindley LJ). 
134 (1873) LR 16 Eq 182. 
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statute was passed, as has been often said, to prevent, and not to protect or 
cover fraud.135  
This latter quote especially explains why the statutory formality requirements do not 
interfere with equity’s jurisdiction to prevent fraud. 
4.6.2.2 The statutory formality requirements do not interfere with equity’s jurisdiction 
to intervene in cases of fraud 
The sophistication of the instrument of fraud principle was explored by Viscount 
Sumner in Blackwell. His Lordship demonstrated that the instrument of fraud 
principle amounts to far more than flat refusal by the courts to apply statutory 
provisions. He said, in relation to secret trusts: 
when, on the strength of these or similar general statements of the doctrine, it 
has been said that in this connection equity has "given the go-by" to the Wills 
Act, less than justice has been done to equity and these great masters of it. 
When Lord Cairns speaks of equity not letting the devisee set up the statute it 
would seem that a fortiori equity would not set up the statute for itself to 
prevent the devisee from doing what it would have itself compelled him to do, 
if he had been negligent or dishonest in his trust, and when he speaks, in a 
figure, of "engrafting" the trusts on the devise surely he is saying in 
condensed words, that evidence, which could not be admitted to fill in what 
the testator's will leaves out, may yet be admissible to inform the Court what 
duty, onerous or not, it must bind on the conscience of the devisee, taking him 
                                                          
135 ibid 187 (Malins VC). 
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as being with regard to legal title such a devisee as the will has made him 
according to its terms.136 
As has been seen, his Lordship further explained that secret trusts are imposed ‘for 
the prevention of fraud’137, and ‘the legislation did not purport to interfere with this 
general equitable jurisdiction’.138 Viscount Sumner’s reasoning is equally applicable 
to inter vivos parol agreement trusts, where evidence which is not admissible to ‘fill 
in’ what was omitted from the deed of conveyance can similarly be applied, for the 
prevention of fraud, ‘to inform the Court what duty… must bind’ B. Notably, in the 
context of inter vivos agreements, Lord Thurlow spoke in Irnham v Child139 of ‘the 
general authority of a court of equity, to relieve in cases of fraud’.140 Here, it is 
pertinent to recall that it has been demonstrated, above at 3.5.1.4, that, according to 
the influential and authoritative jurist Lewin, s7 of the Statute of Frauds was never 
intended by Parliament to apply to trusts arising out of equity’s general jurisdiction, 
only to express trusts. 
A further argument in favour of the view that it has never been within the intention of 
Parliament for parol agreement trusts to be regulated by the formality requirements 
for testamentary dispositions and declarations of trusts of land can be made on the 
basis that Parliament has had several opportunities since 1677 to amend the 
statutory provisions in question, and has consistently declined to do so. This has not 
been lost on the courts. In Blackwell, Viscount Sumner, pointing out that secret trusts 
have been enforced for several centuries, commented that the Wills Act: 
                                                          
136 Blackwell (n 12) 337 (Viscount Sumner). 
137ibid 335. 
138ibid 339. 
139 (1781) 1 Bro CC 92, 26 ER 1006. 
140ibid 93 (Lord Thurlow). 
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is an amending Act, of which it may be said in no merely theoretical sense 
that the Legislature was acquainted with the existing state of the law… for two 
Royal Commissions… after enquiring (inter alia) into the subject of wills of real 
and personal property had reported before the Wills Act came before 
Parliament as a Bill. The extent to which parol evidence was admissible under 
existing practice for various purposes and the evils thereout arising were 
known… [and] no… remedy is attempted by the Statute of Wills for the 
mischiefs that might arise from admitting evidence [in secret trusts cases].141 
The exact same argument can be made in respect of inter vivos parol agreement 
trusts, but even more strongly. As has been explained above at 4.3.5, by the time 
that the Law of Property Act 1925 was enacted, it had come to be accepted by the 
English courts that inter vivos parol agreement trusts are constructive trusts. The 
wording of s53(2) of that Act expressly clarified that constructive trusts fall within that 
subsection. Hence, Parliament went further than merely continuing not to interfere 
with equity’s jurisdiction to recognise parol agreement trusts. Rather, the legislature 
expressly legislated so as to exclude inter vivos parol agreement trusts from the 
ambit of the formality requirements in s53(1)(b). 
A final point to note is that it has been mentioned several times above in this thesis 
that there are a number of authorities which show that both inter vivos and post 
mortem parol agreement trusts have been enforced since before the enactment of 
the Statute of Frauds.142 In Chamberlaine v Chamberlaine,143 Lord Nottingham said 
that it had been ‘the constant course of this court’144 to enforce secret trusts. His 
                                                          
141 Blackwell (n 12) 338. 
142See Young v Peachy (n 13) 257 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
143 (n 25). 
144 ibid 35. 
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Lordship is also said to have regarded the doctrine by which secret trusts are 
enforced 'as established',145 This is of particular significance in light of the fact that 
Lord Nottingham was the chief draughtsman of the Statute of Frauds,146 for it 
provides strong evidence that that legislature has never intended to interfere with 
equity’s jurisdiction to raise trusts to prevent fraud in cases concerning parol 
agreement trusts. 
4.6.3 The doctrine of parol agreement trusts, the instrument of fraud principle, 
and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty: the verdict 
It the response of the courts to the introduction of the statutory formality 
requirements was that Parliament did not intend that the Statute of Frauds or its 
successor provisions, enacted to prevent fraud, should be used to facilitate fraud, 
and that therefore Parliament must not have intended to interfere with equity’s 
jurisdiction to impose trusts for the prevention of fraud. Equity judges from previous 
centuries were, it seems, well aware of their duty to follow the will of Parliament, as 
is evident from numerous dicta from cases concerning parol agreement trusts. If this 
view is accepted, to state that the doctrine of secret trusts is unconstitutional is, in 
fact, to disregard not only the weight of authorities, but also the will of Parliament. It 
is evident from many authorities that the judiciary has taken the view that to fail to 
enforce parol agreement trusts and thus permit s9 to be used as an instrument of 
fraud would be subversive to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. As Cotton LJ 
                                                          
145Walpole v Orford (1797) 3 Ves Jun 402, 410. The Solicitor general made this comment in relation to an 
apparently unreported secret trust case from the time of Lord Nottingham called Berenger v Berenger. 
146 Lord Nottingham’s role as a draughtsman is explained in W S Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol 6 
(Merthuen, London 1925) 384. 
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put it in a secret trust case, when there is a correctly communicated and accepted 
secret trust, ‘the court is justified and bound to admit parol evidence’.147 
If the conclusions reached so far are accepted, what is now called a constructive 
trust, in the context of parol agreement trusts, may be thought of as a manifestation 
of equity’s ancient jurisdiction to prevent fraud. The instrument of fraud principle is 
not a separate doctrine; it merely explains why no statutory provisions regulate the 
exercise of this jurisdiction. Accordingly, parol agreement trusts can be enforced for 
the prevention of fraud regardless of whether or not the disposition in question is one 
which, prima facie, seems to be regulated by formality requirements.148 Although, in 
the case of inter vivos parol agreement trusts of land, equity’s ability to intervene to 
prevent fraud has been formalised by s53(2) of the 1925 Act, perhaps this should not 
be seen as a reason to dismiss the instrument of fraud principle. Rather, it is 
proposed that the enactment of s53(2) ought to be seen as vindication of equity’s 
approach as explained here. As for secret trusts, the reasoning of Viscount Sumner 
still has direct application today. 
In conclusion to this section, it is proposed that the juxtaposition between the 
instrument of fraud principle, fraud as a justification for the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts, and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty may be summarised 
as follows:   
1) B acquires legal title to the property in circumstances where there has been 
no express trust created in accordance with the relevant formality 
requirements; 
                                                          
147Re Spencer's Will (1887) 57 LT 519, 521. 
148This view explains why parol agreement trusts may be enforced for the prevention of fraud in instances where 
statutory formality requirements do not apply. See, for example, Banner Homes (n 17); De Bruyne (n 54). 
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2) Nevertheless, A or C (as the case may be) claims that B has taken as trustee 
for him/her; 
3) Prior to acquisition of legal title to the property, B had agreed with A or C to 
use the property in a certain way, and A or C had, with B’s knowledge, relied 
on this agreement; 
4) It has, since prior to the Statute of Frauds, been regarded by equity as a fraud 
for B to renege on such a parol agreement; 
5) Equity has a general jurisdiction to impose a trust (now recognised as a 
species of constructive trust) for the prevention of fraud; 
6) It was not within Parliament’s intention that the statutory formality 
requirements should be used as an engine of fraud; 
7) Consequently, Parliament did not seek to interfere with equity’s general 
jurisdiction to impose a trust for the prevention of fraud; 
8) Therefore, even though no trust has been declared or evidenced as required 
by the statutes, equity may nevertheless hold that B took as a trustee for A or 
C.  
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Chapter 5 The Place of Parol Agreement Trusts within the Law of Constructive 
Trusts 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to give doctrinal consideration to the position of parol 
agreement trusts within the law of constructive trusts. The first aim is to consider the 
relationship between parol agreement trusts and the other types of trusts and 
equitable doctrines which are similar to, or have sometimes been assimilated with, 
parol agreement trusts. The extent to which parol agreement trusts differ from, and 
are similar to, ‘common intention constructive trusts’, ‘subject to contract’ 
constructive trusts, proprietary estoppel, and mutual wills will be explored with a view 
to establishing whether any of these trusts or doctrines should be subsumed within 
the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. 
The second aim of this chapter is to consider the relationship, in terms of doctrinal 
affinities, between parol agreement trusts and other constructive trusts. Although a 
full survey of the law of constructive trusts is beyond the scope of the research 
question, the research which has been undertaken for the purposes of this thesis 
has shed some light on the historical doctrinal relationship between parol agreement 
trusts and other trusts, which may in turn inform thinking in respect of some of 
today’s controversies in the law of constructive trusts. 
5.2 Are ‘Common Intention Constructive Trusts’ Parol Agreement Trusts? 
Even within an area of law so beset by controversy as that of constructive trusts, 
those trusts often referred to as ‘common intention constructive trusts’ stand out as a 
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lightning rod for debate.1 This section explores whether common intention 
constructive trusts are best regarded as falling within the doctrine of parol agreement 
trusts and whether such a finding would provide a doctrinal basis for the resolution of 
the many contradictions and uncertainties which blight this area of equity. These 
cases typically involve a dispute between unmarried partners in circumstances 
where a shared home was purchased from A in the name of one of the partners (B) 
subject to a parol agreement that the other (C) should have a beneficial interest in 
the property.2 The parol agreement may have been expressly entered into by the 
parties, or it may be inferred from their conduct. Either way, the express or inferred 
parol agreement may lead to the imposition of a constructive trust. It is thus evident 
that, at least superficially, parol agreement trusts and common intention constructive 
trusts are extremely similar. Once it has been established that a beneficial interest in 
C’s favour has arisen under a common intention constructive trust, it is necessary for 
the court to quantify that interest. According to recent developments in the law, 
common intention constructive trusts may also arise when legal title to the land is 
acquired in the joint names of B and C. In these ‘co-ownership’ cases, there is 
                                                          
1 See, for example, A Hayward, ‘Common Intention Constructive Trusts and the Role of Imputation in Theory 
and Practice’ [2016] Conv 233; S Greer and M Pawlowski, ‘Imputation, Fairness and the Family Home [2015] 
Conv 512; B Sloan, ‘Keeping up with the Jones Case: Establishing Constructive Trusts in ‘Sole Legal Owner’ 
Scenarios’ (2015) 35 LS 226; Y K Lieu, ‘The Secondary-rights Approach to the "Common Intention 
Constructive Trust”’ [2015] Conv 210; T Etherton, ‘Constructive Trusts: a New Model for Equity and Unjust 
Enrichment’ (2008) 67 CLJ 265; S Gardner and K Davidson, ‘The Supreme Court on Family Homes’ (2012) 
128 LQR 178; S Gardner, ‘Family Property Today’ (2008) 124  LQR 422. 
2 In M v M [2013] EWHC 2534, [2014] 1 FLR 439 it was held that a common intention constructive trust could 
arise, within the context of a ‘one man company’, between a company and its controller. Furthermore, in 
Crossco No 4. v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, [2012] All ER 754, it was recognised by the Court of 
Appeal that the principles relating to common intention constructive trusts may be employed outside of the 
context of the family home. It should, however, be noted that in Erlam v Rahman [2016] EWHC 111 (Ch), 
[2016] P & CR DG5 [41], it was held that when contributions have been made to the acquisition of property 
outside of a domestic setting, the principles of resulting  trusts should prevail, and common intention 
constructive trusts should have no application. 
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already a trust of land.3 In such cases, the common intention constructive trust is 
used for the purposes of quantifying the beneficial interests.  
This part of the thesis will consider firstly whether the ‘single ownership’ cases of 
common intention constructive trusts should be regarded as parol agreement trusts. 
Next, the question of whether the doctrine of parol agreement trusts may justify the 
use of constructive trusts in the ‘co-ownership’ cases will be considered. Finally, 
there will be a brief analysis of the extent to which the doctrine of parol agreement 
trusts may bring about some clarity to the means by which the beneficial interests 
are quantified in cases concerning intention constructive trusts. 
5.2.1 Single ownership cases: the establishment of the constructive trust 
5.2.1.1 Background: the nature and requirements of common intention constructive 
trusts 
For a variety of socio-legal reasons, the first of the cases concerning common 
intention constructive trusts did not appear until the latter part of the twentieth 
century. 4 Although the case which gave birth to common intention constructive trusts 
is Gissing v Gissing,5 the leading case on the requirements for common intention 
constructive trusts in cases of single ownership is Lloyd’s Bank v Rosset.6 In this 
case, the House of Lords held that the necessary requirements for the establishment 
of a common intention constructive trust are an express or inferred agreement, or a 
common intention, between B and C that C has a beneficial interest in the land, and 
                                                          
3Law of Property Act 1925, ss34-26. 
4For a comprehensive explanation, see Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432 [41]-[48] (Baroness 
Hale) and Pettitt v Pettit [1970] AC 777, HL, 824 (Lord Diplock). Note that the courts now have statutory 
powers to redistribute the property of divorcing spouses and civil partners under the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1972 and the Civil Partnership Act 2004 respectively. Nevertheless, there are still very large numbers of 
cohabiting couples with no such statutory protection (see Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53, [2012] 1 AC 776 
[56] (Lord Collins)). 
5 [1971] AC 886, HL. 
6 [1991] AC 107, HL. 
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detrimental reliance on the agreement by C. An express common intention can arise 
as a result of any conversation between B and C which might be interpreted as an 
agreement that C should take a beneficial interest, including excuses as to why legal 
title is in B’s sole name.7 In Rosset, Lord Bridge emphasised that a common 
intention will only be inferred when C has made a direct contribution to the purchase 
price of the land.8 According to the law as laid down in Rosset, once a common 
intention has been established, indirect contributions can be sufficient to show 
detrimental reliance.9 In cases of inferred common intention, the direct contribution 
itself is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of detrimental reliance.10 
Recent obiter statements in two co-ownership cases, Stack v Dowden11 and Jones v 
Kernott,12 have thrown some doubt on whether the requirements in Rosset are still 
good law. Most specifically, doubt has been cast on whether it is still necessary to 
prove detrimental reliance in order to establish a common intention constructive trust 
and also whether indirect contributions might be sufficient to establish an inferred 
common intention. Opinion amongst commentators is split as to the current state of 
the law,13 although it has been held in several recent authorities that detrimental 
                                                          
7 Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 636, CA; Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 133, CA; Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 
WLR 1127, Fam. 
8 [1991] AC 107, 132-133. 
9 See Grant (n 7); Eves (n 7); Hammond (n 7). 
10 Midland Bank v Cooke [1995] 4 All ER 562, CA. 
11 (n 4). 
12 (n 4). 
13 The following take the view that detrimental reliance is still a requirement: A Hudson, Equity & Trusts (7th 
edn, Routledge, Abingdon, 2013) 721-723; J Glister and J Lee, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (20th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 2015 ), 300; B McFarlane & C Mitchell, Hayton & Mitchell: Text, Cases and 
Materials on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies, (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015), 689-690; 
B McFarlane, N Hopkins & S Nield, Land Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford, 2015), 542. 
On the other hand, P Davies & G Virgo, Equity & Trusts, Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, Oxford, 2013), 427-
438 take the view that detrimental reliance is no longer a requirement, whilst P Pettit, Equity & the Law of 
Trusts (12th edn, OUP, Oxford, 2012), 200, takes the view that the law is unclear in this respect. Meanwhile, 
McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield, 552, suggest that in order for a common intention to be inferred, a direct 
contribution is still necessary, whilst McFarlane and Mitchell, 688-689, suggest that a direct contribution is not 
necessary. Glister and Lee, 304-305, take the view that it is unclear whether a direct contribution is still 
required. 
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reliance is still a requirement for common intention constructive trusts in single 
ownership cases.14 
5.2.1.2 Are single ownership common intention constructive trusts examples of parol 
agreement trusts? 
Although the cases concerning common intention constructive trusts are numerous, 
there is surprisingly little in the way of judicial discussions as to the jurisprudential 
origins of these trusts, especially in the leading cases.15 In Re Densham, however, 
Goff J opined that the principle upon which common intention constructive trusts 
operates, by which ‘it would be unconscionable for a party to set up the statute and 
repudiate the agreement… was established long ago in Rochefoucauld v Boustead... 
and clearly accepted by the House of Lords in Gissing v Gissing’.16 In Gissing itself, 
no reference was made to Rochefoucauld v Boustead17 or any of the other cases 
referred to above. It is submitted, however, that if the judgment as a whole is 
scrutinised, the reader does not come away with the impression that their Lordships 
viewed themselves as inventing a new ground for the imposition of a constructive 
trust. Therefore, Goff J’s view that the House of Lords was merely applying the 
principle in Rochefoucauld is, at the very least, plausible.  Accordingly, in order to 
determine whether it is competent to regard common intention constructive trusts as 
parol agreement trusts, the extent to which common intention trusts satisfy the 
requirements for parol agreement trusts, as laid down above at 4.4. 
                                                          
14 Curran v Collins [2015] EWCA Civ 404, [2016] 1 FLR 505 [2 ] (Arden LJ); Gallarotti v Sebastianelli [2012] 
EWCA Civ 865, [2012] 2 FLR 1231 [5] (Arden LJ), although c.f. Capehorn v Harris [2015] EWCA Civ 955, 
[2016] HLR 1. 
15 Gissing (n 5); Rosset (n 6); Stack (n 4); Jones v Kernott (n 4). 
16Re Densham [1975] 1 WLR 1518, Ch, 32 (Goff J). See also Healey v Brown [2002] WTLR 849, Ch. 
17 [1897] 1 Ch 196, CA. 
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5.2.1.2.1 Requirement one: an agreement must be reached between two parties 
whereby one of the parties promises that, upon receiving title to certain specified 
property, s/he will use it for a certain purpose 
It has been pointed out several times that in most cases of common intention trusts, 
B palpably never had any intention that C should take an interest in the land.18 Use 
of the phrase ‘common intention’ in this context seems to have originated from 
judicial attempts in the 1950s to invent a new type of interest called a ‘family asset’, 
arising out of a spousal common intention,19 the phrase ‘common intention’ being 
borrowed from contract law.20 Although the myth of the family asset was put to rest in 
Gissing, use of the phrase ‘common intention’ persisted. ‘Intention’ seems to have 
been given the objective meaning familiar to modern contract lawyers, i.e., whether 
‘what was communicated between [the parties] by words or conduct, and whether 
that leads objectively to a conclusion that they intended to create legal relations and 
had agreed…’21 Thus, the enforcement of common intention constructive trusts turns 
upon the finding of an agreement between the parties. In Gissing v Gissing, Lord 
Diplock explained that such trusts arise out of an ‘oral agreement between [B] and 
[C],’22 In Rosset, Lord Bridge emphasised that ‘common intention’ has the same 
meaning as ‘an agreement, made an arrangement… an understanding’.23 The need 
for an agreement has been reiterated many times since.24 The agreement may be 
                                                          
18See N Piska ‘Constructive Trusts and Constructing Intention’ in M Dixon (ed) Modern Studies in Property 
Law Vol 5 (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) 203 and the references cited therein; S Gardner ‘Family Property’ (n 
1).   
19The reason for this example of judicial inventiveness was that it was further argued that these family assets 
should be subject to sweeping discretionary powers of the courts to vary beneficial interests as they saw fit 
pursuant to the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 s17. 
20See the explanation in Pettitt (n 4) 823 (Lord Diplock).  
21 RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Muller GmbH & Co KG (UK Production) [2010] UKSC 14, 
[2010] 1 WLR 753 [45] (Lord Clarke). 
22Gissing (n 5) 905 (Lord Diplock). 
23 (n 6) 127 (Lord Bridge). 
24 See also Grant (n 7) 649 (Nourse LJ). For recent mentions of the requirement for an agreement, see Gallarotti 
(n 14) [5] (Arden LJ) and Capehorn (n 14) [17]- [23] (Sales LJ). 
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established out of the express words of the parties, or be inferred from their conduct. 
The former cases tend to involve scenarios in which B made an excuse as to why C 
did not appear on the legal title.25 B’s excuse ‘raise[s] a clear inference that there 
was an understanding between [C] and [B], or a common intention, that [C] was to 
have some sort of proprietary interest in the house; otherwise no excuse for not 
putting her name onto the title would have been needed.’26 
Particular issues arise in relation to inferred common intention parol agreement 
trusts, for it is arguable that, in many cases involving an inferred common intention, 
there is no real agreement at all.27 If this argument is accepted, then such trusts 
cannot be considered to be parol agreement trusts. But numerous authorities show 
that an agreement is required. For example, in Capehorn v Harris,28 Sales LJ stated 
that, in order for a beneficial interest to be established, ‘an actual agreement has to 
be found to have been made, which may be inferred from conduct in an appropriate 
case.’29 He further explained that the court has the power to ‘infer that nonetheless 
[i.e. despite not having reached any express agreement] (unbeknown to themselves) 
the parties did in fact make an agreement by their conduct’.30 This is in line with 
observations made in the highest appellate court in Jones v Kernott,31 Stack32 and 
Gissing.33 If this is accepted, then there is little difficulty in saying that the inferred 
common intention cases, being cases in which an objective agreement is inferred 
from the parties’ conduct, fall within the ambit of the doctrine of parol agreement 
                                                          
25 e.g. Grant (n 7); Eaves (n 7). 
26 Grant, ibid 649 (Nourse LJ). 
27 See Crossco (n 2) [85] (Etherton LJ) and S Gardner ‘Rethinking Family Property’ (1993) 109 LQR 263; N 
Piska ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 18) 203; S Gardner ‘Family Property’ (n 1). 
28 (n 14). 
29 Capehorn (n 14) [17] (Sales LJ), delivering the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
30 ibid [23] (Sales LJ), delivering the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
31 [26]-[27] (Baroness Hale Lord Walker), and also [70]-[75]. 
32 (n 4) [126] (Lord Neuberger PSC). 
33(n 5) [897] (Lord Reid). 
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trusts. For example, it is a long-established rule that silence on behalf of a secret 
trustee when asked by the testator to perform the secret trust is taken to be 
acceptance of the trust obligation.34 It is arguable that there is no real agreement in 
such cases. Even a declaration of express trust may be inferred from the conduct of 
the parties.35 In fact, as cases involving an express common intention often arise 
when B has communicated to C an excuse for not formally granting an interest in the 
land, there is generally no actual agreement in these cases either. Rather, the 
excuse ‘raise[s] a clear inference that there was an understanding between [C] and 
[B], or a common intention, that [C] was to have some sort of proprietary interest in 
the house; otherwise no excuse for not putting her name onto the title would have 
been needed.’36 Therefore, it would seem to be unduly restrictive to exclude inferred 
common intention constructive trusts from the ambit of the doctrine discussed here 
purely on the basis that there was no actual spoken agreement. It is therefore 
submitted that both express and inferred common intention constructive trusts may 
only be established when B and C have entered into a parol agreement whereby B 
has agreed that C will take a beneficial interest. This is entirely consistent with the 
first requirement of parol agreement trusts. 
 
5.2.1.2.2 Requirement two: the promise cannot amount to a valid declaration of 
express trust 
This requirement is clearly satisfied in cases of common intention constructive trusts, 
for these cases invariably arise when the parties have not made any written 
declaration of trust which satisfies the Law of Property Act 1925, s53(1)(b). 
                                                          
34 Moss v Cooper (1861) 1 J & H 352, 70 ER 782. 
35 Re Kayford [1975] 1 WLR 279, Ch. 
36 Grant (n 7) 649 (Nourse LJ). 
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5.2.1.2.3 Requirement three: the promisee must demonstrably have relied on the 
agreement, and the promisor must know that s/he has, so that it will be a fraud for 
the promisor to renege thereupon. 
One of the findings which emerged from the analysis in this thesis is that detrimental 
reliance is not a requirement of the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. Assuming that 
detrimental reliance is a necessary ingredient of a common intention constructive 
trust, as seems still to be the case when legal title to the property is in B’s sole name, 
then it might seem contradictory to include common intention constructive trusts 
within the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. What is necessary, according to the 
doctrine of parol agreement trusts, is to show that the promisee relied on the parol 
agreement. This aspect was discussed above, at 4.2.1.2, where it was shown that 
the courts have developed fixed requirements for each type of parol agreement trust 
in order to ensure that parol agreement trusts are only enforced when the courts are 
satisfied that the parol agreement has been relied upon and B must have known this 
to be the case. 
Of all of the categories of parol agreement trusts considered above, common 
intention constructive trusts most naturally fall within category three, alongside 
Rochefoucauld and Pallant v Morgan37 lines of cases. The vendor (A) sells to B in 
circumstances in which B and C have agreed informally that C should take an 
interest in the land. It is arguable, however, that, contrary to the position relating to 
other category three parol agreement trusts, a requirement of detrimental reliance is 
the most expedient means by which the courts can be satisfied that C relied on the 
parol agreement in common intention cases. This is due to the nature of the 
                                                          
37 [1953] Ch 43, CA. 
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relationship between B and C. As they are in an intimate relationship,38 the mere fact 
that C resides in the property and does other things that an ordinary partner of the 
same nature would do is insufficient to allow the court to reach the conclusion that 
the parol agreement has been relied upon. If C performs acts relating to the land that 
are in excess of what would normally be expected of a co-habitee in an intimate 
relationship with the legal owner of that land, however, then the court can safely 
conclude that B’s promise was relied upon. Thus, whilst in most cases of parol 
agreement trusts, proof of detriment is not necessary in order to prove reliance, it is 
suggested here that, owing to the peculiar circumstances in which common intention 
constructive trusts arise, proving detriment is usually the best way to show reliance 
in the latter type of trusts. This would not seem to be inconsistent with the 
classification of common intention constructive trusts as parol agreement trusts, or 
with the general rule that proof of detriment is unnecessary. 
5.2.1.3 Arguments against the classification of common intention constructive Trusts 
as parol agreement trusts 
There are some objections to the classification of common intention constructive 
trusts as parol agreement trusts. Firstly, the requirement of detrimental reliance 
would seem incongruous with the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. As explained 
above, this is not necessarily so. Secondly, it has been argued that common 
intention constructive trusts do not necessarily turn on the finding of any parol 
agreement. The above arguments also refute this proposition. Perhaps more 
significantly, however, fraud has rarely been cited in the courts as relevant to parol 
                                                          
38Usually, although the principles may also properly apply when the parties are in a close platonic relationship. 
See Oates v Stimson [2006] EWCA Civ 546 and Re West Norwood Cemetery [2005] 1 WLR 2176, CC. Note 
that, even when the parties are in an intimate relationship, a constructive trust may arise without detrimental 
reliance if the circumstances are such that reliance can be proven in another way. See Cox [2004] EWHC 1486 
(Ch), [2004] 2 FLR 1010. 
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agreement trusts. No mention of the word ‘fraud’ was made in Stack, Jones, Gissing 
or Rosset. But one of the key points made in this thesis, emphasised above, at 4.3.6, 
is that since the enactment of the Law of Property Act 1925, s53(2), there has been a 
steep decline in judicial references to the prevention of fraud as a reason for 
recognising parol agreement trusts and a corresponding rise in the frequency of 
cases in which little attempt was made to explain the underlying justification for the 
imposition of constructive trusts. Being as the first cases of common intention 
constructive trusts did not appear until the 1970s, it is unsurprising that the courts 
have not firmly attributed their enforcement to the prevention of fraud. This does not 
mean that common intention constructive trusts ought not to be understood as 
arising to prevent fraud.  
5.2.1.4 Common intention constructive trusts should be classed as parol agreement 
trusts 
In conclusion to this section, it is suggested that common intention constructive 
trusts should be recognised as parol agreement trusts, but as a special category in 
which a requirement of detrimental reliance is appropriate. Being as it is always 
necessary for the court to be sure that the other party to the parol agreement (A or C, 
as the case may be) relied upon it, and being as the courts have long been in the 
habit of laying down fixed rules for each kind of parol agreement trust in order to 
ensure this, this proposition in no way contradicts the general rule that it is not 
necessary to prove detrimental reliance in order to raise parol agreement trusts. 
Aside from proving detriment, which is explainable within the context of nature of the 
relationship between B and C, there are no requirements for the establishment of 
common intention constructive trusts which go further than the requirements for the 
establishment of parol agreement trusts generally. It is therefore submitted that it 
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should be recognised that the most plausible underlying justification for the 
enforcement of single ownership common intention constructive trusts is the 
prevention of fraud. 
If single ownership common intention constructive trusts are to be regarded as parol 
agreement trusts, then doctrinal solutions can be proposed to the current uncertainty 
surrounding whether detrimental reliance is a necessary ingredient and whether 
indirect contributions may lead to an inference of common intention. As regards the 
first issue, it is suggested that detrimental reliance should remain as a necessary 
requirement because it is a reliable means by which a court can be sure that C relied 
on the parol agreement rather than acting upon considerations arising out of his or 
her intimate relationship with B. In respect of indirect contributions, the doctrine of 
parol agreement trusts cannot provide a firm answer. Of course, for the doctrine to 
be invoked, there must be strong evidence leading the court to infer that there was 
an agreement between B and C. Requiring a direct contribution is a means by which 
to ensure certainty in the law. Perhaps, however, this should not be an irrefutable 
requirement. Certainly, other strong evidence might properly lead the court to a 
conclusion that there was, objectively speaking, an agreement between the parties. 
It would thus be in keeping with equity’s general approach to parol agreement trusts 
for the courts to retain some degree of flexibility as regards what type of conduct will 
suffice to raise an inference of an agreement. 
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5.2.2 Co-ownership common intention constructive trusts 
5.2.2.1 Introduction to the co-ownership cases 
The recent (and controversial) 39 cases of Stack40 and Jones41 provide confirmation 
that common intention constructive trusts may be employed in the resolution of 
disputes between cohabitees who have purchased a family home jointly, but have 
contributed unequally towards the property’s acquisition. When land is conveyed into 
joint names, a statutory trust automatically arises.42 In the absence of any express 
declaration evidenced in writing in accordance with s53(1)(b), the strong 
presumption is that, even in instances where the contributions to the purchase price 
have been unequal, parties who have co-purchased a family home take as equitable 
joint tenants.43 This is because the usual nature of the relationship and financial 
arrangements between such parties ‘is on the face of things a strong indication of 
emotional and economic commitment to a joint enterprise.’ 44 Nevertheless, if it can 
be demonstrated that the parties’ common intention was that the interests should be 
held other than equally, the quantification of the beneficial interests will be governed 
by a common intention constructive trust. It was further held in Jones that the 
common intention of co-owners may alter over time so that even if, at the time of the 
acquisition of the property, the intention was that the parties should take as joint 
tenants, the beneficial interests may later vary as a result of the parties’ common 
intention.  
                                                          
39 See Y K Lieu, ‘The Secondary-rights Approach’ (n 1); M Dixon, ‘The Never-Ending Story- Co-Ownership 
after Stack v Dowden’ [2007] Conv 456; M Dixon, ‘The Still not Ended, Never-Ending Story [2012] Conv 83. 
40(n 4). 
41(n 4). 
42Law of Property Act 1925, ss34-26. 
43Although the basic premise is that, because equity follows the law, the co-owners take as joint tenants, in most 
cases of joint purchases not involving family homes, unequal contributions will rebut this presumption in favour 
of a tenancy-in-common.  
44Jones v Kernott (n 4) [29] (Baroness Hale and Lord Walker). 
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5.2.2.2 Is it necessary to prove how the common intention constructive trust arises? 
In neither Stack nor Jones was any justification provided for raising a common 
intention constructive trust in the co-ownership cases, nor was there any mention of 
fraud or the necessity of proving reliance, detrimental or otherwise. The common 
intention constructive trust was merely used as a tool for quantifying the beneficial 
interests. 
In the single ownership cases, prior to considering issues relating to quantification, it 
must be demonstrated that, through the establishment of a common intention and 
detrimental reliance, a constructive trust has arisen. In the co-ownership cases, 
however, there is already a statutory trust in place. Thus, according to the leading 
cases, the common intention is relevant only as far as quantification is concerned. 
There is no requirement to establish how and why the constructive trust arises. This 
seems strange, because the initial trust is a statutory trust, not a constructive trust, 
so it is difficult to ascertain how the beneficial interest can be quantified as if there 
were a constructive trust in existence without explaining the grounds upon which the 
constructive trust arises. 
This apparent anomaly might be justifiable if it could be said that the trust in the co-
ownership cases is, all along, a statutory trust, and that principles relating to 
quantification of beneficial interests are merely borrowed from the law relating to 
common intention constructive trusts and applied to the statutory trust in order to 
facilitate a just outcome. But if this is so, it is not easy to see how the rule, developed 
in Jones, that the apportionment of the beneficial interests may vary over time 
according to what was intended by the parties, can be reconciled with the 
requirement in Law of Property Act 1925, s53(1)(c) that a disposition of an equitable 
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interest must be in writing, otherwise it is void.  
If, for instance, B and C initially share the beneficial interest equally, and their 
common intention changes so that B has a 25% beneficial interest and C a 75% 
beneficial interest, this would seem to amount to a disposition of an equitable 
interest. In effect, the parties have agreed without writing that 25% of B’s beneficial 
interest to be transferred to C. It will be recalled that although s53(2) of the Law of 
Property Act exempts ‘implied, resulting and constructive trusts’ from the ambit of 
s53(1)(c), there is no provision exempting statutory trusts from the ambit of s53(1)(c). 
Thus, if, in the co-ownership cases, the principles of common intention constructive 
trusts relating to quantification are merely borrowed and applied to a statutory trust, it 
is arguable that the requirement in s53(1)(c) is being overlooked, for, according to 
this construction, the court is sanctioning the transfer, without writing, of a beneficial 
interest which falls outside of the ambit of s53(2). 
A further point of interest is that an agreement whereby B promises to transfer 25% 
of his beneficial interest to C in return for C’s promise to assume greater financial 
responsibility, as happened in Jones, would seem to amount to a contract for the 
sale of the interest in the land. Accordingly, it should be governed by the Law of 
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s2(1), which requires contracts for the 
sale of land or interests therein to be in writing. Although, by virtue of s2(5), s2(1) 
does not ‘affect the creation or operation of resulting, implied or constructive trusts’, 
there is again no exemption for statutory trusts. 
Of course, if the trust by which the beneficial interests are apportioned is a 
constructive trust which supersedes the statutory trust, then these difficulties are 
obviated by s53(2) of the 1925 Act and s2(5) of the 1989 Act. It is strongly 
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suggested, therefore, that the co-ownership cases are best viewed as cases in which 
a common intention constructive trust arises which supersedes the underlying 
statutory trust. It is thus necessary to explain how and why this constructive trust 
arises. 
5.2.2.3 How may a parol agreement constructive trust arise in the co-ownership 
cases? 
In co-ownership cases, it is possible to justify the imposition of a common intention 
constructive trust by reference to the requirements for parol agreement trusts. It is 
helpful if the vendor is regarded as A, the lessor contributor as B and the greater 
contributor as C. If, prior to or contemporaneously with the acquisition of the land, B 
and C enter into a parol agreement (either tacitly or expressly45) that the beneficial 
interests will be allocated unequally, but no written declaration of trust is made, it 
may be argued that C relied on the parol agreement by refraining from insisting that 
the trust be declared in writing. It would therefore be a fraud for B to rely on the 
informality and renege upon the parol agreement, thereby acquiring a 50% beneficial 
interest as a joint tenant at the expense of C. If this reasoning is accepted, the 
expansion of the ambit of common intention constructive trusts into instances of co-
ownership does not preclude such trusts from being considered parol agreement 
trusts of the type discussed in this thesis. 
Subsequent variations of the beneficial interests, as was permitted in Jones, may 
also be explained with reference to the principles governing parol agreement trusts. 
In Jones, B and C initially took as joint tenants. The new common intention, or parol 
                                                          
45Because of the nature of a normal relationship between cohabiting partners in a quasi-matrimonial 
relationship, in the absence of an express parol agreement, it will be unusual for the conduct of the parties to be 
such that that court can draw an inference that unequal beneficial ownership was intended. This explains why 
cases of the nature considered in this section should not arise with any degree of frequency. 
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agreement, arose (as the court inferred) when the relationship between B and C was 
dissolved and B began to live elsewhere. There parol agreement was that the parties 
would no longer share the beneficial interest equally, but rather that C would take a 
larger beneficial interest. C then began to assume far greater financial responsibility 
in respect of the house and associated costs. In these circumstances, it would not be 
unreasonable to say that a court could conclude that C had relied on the parol 
agreement, for if, at the time that B left the property, he had stated that he was 
unwilling to countenance any change in the beneficial interests, then it is most 
unlikely that C would have assumed such responsibilities. It thus follows that it could 
be concluded that it would be a fraud for B to rely on the lack of any formal 
disposition to C of any part of his equitable interest. Hence, a parol agreement 
constructive trust would be raised in C’s favour for the prevention of fraud.  
5.2.3 Quantification of the beneficial interest 
Regardless of whether a common intention trust is one concerning single or joint 
legal ownership, the court must quantify each party’s beneficial interest. A source of 
perennial discord is the question of which principles the courts must employ in order 
to do this.46 Application of the parol agreement trust doctrine provides the answer; it 
would be fraudulent for the legal owner to depart from the parol agreement, so 
therefore, by logical extension, the beneficial interests may only be quantified with 
reference to what was agreed. Of course, the parties may not (and probably will not) 
have expressly agreed precisely how the beneficial interest is to be quantified,47 so 
the court may infer what was agreed with reference to the conduct of the parties. 
This is perfectly permissible within the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. For 
                                                          
46 This issue is discussed at length in Stack (n 4). 
47Other than, of course, in cases where the beneficiary is to take a 100% beneficial interest, such as 
Rochefoucauld (n 17); Samad v Thompson [2008] EWHC 2809 (Ch), [2008] NPC 125. 
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example, in Pallant, the beneficial interests were quantified based on ‘the proper 
inference from the facts’.48 Similarly, in Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Ltd,49 the 
constructive trust took effect as ‘contemplated under the arrangement reached 
between [the parties]’.50  
In Jones, however, the Supreme Court recently held that if: 
it is impossible to divine a common intention as to the proportions in which 
[the beneficial interest is] to be shared... the court is driven to impute an 
intention to the parties which they may never have had...’51 and that such 
imputation is to be determined as ‘the court considers fair having regard to the 
whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property’52  
It is difficult to justify doctrinally any such imputations. The defendant who fails to 
adhere to terms which were never agreed can hardly be considered to be a 
perpetrator of a fraud for not adhering to the non-existent terms.  If the court 
quantifies the beneficial interests other than in accordance with what, on the balance 
of probabilities, was agreed between the parties, it is sanctioning a fraud rather than 
preventing it because the defendant will effectively be forced by the court to deal with 
the property otherwise than in accordance with the express or inferred agreement 
upon which the claimant has relied.  
A final concern is that it is difficult to conceive of circumstances where, having found 
a parol agreement and determined that departure therefrom would constitute a fraud, 
                                                          
48Pallant (n 37) 49 (Harman J) 
49[2000] Ch 437, CA. 
50ibid 402. 
51Jones v Kernott (n 4) [31] (Baroness Hale and Lord Walker). 
52ibid [51] (Baroness Hale and Lord Walker), citing Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546, [2005] Fam 211 
[69] (Chadwick LJ). 
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the court would then be unable to construe what was intended from the available 
evidence unless, of course, the courts are in the habit of inferring parol agreements 
in circumstances in which such an initial inference cannot be justified.53 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
In terms of development of the law, the path that the law of common intention 
constructive trusts is taking is one which seems to meander according to judicial 
whims, with no doctrinal framework to provide any mooring point. Recent decisions 
of the highest appellate court have brought about a raft of debate, some derision,54 
and have failed to provide certainty. It is therefore suggested that it is high time that 
judicial consideration is given to the doctrinal principles which underpin this area of 
law. It is further contended that common intention constructive trusts were likely born 
out of principles governing parol agreement trusts, and ought to be henceforth 
treated as parol agreement trusts. The benefits of classifying common intention 
constructive trusts as such are that this would provide a fraud-based doctrinal basis 
for the resolution of many of the current uncertainties which plague this area of law. 
More specifically, if common intention constructive trusts are classified as parol 
agreement trusts, the following propositions can be made: 
1) in single purchaser cases, the requirement of detrimental reliance should 
remain; 
2) in single purchaser cases, inferring a parol agreement from contributions or 
                                                          
53In instances where the agreement as regards the quantification really cannot be inferred, then maybe recourse 
should be had to the time-honoured maxim, equity is equality. This was, in fact suggested in Cobbe v Yeoman’s 
Row, [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752 [30] (Lord Scott) and also in Pallant (n 37) 49 (Harman J). For 
recent example of cases in which the court was driven to impute the common intention, see Graham-York v York 
[2015] EWCA Civ 72; Barnes v Phillips [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2015] Fam Law 1470. The excessive 
eagerness of the courts to impute a common intention in these cases is criticised by A Hayward, ‘Common 
Intention Constructive Trusts and the Role of Imputation in Theory and Practice’ [2016] Conv 233. 
54 See especially Dixon, ‘The Still not Ended… Story’ (n 39). 
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actions other than direct contributions to the purchase price would not impugn 
upon the doctrine (although there is a danger of excessive uncertainty in the 
law); 
3) in the co-ownership cases, it should be necessary to explain the grounds 
upon which the common intention trust, which supersedes the statutory trust, 
arises. This can be done by applying principles relating to parol agreement 
trusts; 
4) imputation of a parol agreement for the purposes of quantification of the 
beneficial interest is doctrinally unsupportable. 
 
5.3 The Relationship between Parol Agreement Constructive Trusts and 
Proprietary Estoppel 
5.3.1 The requirements of the doctrine of parol agreement trusts v the 
requirements for proprietary estoppel 
The relationship between proprietary estoppel and common intention constructive 
trusts has been given a relatively high degree of judicial and academic discussion, 
with most agreeing that estoppel is a doctrine which is distinct from constructive 
trusts.55 This part of the thesis will consider the relationship between the doctrine of 
parol agreement trusts and the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. There are many 
similarities between the two doctrines. Both prevent equitable fraud, and both can be 
invoked when the defendant reneges upon a promise which has been relied upon by 
                                                          
55 See, for example, Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 for a discussion of the relationship. See also T Etherton 
‘Constructive Trusts and Proprietary Estoppel: The Search for Clarity and Principle [2009] 2 Conv 104. 
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the claimant. A successful action in proprietary estoppel might lead to the declaration 
of a constructive trust. The requirements for proprietary estoppel were summarised 
by Lord Walker in Thorner v Major:56 
most scholars agree that the doctrine is based on three main elements, 
although they express them in slightly different terms: a representation or 
assurance made to the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment 
to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance.57 
It can be observed that these requirements are different from the requirements of the 
doctrine of parol agreement trusts, as elucidated above, at 4.4. In order for a parol 
agreement constructive trust to be imposed, a bilateral agreement is required, whilst 
a unilateral representation or assurance will suffice for the invocation of proprietary 
estoppel. Furthermore, whilst the doctrine of parol agreement trusts invariably results 
in the recognition of a beneficial interest, a wide range of remedies, including, for 
example, damages in lieu of an interest, is available in successful estoppel suits.58 
Finally, proprietary estoppel requires proof of detrimental reliance, whilst mere 
reliance will suffice to establish a parol agreement constructive trust. 
5.3.2 The scenarios to which the two doctrines may apply 
In terms of the function of the two doctrines, there is some overlap as to the 
scenarios to which they might apply, not least because a defendant’s promise which 
forms part of a parol agreement will also count as a representation or an assurance 
for the purpose of establishing a claim in estoppel. Nevertheless, there are many 
scenarios which are within the domain of proprietary estoppel and outside of the 
                                                          
56 [2009] UKHL 18, [2009] WLR 776. 
57 ibid 29. For a more detailed analysis, see B McFarlane and P Sales, ‘Promises, Detriment and Liability: 
Lessons from Proprietary Estoppel’ (2015) 131 LQR 610. 
58 E.g. Baker v Baker (1993) 25 HLR 408, CA. 
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scope of the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. Obvious examples are those 
instances in which the claimant is promised and/or is granted by the courts a remedy 
other than a beneficial interest in the property. Furthermore, it would seem that 
cases in which the assurance or agreement was made by the defendant some time 
after his acquisition of title to the property also fall within the exclusive ambit of 
estoppel. It will be recalled from 4.4, above, that the doctrine of parol agreement 
trusts requires that the defendant must agree to use the property for a certain 
purpose upon receipt of that property. In none of the cases concerning any of the 
three categories of parol agreement trusts was the trust enforced when B already 
owned the property at the time at which the parol trust was entered into. 
 
Indeed, it has been held in the House of Lords that constructive trusts of the kind 
discussed here could not arise when ‘[B] owned the property before [C] came upon 
the scene.’59 Even in common intention constructive trust cases, the courts have 
shown the same curious reluctance to recognise trusts arising out of post-acquisition 
parol agreements.60 Contrarily, there are numerous authorities in which proprietary 
estoppel was successfully pleaded where the assurance or representation was made 
after the representor had acquired the land in question.61 It thus seems that, over a 
very long period, the courts have consistently invoked proprietary estoppel in the 
resolution of cases in which a landowner perpetrated a fraud by reneging upon a 
promise, assurance or parol agreement made some time after his/her acquisition of 
                                                          
59Cobbe (n 53) [37] (Lord Scott). See also Re Goodchild [1997] 1 WLR 1216, CA, 1229-1230. 
60 In Rosset (n 6) 132 (Lord Bridge), it was held that a common intention arising post-acquisition can only 
‘exceptionally’ give rise to a common intention constructive trust. See also Bernard v Josephs [1982] Ch 391, 
CA, 404 (Griffiths LJ); Morris v Morris, [2008] EWCA Civ 257; [2008] Fam Law 521 [19] (Peter Gibson LJ); 
Mirza v Mirza [2009] EWHC 3 (Ch), [2009] 2 FLR 115 [122] (Stephen Smith QC sitting as Deputy Judge). 
61See, for example, Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862) 4 De G F & J 517, 45 ER 1285; Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210, 
CA; Greasley v Cooke [1980] 1 WLR 1306, CA; Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3, 1 All ER 988; Inwards v 
Baker [1965] 2 QB 29, CA; Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA 159, [2003] 1 FCR 501; Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 
WLR 431, CA; Plimmer v Wellington Cor. (1884) 9 App Cas 699; Ottey v Grundy  [2003] EWCA Civ 1176, 
[2003] WTLR 1253; Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96; Davies v Davies [2016] EWCA Civ 463. 
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the land and upon which the other party relied. It is therefore suggested that one of 
the features which distinguishes proprietary estoppel from the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts is that a successful action in estoppel does not depend upon the 
defendant’s acquisition of the property being subject to the equity.  
5.3.3 Why does the doctrine of parol agreement trusts only apply to pre-
acquisition agreements? 
It may seem curious that parol agreement trusts only seem to arise in respect of pre-
acquisition parol agreements. There seems to be no obvious reason why this is so. 
Certainly, the fraud is arguably the same if B reneges upon a post-acquisition parol 
agreement that has been relied upon as if he reneges upon a pre-acquisition parol 
agreement that has been relied upon. It has been suggested that if a parol 
agreement is entered into when B already owns the property, then it cannot be said 
that the land was transferred to him in reliance on the parol agreement, or that B has 
gained anything as a result of the parol agreement.62 As has been demonstrated in 
chapter 3, above, however, there are many cases of parol agreement trusts, 
Rochefoucauld and Pallant included, in which A did not transfer the land on the 
strength of the parol agreement, and there is no requirement that B should be able to 
benefit personally from any failure on his part to perform the parol agreement. 
Expansion of the doctrine of parol agreement trusts into instances involving post-
acquisition parol agreements, therefore, would not impugn upon any of the 
underlying justifications for the doctrine that are proposed here. Moreover, it is 
possible that the courts’ failure to recognise post-acquisition parol agreement trusts 
is based on the misapprehension that, in cases such as Rochefoucauld, it is 
                                                          
62 McFarlane, ‘The Centrality of Constructive and Resulting Trusts’, in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts (Hart, Oxford, 2009), 183-204, 201. 
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necessary to show that the land was conveyed to B by A on the strength of the parol 
agreement. 
In the final analysis, what is certain is that, regardless of the reasons why post-
acquisition parol agreements cannot give rise to parol agreement constructive trusts, 
the authorities strongly suggest that the law is settled in this respect, and that parol 
agreements entered into by a party who already owns the subject matter of the parol 
agreement fall within the domain of the similar, but distinct, doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel. 
5.3.4 The two doctrines should remain separate 
In summary, the doctrines of parol agreement trusts and proprietary estoppel are 
conceptually different, have different requirements, and each is capable of applying 
to scenarios beyond the ambit of the other.63 It should further be added that a range 
of remedies may be imposed in the event of a successful action in estoppel, many of 
which fall short of the granting of a beneficial interest under a trust.64 It is thus 
submitted that, notwithstanding the overlap in the situations to which each doctrine 
may apply, there is ample justification for regarding the two doctrines as distinct from 
one another. 
                                                          
63 M Dixon, ‘Developments in Estoppel and Trusts of Land’ [2015] Conv 469, makes the point that proprietary 
estoppel is often invoked in cases involving ‘a family farm and/or disappointed children who claim to have been 
promised some present right or future inheritance, only to have it snatched away by fickle parents or relatives.’ 
64 For a recent example, see Davies (n 61). 
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5.4. Are Mutual Wills Parol Agreement Trusts? 
5.4.1 Introduction to mutual wills 
Mutual wills, like secret trusts, have attracted a significant volume of case law.65 The 
purpose of this section, rather than to analyse all of these authorities, is simply to 
explore the extent to which mutual wills might be governed by the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts.66 Mutual wills arise when two testators (T1 and T2) execute 
identical wills and promise one another that the wills will not be amended at any 
point in the future. Usually T1 and T2 will bequeath one another’s estate to each 
other for life with remainder to a beneficiary (B). Upon the death of T1, T2 (or vice 
versa) is obliged to apply T1’s estate according to the mutual will so that, upon T2’s 
death, if T2 has bequeathed the property to another party, T2’s executors and/or that 
party will take as constructive trustee for B under the mutual wills.67 Perhaps more 
surprisingly, T2’s own estate must also be applied according to the mutual wills. 
Thus, upon the death of T1, T2 will hold T2’s own estate on constructive trust for B,68 
although this seems to be a constructive trust which does not ‘bite’ until T2’s death, 
and has been called a ‘floating trust’.69 Since very early times, it has been held that 
mutual wills are enforced for the prevention of fraud for the same reasons as secret 
trusts.70 It is also apparent that this fraud does not depend on any personal gain 
                                                          
65 Re Dale [1994] Ch 31, Ch. 
66 In attempts to rationalise the kinds of trusts labelled in this thesis, it has been argued that mutual wills are (S 
Gardner, ‘Reliance-based Constructive Trusts’, Mitchell, Constructive and Resulting Trusts (n 62)) and are not 
(McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 66)) enforced pursuant to the same principles. 
67 See Healey (n 16). 
68 See, for example, Charles v Fraser [2010] EWHC 2154 (Ch), [2010] WTLR 1489; Fry v Densham Smith 
[2010] EWCA Civ 1410, [2011] WTLR 387. 
69 See, for example, Goodchild (n 59) 1225 (Leggatt LJ). This might provide a doctrinal precedent for the 
‘ambulatory constructive trust’ proposed in Stack (n 4) [62] (Baroness Hale) and Jones v Kernott (n 4) [14] 
(Lord Walker and Baroness Hale). 
70 Dufour v Pereira (1769) Dick 419, 21 ER 332. A full version of Lord Camden LC’s judgment in Dufour 
(fuller than appears in Dicken’s report), in which the affinity between secret trusts and mutual wills is explained 
in some detail is quoted in Dale (n 65) 40-42 (Morritt J). 
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being obtained by the person who breaches the confidence.71 Strangely, however, it 
has also apparently long been a requirement that the agreement between T1 and T2 
must amount to a valid contract.72 Indeed, it has recently been held that the 
agreement between T1 and T2 must comply with s2 of the Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1999.73 
5.4.2 The juxtaposition between mutual wills and parol agreement trusts 
The liability of T2 in respect of property received under the will of T1 clearly falls 
within the model of parol agreement trusts as presented in this thesis. T1 relied on 
the agreement when bequeathing his/her estate to T2, and T2 knew this to be the 
case. Of course if, as is often the case, T2 has received T1’s estate subject to a life 
interest bestowed by T1’s will, then T2 will have no entitlement to capital, and it will 
not be necessary to apply the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. But if, as in Healey 
v Brown,74 the mutual wills related to land which was, at the time of T1’s death, held 
by T1 and T2 as joint tenants then, although T2 takes absolutely by operation of law, 
T2 will take T1’s share on trust for the agreed beneficiary pursuant to secret trust 
principles.75 
More problematic is the question of why, after T1’s death, as long as the agreement 
between T1 and T2 amounted to a valid contract, T2’s own property is subject to a 
constructive trust which ensures that this property is distributed according to the 
terms of the mutual wills. The appropriateness of the requirement for a valid contract, 
                                                          
71 Dale, ibid. 
72 This aspect is apparent from Dicken’s report: Dufour (n 70). See also Goodchild (n 59) 1225-1225 (Leggatt 
LJ); Re Walters [2008] EWCA Civ 782, [2009] Ch 212; Healey (n 16). The requirement for a valid contract is 
accepted by Glister and Lee, Hanbury & Martin (n 13) 268; McFarlane and Mitchell, Hayton & Mitchell (n 13) 
121. 
73 Healey (n 16). 
74 ibid. 
75 Ibid [28] (Donaldson QC sitting as Deputy High Court Judge). 
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although confirmed by several authorities,76 is not universally accepted.77 In Re 
Dale,78 counsel for the beneficiary pertinently pointed out that at the time of Dufour v 
Pereira,79 the case which appears to be the source of the rule that there must be a 
valid contract, the law did not permit a husband and wife to enter into contractual 
relations with one another. The fact that T1 and T2 were husband and wife suggests 
that when Lord Camden LC mentioned a ‘contract’, was not speaking of a legally 
binding contract, more of an agreement of the type which is common to parol 
agreement trusts. In fact, in Dufour, Lord Camden explained that T2’s liability in 
respect of her own estate rested on the same principles as governed the liability of 
secret trustees.80 Essentially, T2 promised that he would bequeath his own property 
in a certain way, and T1 relied on this promise. If Neale v Willis81 is recalled, D (who 
was neither the person who transferred the trust property to B, nor the beneficiary of 
the parol agreement) relied on B’s promise that, upon B’s acquisition of land from A, 
B would grant C an interest in the land. By analogy, in the case of a mutual will, D 
(T1) relied on B’s (T2’s) promise that B would bequeath B’s land to C. The only 
difference is the absence of a person (A) conveying the property in question to B; in 
effect, this was a parol agreement entered into by B in respect of property that he 
already owned. As has been explained above, at 5.3.3, however, post-acquisition 
parol agreements, as a general rule, have been held incapable of generating parol 
agreement trusts. This, coupled with the fact that, according to the current law, the 
agreement between T1 and T2 must seemingly satisfy the requirements for a valid 
contract, shows that, at least in respect of T2’s constructive trusteeship, the doctrine 
                                                          
76 See Goodchild (n 59); Healey (n 16). 
77 See Walters (n 72), [2009] Ch 212. 
78 (n 65). 
79 (n 70). 
80 ibid. Lord Camden LC cited Thynn v Thynn (1684) 1 Vern 296, 23 ER 479; Devenish v Baines (1689) Prec Ch 
3, 24 ER 2; Chamberlaine v Chamberlaine (1678) 2 Freem 34, 22 ER 1041. 
81 (1968) 19 P & CR 836, CA. 
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of mutual wills is distinct from the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. Nevertheless, it 
must be accepted that, at least in terms of doctrinal origin, the two types of trust are 
very closely intertwined. It is also notable that the controversial idea of the ‘floating 
trust’ (although not so named) is also found in some older authorities concerning 
parol agreement trusts, and has not attracted controversy in this context.82 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that in the recent case of Re Walters,83 the 
Court of Appeal actually held that a mere agreement, rather than a valid contract is, 
or at least should be, sufficient for the operation of the doctrine of mutual wills.84 
Should the requirement for a valid contract be definitively abandoned in the future, it 
would, perhaps, be difficult to argue that even T2’s constructive trusteeship of his 
own estate is not established pursuant to the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. 
Such a development in the law would, however, require further exploration of the 
current position that parol agreement trusts cannot usually arise in respect of post-
acquisition parol agreements. As matters stand, however, the doctrine of mutual 
wills, as it affects T2’s own property, would seem to represent a peculiar hybrid 
between the common law rules of contract law and the equitable rules relating to 
parol agreement trusts. 
 
5.5 The ‘Subject to Contract’ Cases 
There is a line of cases which suggests that a purchaser of land (B) may be held to 
have taken the land subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of a third party (C) 
when B agreed with the vendor (A) that he would take the land subject to a right that 
                                                          
82 E.g. Drakeford v Wilks (1747) 3 Atk 539, 26 ER 1111.  
83 (n 72). 
84 See P Luxton, ‘Walters v Olin: uncertainty of subject matter - an insoluble problem in mutual wills?’ [2009] 
Conv 498. 
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A (or A’s predecessor in title) had granted to C and which would otherwise be 
unenforceable against B.85 Such constructive trusts, which can arise when the 
contract of sale between A and B expressly stated that the purchase was subject to 
C’s rights, have been recognised when C was originally a contractual licensee,86 or 
had unprotected rights in registered land under a specifically enforceable contract.87 
It has been held that such a constructive trust is a new interest, arising upon the 
conveyance by A to B. As such, these trusts may be recognised even in registered 
land when C’s original right was not protected by entry on the register of title.88 The 
requirements for the imposition of these trusts as divined from the two most recent 
Court of Appeal decisions, can be summarised as follows:89 
1) C must have a prior interest (in all of the cases, this has been a contractual 
interest) which, in the circumstances would be unenforceable against B; 
2) The contract of sale must state that B has taken subject to C’s interest;90 
3) B must have taken with his conscience affected so as to take subject to a 
constructive trust (or another right that can be granted in equity, such as an 
equitable easement) giving effect to what was agreed with A. 
In order to satisfy the third requirement, it is necessary to demonstrate that B ‘has 
undertaken a new obligation, not otherwise existing, to give effect to the relevant 
                                                          
85 See Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359, CA; Lyus v Prowsa Developments Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 1044, Ch; Ashburn 
Anstalt v Arnold [1989] Ch 1; Lloyd v Dugdale [2002] 2 P & CR 167; Chaudhary v Yavuz [2011] EWCA Civ 
1314. 
86 Binions (n 85). 
87 Lyus (n 85). 
88 ibid. See also Collings v Lee [2001] 2 All ER 332, CA. The relevant statutory provisions are contained in the 
Land Registration Act 2002, ss28-29. 
89 See Chaudhary (n 85) [55] (Lloyd LJ), quoting Lloyd v Dugdale [2002] EWCA Civ 1314, P & CR 167 [52] 
(Slade LJ). 
90 It has not been directly stated that that 1) and 2) are requirements for ‘subject to contract trusts’. However, in 
all of the cases in which this doctrine has been discussed it has been assumed that cases in which C has a prior 
interest and there is an express provision in the contract whereby B promises to respect that interest form a 
discrete line to which particular considerations apply. 
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incumbrance or prior interest.’91 C may prove this if the sale from A to B was 
stipulated to be subject to C’s right and there is evidence that B intended to afford C 
a new right deriving from C’s original right. Such evidence could, for instance, 
include a reduction in the purchase price.92 
The ‘subject to contract’ cases have been subjected to various academic criticisms. 
It has been suggested that these trusts are subversive to the doctrine of 
consideration93 and to the statutory land registration regime.94 The notion that a 
‘subject to contract constructive trust’ might arise when C’s original right was a mere 
contractual licence has provoked particular criticism on the ground that licences, 
unlike constructive trusts, are mere personal rights.95 Indeed, it has been suggested 
that the phrase ‘constructive trust’, in cases concerning contractual licences, is a 
misnomer used to describe equitable enforcement of a personal right.96 
Some cases concerning parol agreement trusts, especially Bannister v Bannister,97 
have been cited as authorities which underpin these ‘subject to contract’ cases,98 
and some commentators have suggested that these cases are enforced pursuant to 
the same principles which justify cases concerning parol agreement trusts.99 It has 
also been held that the reason for the imposition of the constructive trust in such 
cases is the prevention of ‘fraud in the sense in which the term is used in a court of 
                                                          
91 Chaudhary v Yavuz (n 85) [55] (Lloyd LJ), quoting Lloyd (n 89) [52]. 
92 ibid. 
93 M P Thompson, ‘Leases, Licences and the Demise of Errington [1988] Conv 201, 206. 
94 M. P Thompson, Modern Land Law (4th edn., OUP, Oxford, 2009), 151. 
95 Thompson, ‘Leases, Licences’ (n 93) 206; McFarlane and Mitchell, Hayton & Mitchell (n 13) 671; 
McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield, Land Law (n 13) 720. 
96 B McFarlane, ‘Constructive trusts arising on a receipt of property sub conditione (2004) LQR 667, 691. 
97 [1948] 2 All ER 133, CA 
98 Bannister, ibid, was cited in Binions (n 85) 368 (Lord Denning MR); Lyus (n 85) (Dillon J); Ashburn Anstalt 
v Arnold [1989] Ch 1, CA, 23-25 (Fox LJ). Additionally, Pallant (n 37) was cited as authority for the same 
proposition in Lyus (n 85) 1052, as was Rochefocuauld (n 17) 1055. Bannister was also cited in DHN Food 
Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets BC [1976] 1 WLR 852, CA, 859 (Lord Denning) as authority that the 
granting of ‘an irrevocable licence’ may lead to the imposition of a constructive trust.  
99 E.g. Glister and Lee, Hanbury & Martin (n 13) 277-278. 
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equity’.100 Certainly, these constructive trusts can be seen as being very closely 
aligned with parol agreement trusts. Owing to B’s agreement with A that he will 
respect C’s ‘rights’, it becomes fraudulent for B to renege upon his promise. The 
fraud, then, is arguably the same as that which triggers the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts, for, without clear evidence that A relied on B’s undertaking by, for 
example, accepting a reduced price, C’s claim will fail. The ‘subject to contract’ 
cases differ, however, in respect of the apparent requirements relating to the 
contract between A and B and the existence of C’s prior contractual interest. As this 
doctrine has only ever been invoked, successfully or otherwise, in relation to land, it 
would seem that the contract between A and B, which is expressly subject to C’s 
rights, must satisfy s2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. 
Hence, something more than a mere parol agreement between A and B is required.  
It is suggested here that the law relating to the ‘subject to contract’ cases has been 
over-complicated and that these constructive trusts ought to have been explained 
simply as parol agreement trusts as per the doctrine as laid down in this thesis. In 
Lyus v Prowsa Developments Ltd,101 A’s predecessor in title had granted to C an 
estate contract. According to the contract of sale between A and B, B promised to 
respect C’s estate contract, and A thus sold at a reduced price. Probably the best 
explanation of the case is that, in actuality, B did not agree to honour the estate 
contract. The estate contract, as the parties knew, was unenforceable against B, and 
it is established that the constructive trust which arises in such cases represents a 
new right, not a continuation of the old right. In effect, then, what B agreed was to 
sell a certain part of the land to C on the same terms as had been agreed by A’s 
predecessor in title, and A clearly relied on B’s promise. If a slightly different version 
                                                          
100Lyus (n 85) 1052 (Dillon J). 
101 (n 85). 
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of the scenario in Lyus is imagined, whereby the agreement between A and B was 
purely oral, rather than appearing in the contract, the result would be the same; A 
relied on B’s promise to sell part of the land to C.102 Imagine a second alteration to 
the facts of Lyus whereby C had no pre-existing estate contract and A and B agreed 
that, upon taking title, B would sell part of the land to C. Again, according to the 
doctrine of parol agreement trusts, the result would be the same. It thus seems, that, 
in the ‘subject to contract constructive trust’ cases, whether or not the agreement 
between A and B is reduced to writing, and whether or not C had a pre-existing 
contractual interest, should be of no consequence. Assuming significance to these 
issues obscures the fact that these cases can be resolved on exactly the same 
grounds as the other cases of parol agreement trusts which are considered here. 
Furthermore, any constructive trust raised in such a manner is a new constructive 
trust, no more within the ambit of the land registration requirements as a resulting 
trust arising upon a conveyance. There would, however, be little danger of a 
multiplicity of claims eroding the land registration requirements because of the 
necessity of proving that A relied on the agreement, parol or otherwise, with B. 
Absent a reduction in the purchase price, it would be difficult for C to establish A’s 
reliance. 
Binions v Evans,103 the only other case in which the doctrine was successfully 
invoked, is rather more difficult to justify. B agreed with A that he would allow C to 
remain in occupation on the same terms as had been agreed in writing between A 
and C. Assuming that the written agreement created a mere contractual licence,104 
                                                          
102Examples of parol agreement trusts in which constructive trusts arose out of promises to sell a certain part of 
the land upon receipt include Chattock v Muller (1878) LR 8 Ch D 177; Pallant (n 37); Banner Homes (n 49).  
103 (n 85). 
104 In Binions (n 85), Lord Denning MR held that a contractual licence had originally been granted to C by A. 
The majority, Megaw and Stephenson L JJ, held that what had actually been granted by A was a life interest 
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the arguments that a trust ought not to arise out of B’s promise to create a new 
personal right (i.e. a new licence) seem convincing. Notably, however, in Bannister, 
B promised A that she could ‘stay in No 30 as long as she liked rent free.’105 
According to Lord Denning MR, this was the essence of the promise in Binions, 
notwithstanding that the formal agreement gave A the right to evict C upon the giving 
of a specified notice, which would seem to preclude the agreement being construed 
as an attempt to confer a life interest under a trust. If, as was held in Bannister, a 
mere parol agreement is sufficient to raise a constructive trust, it is arguable that, 
were a different result reached in a case such as Binions, the law would be 
penalising C for reducing to writing, in the usual written form, the essence of what 
was agreed less formally in Bannister. Therefore, if the substance of the written 
agreement between A and C was that C could live in the land for life, then it is 
arguable that this is also the substance of what B agreed, and what A relied upon. 
Upon this construction, a parol agreement trust arguably could be raised.106 
The above discussion notwithstanding, it should be noted that, as has been pointed 
out,107 scenarios such as Lyus and Binions could now be resolved through 
application of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, which would allow C 
to sue B upon the contract of sale, notwithstanding the lack of privity. This approach 
would provide C with relief without any need to address the complexities of trust law, 
or the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. This would suggest that, in future, the 
principles of equity may be redundant in cases of the kind discussed in this section. 
It should, however, be recognised that these principles have been discussed in post-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
under the Settled Land Act 1925, and that B had re-granted this equitable interest in writing in the contract, 
making it inherently binding upon B. 
105 Bannister (n 97) 135 (Scott LJ). 
106 See McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 96) 673 for a similar explanation. 
107 Thompson, Modern Land Law (n 94) 151. 
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1999 Act cases, so it seems that there might still be a place in the law for ‘subject to 
contract constructive trusts’  
In conclusion to this section, it is submitted that the ‘subject to contract constructive 
trust’ cases ought simply to have been determined according to the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts whenever what has been agreed was capable of being given effect 
through the imposition of a trust, but that the scope for equity’s future intervention in 
this area would seem to have been constrained by the 1999 Act. Thus, in this area, 
the law of contract might well have superseded the doctrine of parol agreement 
trusts. 
5.6 Doctrinal Relations Between Parol Agreement Trusts and Other 
Constructive Trusts 
5.6.1 The modern position of parol agreement trusts within constructive trusts 
There is perhaps no body of jurisprudence in which the principles have been 
obfuscated for so long, and to such an extent, by the inconsistent use of terminology 
as the law of constructive trusts. Notably, pre-twentieth century judges were not, as a 
general rule, afflicted by the modern preoccupation with classifying trusts. As has 
been seen, however, when questions arose as to the applicability of the limitation 
period laid down in the Trustee Act 1888 and previous limitation regimes, the courts 
were obliged to determine whether certain trusts should be treated as constructive or 
express trusts.108 Those trusts which placed the trustee in a position similar to that of 
a formally appointed trustee were treated as if they were express trusts, whilst trusts 
which merely gave the claimant an equitable proprietary interest in the property were 
classed as constructive trusts. The historical classification of trusts for limitation 
                                                          
108 See in particular 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.5-3.3.1.8 above.  
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purposes is thus instructive as to the perceived nature of those trusts, and may 
assist in determining whether any other types of non-express trusts bear doctrinal 
similarities to parol agreement trusts. It should be noted that the limitation regime as 
it applied to trusts was amended by the Limitation Act 1939, and is now found in the 
Limitation Act 1980, s21. The pre-1939 cases do not apply directly to the current law 
as regards the applicability of the current limitation period. They are of great value, 
however, as they are often the only pre-twentieth century cases in which the 
classification of trusts was considered in any detail. The current law as regards the 
running of time against trustees is covered in the leading case of Williams v Central 
Bank of Nigeria.109 
In Paragon Finance v DB Thakerar & Co,110 Millett LJ gave the most widely accepted 
version of the modern law of constructive trusts.111 He stated that constructive trusts 
could be divided into two classes. The first includes trustees de son tort, secret 
trusts, Rochefoucauld-type trusts and those involving ‘the Pallant v Morgan equity’. 
In these instances, ‘circumstances in which the defendant obtained control make it 
unconscionable for him thereafter to assert a beneficial interest in the property.’112 
Thus, in such cases, ‘the constructive trustee really is a trustee. He does not receive 
the trust property in his own right but by a transaction by which both parties intend to 
create a trust from the outset and which is not impugned by the plaintiff.’113 
According to Millett LJ, these are the kinds of constructive trustees against whom the 
pre-1939 limitation period did not run.114 Millett LJ’s reasoning was based on several 
                                                          
109 [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] AC 1189. Note that the limitation regime as it applied to trusts was amended by the 
Limitation Act 1939, and is now found in the Limitation Act 1980, s21. The pre-1939 cases do not apply 
directly to the current law as regards the applicability of the current limitation period (see generally Williams). 
110 [1999] 1 All ER 400, CA, 408-409. 
111 See generally Williams (n 109) for evidence of the esteem in which Millett LJ’s words are held. 
112 (n 110) 408-409. 
113 ibid.  
114 Such trustees are similarly immune according to the current regime. 
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statements from older cases to the effect that time did run against defendants who 
ostensibly obtained the property for their own benefit but as a result of an unlawful 
transaction which exposed them to being declared to have taken as constructive 
trustees.115 
Millett LJ’s second class includes dishonest assistants and knowing recipients. He 
described these trusts as arising because ‘[e]quity has always given relief against 
fraud by making any person sufficiently implicated in the fraud accountable in equity’. 
As will be explored below, however, Millett LJ took the view that: 
[s]uch a person is not in fact a trustee at all, even though he may be liable to 
account as if he were. He never assumes the position of a trustee, and if he 
receives the trust property at all it is adversely to the plaintiff by an unlawful 
transaction which is impugned by the plaintiff.116  
According to Millett LJ, these are the kinds of ‘constructive trustees’ against whom 
the pre-1939 limitation period did run.117 
Interestingly, Millett LJ did not mention those trusts arising against non-equity’s 
darling recipients of trust property, nor did he refer to constructive trustees of 
incidental profits, secret commissions or property obtained through self-dealing. It 
has been held on high authority that the former are not properly to be referred to as 
trusts,118 whilst the latter three are constructive trusts.119 
                                                          
115 Cases relied upon include Soar v Ashwell [1893] 2 QB 390, CA; Taylor v Davies [1920] AC 636, PC; 
Clarkson v Davies [1923] AC 100, PC. 
116 (n 110). 
117 This also represents current position- see Williams (n 109). 
118 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] 2 WLR 802, HL, 707 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). See also Williams, ibid, [31 (Lord Sumption]. 
119  See respectively European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45 [2014]; 3 WLR 
535; Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, HL; Taylor (n 115). 
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For the purposes this part of the thesis, the most important points to note from the 
above summary of the modern position, based on the leading cases, are as follows: 
1) the trusts recognised in this thesis as parol agreement trusts are seen as 
doctrinally closer to trusteeship de son tort than to other kinds of constructive 
trusts (save, of course, for those specifically covered  at 5.2-5.5, above); 
2) the recognition of parol agreement trusts is often attributed to 
unconscionability, as opposed to (or as a synonym of) fraud, the authorities 
covered in chapters 2-4 of this thesis notwithstanding; 
3) parol agreement trustees and trustees de son tort are genuine constructive 
trustees; 
4) the pre-1939 limitation period applied to knowing recipients and dishonest 
assistants because they were constructive trustees who only assumed that 
position as a result of the plaintiff’s impugnment of a breach of a pre-existing 
trust or fiduciary duty; 
5) knowing recipients and dishonest assistants are doctrinally similar and both 
are made liable on the ground of fraud; 
6) neither dishonest assistants nor knowing recipients are trustees; 
7) recipients of property who are not ‘equity’s darling’ are not trustees. 
 
5.6.2 Parol agreement trusts compared with ‘traditional’ constructive trusts 
It has been demonstrated above, at 4.3, that parol agreement trusts, prior to Taylor v 
Davies,120 were not regarded as constructive trustees at all. Nevertheless, the 
phrase ‘constructive trust’ was in currency in pre-twentieth century cases. 
                                                          
120 (n 115). 
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Constructive trusts were sometimes described as being imposed ‘without reference 
to any presumable intention of the parties’.121 Examples of such trusts include the 
trusts which bind recipients of trust property who were other than equity’s darling122 
the trusts subject to which trustees and other fiduciaries were compelled to take 
incidental profits and other unauthorised gains,123 and the trusts imposed in cases of 
self-dealing.124 These trusts were not generally thought of as being imposed for the 
prevention of actual fraud,125 although their enforcement was sometimes attributed 
by commentators to equity’s jurisdiction to prevent ‘constructive fraud’, a phrase 
used to describe acts which did not involve misconduct but which had a similar effect 
on the ‘victims’ to acts which were  fraudulent.126 This can be contrasted with parol 
agreement trusts, which have long been regarded as arising on the ground of fraud. 
Proprietary and in personam claims (when indeed in personam claims were prima 
facie possible, as in the case, for example, of unauthorised incidental profits) against 
constructive trustees by beneficiaries of such trusts were generally regarded as time-
                                                          
121 J Smith, A Manual of Equity Jurisprudence (5th edn, Stevens & Norton, London, 1856) 151. See also J Story 
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as administered in England and America (9th edn, Little, Brown and Co, 
Boston 1866) 414. 
122 Portlock v Gardner (1842) 1 Hare 594, 66 ER 1168; Soar v Ashwell (n 115) 405 (Kay LJ). The status of 
these trusts as constructive trusts is explained in J Smith, A Manual of Equity Jurisprudence, (5th edn., Stevens 
& Norton, London, 1856), 155-156. See also G Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, 
vol 2, (Stevens & Norton, London, 1849). 
123 See, for example, Portlock, ibid. The status of these trusts as constructive trusts is explained in Smith, Equity 
Jurisprudence (n 121). 
124 Taylor (n 115). 
125 See, for example L A Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (Pitman, London 1957). 
126 Smith, Equity Jurisprudence (n 121) 80-82. Smith’s definition of constructive fraud, 60, is as follows: 
‘Constructive frauds are acts, statements or omissions which operate as virtual frauds on individuals or, if 
generally permitted, would be prejudicial to the public welfare, and are not clearly resolvable into mere accident 
or mistake, and yet may have been unconnected with any selfish or evil design, or may amount, in the opinion of 
the party chargeable therewith, to nothing more than what is justifiable or allowable.’ Smith defined actual fraud 
(at 48) as ‘something done, said or omitted, with the design of perpetrating what the party must have known to 
be a positive fraud’. As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, knowingly reneging on a parol agreement 
which has been relied on would amount to a fraud of this nature. A similar definition of constructive fraud is 
found in J Story Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in England and America Vol 1 (4th 
edn, Little, Brown and Co, Boston 1866) 219-220. Story also attributes liability for breaches of trust or duty to 
the prevention of constructive fraud. See also Evans v Bicknell (1801) 6 Ves Jun 174, 31 ER 998, 192 (Lord 
Eldon); Parr v Jewell (1855) 1 K & J 671, 69 ER 629, 674 (Page Wood VC); Patch v Ward (1867) LR 3 Ch 
App 203, 213 (Rolt LJ). The phrase was criticised in Finch v Shaw (1854) 19 Beav 500, 52 ER 44, 514 (Romilly 
MR). 
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barred.127 This is because constructive trustees had ostensibly acquired the property 
in question for their own benefit rather than in any fiduciary capacity but were liable 
to be declared at a later date to have taken on constructive trust upon the proof of 
certain material facts. The difficulty in establishing such facts many years distant 
from the events surrounding the disputed transaction was thought capable of 
undermining security of property rights.128 On the other hand, parol agreement 
trustees, having agreed to take on trust, took the property in a fiduciary capacity from 
the first.  
Moreover, constructive trusts were viewed principally as a means by which the Court 
of Chancery could claim the jurisdiction to order the return or transfer of property, as 
was conceded by Grant MR in Beckford v Wade when his Lordship asked the 
rhetorical question: ‘[up]on what grounds is a Court of Equity ever called upon to 
direct one man to convey a real estate to another, except upon the ground of a trust, 
either actual or constructive?’129 Here, Grant MR was seeking to explain the 
difference between mere constructive trustees and ‘actual trustees’ who were 
subject to onerous equitable obligations as a result of having expressly or impliedly 
undertaken to perform the trust, and against whom the limitation period was no bar. 
Beckford is a very instructive case, for, although it is often cited as a case on 
knowing receipt, and is cited as an authority that knowing recipients were once 
thought of as constructive trustees and could hide behind the limitation period, 130 it 
actually concerned a ‘non-equity’s darling constructive trustee’.  
                                                          
127 Examples of cases of traditional constructive trusts in which the claims were held to be time-barred include 
Llevellyn v Mackworth (1745) Barn Ch 445, 27 ER 714; Townshend v Townshend (1783) 1 Bro CC 550, 28 ER 
1292. 
128 See Beckford v Wade (1805) 17 Ves Jun 87, 34 ER 34, 97. See also Taylor (n 115) 1203-1204 (Viscount 
Cave). 
129 ibid, 96. 
130 See Williams (n 109) [16] (Lord Sumption). 
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The facts of Beckford are rather imperfectly reported, but close examination of the 
judgment reveals that the disputed land was sold in 1744 by executors, seemingly in 
breach of trust. The purchaser was apparently aware of this breach, making him a 
knowing recipient. The claimant commenced a proprietary claim over 60 years later 
against the person with title to the land at that time. Given the time-frame involved, 
the defendant was almost certainly a successor in title to the original purchaser. The 
words of the judgment seem also to suggest this. Grant MR stated that ‘the 
Appellants [i.e. the defendants], and those, under whom they claim, have had a 
possession of more than fifty years under deeds, wills, and other conveyances’.131 
He also referred to the defendants as parties who claimed ‘by virtue of [the 
conveyances in question] or by title deduced from them’.132 It is thus improbable that 
the defendant had received with knowledge of the breach of trust. Rather, the 
defendant had taken a conveyance of trust property and was not equity’s darling. As 
a constructive trustee in the traditional sense, the defendant was permitted to avail 
himself of the limitation period. 
It can be seen, then, that, in terms of the reasons for their imposition and their 
treatment for the purposes of the statutory limitation period, parol agreement trusts 
and ‘traditional’ constructive trusts, in terms of their doctrinal origins and 
development, bore little relation to one another. 
5.6.3 Parol agreement trusts compared with dishonest assistants and trustees 
de son tort 
From a historical perspective, dishonest assistants and trustees de son tort share 
some characteristics with parol agreement trusts, notwithstanding the obvious 
                                                          
131 Beckford  (n 128) 88-89. 
132 ibid, 93. 
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difference that the former are ‘strangers’ to a trust which already existed before they 
became involved in any breach. Although they were occasionally described as 
constructive trustees in the nineteenth century,133 in fact, during this period, neither 
dishonest assistants nor trustees de son tort were usually referred to or treated as 
constructive trustees.134 Furthermore, they were unable to avail themselves of the 
statutory limitation period.135 There are, however, plain differences between 
dishonest assistants and parol agreement trustees. As is generally accepted by 
modern jurists, dishonest assistants, although liable on the ground of fraud,136 are 
not trustees at all, not least because they never assume legal title or any form of 
trusteeship, and cannot be subject to proprietary claims. They were not made 
trustees on the ground of fraud. Instead, they were implicated in fraudulent breaches 
of trust and made liable as if they were trustees who had committed the fraudulent 
breach.137 Liability for dishonest assistance, therefore, is purely accessorial and is 
very different in nature from the trusteeship which is assumed by parol agreement 
trustees. 
It has recently been suggested by Lord Sumption that trustees de son tort are similar 
to ‘trustees under trusts implied from the common intention to be inferred from the 
conduct of the parties’138 because  both the former and the latter lawfully assumed 
trusteeship and ‘intended to act as trustees, if only as a matter of objective 
                                                          
133 Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251 (Lord Selborne); Soar v Ashwell (n 115) 405 (Kay LJ). 
134 See, for example, Fyler v Fyler (1841) 3 Beav 550, 49 ER 216; Marshall v Sladden (1849) 7 Hare 428, 68 
ER 117; Portlock (n 122); Re Spencer (1881) 51 LJ Ch 271 273 (Lindley LJ). See also Soar v Ashwell (n 115) 
394 (Lord Esher); 397 (Bowen LJ). Smith Equity Jurisprudence (n 121) does not include either in his chapter on 
constructive trusts, nor does A Underhill, A Practical and Concise Manual of the Law Relating to Private Trusts 
and Trustees (4th edn, Butterworths, London 1894); nor Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction (n 122). 
135 See generally Soar v Ashwell (n 115). 
136 Paragon (n 110). 
137 NB: the original breach need not now be fraudulent- see Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 
AC 164. 
138 Williams (n 109) [9] (Lord Sumption); Soar v Ashwell (n 115) 394 (Lord Esher); 397 (Bowen LJ); 405 (Kay 
LJ). 
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construction of their acts.’139 Interestingly, trustees de son tort were sometimes, on 
account of their intermeddling, described as having undertaken to perform the 
trust.140 This implies a close relationship between trustees de son tort and parol 
agreement trustees. Historically, however, trustees de son tort were often treated as 
being most similar to dishonest assistants141 on the ground that neither were formally 
appointed trustees but both, by their interference, exposed themselves to the 
liabilities of express trustees and could be liable as accessories. Notably, trustees de 
son tort do not necessarily take legal title to the trust property.142 In this respect, they 
are also similar to dishonest assistants but dissimilar to parol agreement trustees. 
Another major difference between trustees de son tort and parol agreement trustees 
is that the former, unlike the latter, have never been regarded as being made 
trustees for the prevention of actual fraud. In this respect, trustees de son tort are 
even more distantly related to parol agreement trustees than are dishonest 
assistants. Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that parol agreement trustees and 
trustees de son tort are both to be included amongst the ranks of trustees who are 
made so on account of their undertaking to perform the trust. 
5.6.4 Parol agreement trusts and liability for knowing receipt 
During the course of the research carried out for the purpose of ascertaining the 
position of parol agreement trusts vis a vis the statutory limitation period, it became 
apparent that the trusteeship of parol agreement trustees was sometimes described 
in pre-twentieth century cases in similar terms to the trusteeship of knowing 
recipients. This was surprising, for it flies in the face of the modern orthodoxy. The 
purpose of this section is to examine, through a doctrinal-historical lens, whether the 
                                                          
139 ibid. 
140 Hardy v Caley (1864) 33 Beav 365, 55 ER 408, 367 (Romilly MR). 
141 See Barnes v Addy (n 133) 251 (Lord Selborne); Soar (n 115) 394 (Lord Esher MR); 396-397 (Bowen LJ). 
142 P Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart, Oxford, 2015) 90. 
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trusteeship of parol agreement trustees can be seen as related to that of knowing 
recipients. It should be noted that this section is not intended to provide a complete 
survey of academic positions regarding knowing recipients,143 and it is hoped that 
the arguments proposed here might be further developed (or refuted) in the future. 
5.6.4.1 Knowing receipt: a summary of the modern orthodoxy 
According to the modern law, a party who knowingly receives trust property that has 
been transferred to him in breach of trust is liable as a knowing recipient. A party 
who takes with mere constructive notice of the trust or the breach of trust, or as a 
volunteer with no notice, will merely take subject to the beneficiary’s equitable 
interest and will be subject to an equitable proprietary claim.144 It is regarded as an 
essential characteristic of knowing receipt that the knowing recipient’s ‘possession 
is… at all times wrongful and adverse to the rights of both the true trustees and the 
beneficiaries.’145 It should also be noted that a party who receives trust property as 
an agent cannot be liable for knowing receipt; the ‘the recipient must have received 
the property for his own use and benefit’.146  
The most widely accepted modern position is that the phrase ‘constructive trustee’ 
was historically used to describe knowing recipients147 but that this is a misleading 
label for what is more accurately described as mere ‘formula for equitable relief’.148 
The liability of knowing recipients is regarded as in personam liability which affects 
                                                          
143 For examples, see C Harpum, ‘The Stranger as Constructive Trustee: Part 1’ (1986) 102 LQR 114; C 
Harpum, ‘The Stranger as Constructive Trustee: Part 2’ (1986) 102 LQR 267; C Mitchell and S Watterson, 
‘Remedies for Knowing Receipt’ in Mitchell, Constructive and Resulting Trusts (n 62); M Conaglen and A 
Goymer, ‘Knowing Receipt and Registered Land’ in Mitchell, Constructive and Resulting Trusts (n 62). 
144 See Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas)Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437, CA. 
145 Williams (n 109) [31] (Lord Sumption). 
146 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch 265, CA, 292 (Millett J). 
147 See Williams (n 109) [9] and [11] (Lord Sumption), [65] (Lord Neuberger PSC); Paragon (n 110) 408-409 
(Millet LJ). On this point, see Davis & Virgo, Equity & Trusts (n 13) 904. 
148 Paragon (n 110) 408-409 (Millett LJ); Conaglen and Goymer, ‘Knowing Receipt’ (n 143). C.f. Mitchell and 
Watterson, ‘Remedies’ (n 143). 
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third parties to breaches of trust in a manner very similar to that of dishonest 
assistants.149 One reason which has been given as to why the label ‘constructive 
trustee’ is misleading is that a knowing recipient ‘does not have the powers or duties 
of a trustee, for example with regard to investment or management. His sole 
obligation of any practical significance is to restore the assets immediately’.150 It has 
further been pointed out that ‘[n]obody involved, whether the dishonest receiver, the 
person who passed the property to him, or the claimant, has ever placed any 
relevant trust and confidence in the recipient’.151 Accordingly, the knowing recipient 
‘never assumes the position of trustee’.152 It has also been stated that knowing 
recipients are not constructive trustees because ‘there is no question of the 
defendant holding property for the benefit of the claimant or of a proprietary remedy 
being imposed because it is irrelevant whether the defendant retains the property or 
not.’153 It is thus apparent that the current judicial orthodoxy is that the in personam 
liability of knowing recipients is supplementary to, and separate from, the proprietary 
liability (which was traditionally called constructive trusteeship) which encumbers any 
party, knowing recipients included, who was not in the position of equity’s darling 
when he received trust property.  
Great significance is also afforded to the fact that knowing recipients obtain title and 
assume in personam liability in consequence of an unlawful transfer of property 
which was, prior to the transfer, subject to a pre-existing trust. The fact that the pre-
existence of the trust is a feature common to knowing recipients and dishonest 
                                                          
149 See generally Williams (n 109). See also S Panesar, Exploring Equity (2nd edn, Pearson, Harlow 2012) 471. 
Note that P Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart, Oxford 2015) 92, citing D Sheehan ‘Disentangling Equitable 
Personal Remedies for Receipt and Assistance’ (2008) 16 RLR 41, 58, accepts that a knowing recipient’s 
liability is ‘parasitic’ upon the liability of the de jure trustees, but also that it is ‘non-participatory’. C.f. Mitchell 
and Watterson, ‘Remedies’ (n 143). 
150 Williams, ibid [31] (Lord Sumption). C.f. Mitchell and Watterson, ibid. 
151 ibid [65] (Lord Neuberger PSC). 
152 ibid, quoting from Paragon (n 110) 408-409 (Millet LJ). 
153 A Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2nd edn, Butterworths, London 2002) 196. 
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assistants is often cited as a decisive factor in the treatment of these types of 
‘trustees’ as similar to one another but different from instances of true trusteeship.154 
This is one of the primary reasons why the modern statutory limitation period does 
apply to knowing recipients and dishonest assistants.155 
In summary, the modern judicial position is that, although knowing recipients were 
once called constructive trustees, they are not trustees at all. Like dishonest 
assistants, they are merely affected with accessorial in personam liability, and they 
can raise the limitation period as a defence. It can be seen, then, that the liability of 
knowing recipients is currently seen as almost entirely unrelated to the trusteeship of 
parol agreement trustees. 
5.6.4.2 A doctrinal-historical reassessment of knowing receipt 
It is appears from analysis of authorities from the nineteenth century that the 
historical orthodoxy regarding the doctrinal nature of knowing receipt differs 
significantly from the modern orthodoxy. There are three cases in particular which 
highlight this doctrinal schism. 
The first is Rolfe v Gregory,156 an authority which goes to the root of the historical 
difference between knowing recipients and traditional constructive trustees. Here, it 
was held that a proprietary claim157 against a knowing recipient was not time-barred. 
The testator lent £600 to the defendant Gregory in return for a promissory note for 
£600 plus interest. The testator bequeathed the promissory note to trustees to hold 
on trust for the plaintiff. One of the trustees came to owe money to the defendant. 
The trustee delivered the promissory note to Gregory in satisfaction of the debt. 
                                                          
154 Paragon (n 110); Williams (n 109). 
155 Williams (n 109). 
156 (1865) 4 De G, J & Sm 576, 46 ER 1042. 
157 The order issues by Lord Westbury (ibid) shows this to be the case. 
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Many years later, the plaintiff issued a proprietary claim against Gregory for the fruits 
of the promissory note. Gregory relied on the limitation period to resist her claim. 
Lord Westbury explained that: 
[i]t was contended before me that… Gregory became constructively a trustee 
of the debt for the parties interested, and that his liability in this Court was to 
be considered as resulting merely from constructive trust, that is from a trust 
raised by operation or construction of law… [This view] involves a 
misapprehension of the true principles on which the action of this Court is 
founded…The relief is founded on fraud and not on constructive trust. When it 
is said that the person who fraudulently receives or possesses himself of trust 
property is converted by this Court into a trustee [italics added to emphasise 
similarity with the wording in Lord Westbury’s quote, below, from McCormick v 
Grogan], the expression is used for the purpose of describing the nature and 
extent of the remedy against him, and it denotes that the parties entitled 
beneficially have the same rights and remedies against him as they would be 
entitled to against an express trustee who had fraudulently committed a 
breach of trust.158 
Lord Westbury evidently did not regard the defendant’s proprietary liability as 
divorced from his status as a knowing recipient. Rather, because of the nature of his 
trusteeship, being founded on actual fraud and hence being more onerous than mere 
constructive trusteeship, the defendant could not rely on the limitation period to resist 
the proprietary claim. There are clear parallels with the position of parol agreement 
trustees. In McCormick v Grogan,159 Lord Westbury used very similar words to 
                                                          
158 Rolfe (n 156) 579 (Lord Westbury LC). 
159 (1869) LR 4 HL 82. 
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describe the liability of a secret trustee, explaining that secret trustees are ‘converted 
into trustees, simply on the principle that an individual shall not be benefited by his 
own personal fraud.’160 Lord Westbury’s words in Rolfe and McCormick are 
congruous with one of the central arguments of this thesis, which is that a person 
declared a trustee for the prevention of fraud was regarded as type of actual trustee, 
susceptible to proprietary and in personam claims and no more able than an express 
trustee to shelter behind the limitation period. This can be contrasted with the 
position of a ‘non-equity’s darling constructive trustee’ with no actual knowledge of 
the breach of trust by which he gained the property, who was regarded as a 
constructive trustee, was not susceptible to in personam claims, and could rely on a 
defence of limitation.  
The second important case, Perry v Knott,161 sheds further light on the question of 
why a knowing recipient was regarded as an actual trustee, rather than merely as a 
constructive trustee. Here, Lord Langdale MR asked, rhetorically, ‘[i]s it possible to 
conceive that [the knowing recipient] was ignorant of the trust? Is it possible to 
conceive that she did not undertake, jointly with [the offending trustee], to perform 
that trust?’162 Pertinently, as argued in this thesis, parol agreement trustees are also 
made trustees because they have, expressly or by inference, undertaken to perform 
a trust. Lord Langdale’s reasoning, especially when read alongside that of Lord 
Westbury in Rolfe, suggests that, in terms of their doctrinal characteristics, parol 
agreement trustees and knowing recipients may be rather more closely related than 
is commonly acknowledged. 
                                                          
160 ibid 97 (Lord Westbury). 
161 (1841) 4 Beav 179, 49 ER 307. 
162 ibid 183. See also Hennessey v Bray (1863) 33 Beav 96, 55 ER 302, 102 (Romilly MR). 
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Perry also illustrates that knowing recipients were capable of being guilty of 
breaches of trust subsequent to the breach which led to their acquisition of the trust 
property. Until 1841, there was a rule of Chancery procedure that ‘all parties jointly 
and severally liable were necessary parties’163 to a suit. This meant that ‘all trustees 
implicated in a breach of trust were necessary parties’.164 Accordingly, all knowing 
recipients of trust property had to be made parties, alongside the express trustees, to 
a suit for breach of trust, otherwise the suit would be ‘defective for want of parties’.165 
In Perry, the testator bequeathed £1,000 to his son to hold on trust for his daughter 
for life, in remainder to her children. The son was also one of the testator’s 
executors. The executors transferred £1000 worth of stock from the estate to the son 
and the daughter as joint tenants. The son died, and the daughter transferred the 
stock into her own name and used it for her own purposes, and then sold it. The 
daughter’s children filed the bill against the personal representatives of the son, 
alleging breach of trust. The defendants objected that the suit 'was defective for want 
of parties' on the ground that the other executors, and the daughter, should also be 
made parties. The court, therefore, was required to consider the nature of the 
daughter’s liability as knowing recipient. Lord Langdale MR explained that, ‘where 
trust money is sold, and paid away to a person who has no notice of the trust, and 
who has nothing more to do with it than the mere receiving it from a trustee’,166 then 
such a person was not to be made party to a suit for breach of trust. Because the 
daughter was not ‘ignorant of the trust’,167 however, she was a party to the original 
                                                          
163 This explanation appears in the note to Devaynes v Robinson (1857) 24 Beav 86, 53 ER 289. The same note 
explains that this rule was abolished by the ‘32d General Order of August 1841 (Ord. Can. 174).’ 
164 ibid. 
165 Perry (n 161). This undermines the argument of Mitchell and Watterson, ‘Remedies’ (n 143) 153 that 
knowing recipients ‘do not owe a secondary liability… by reason of their involvement in the trustees’ breach of 
their custodial duties.’ 
166 ibid 183 (Lord Langdale MR). 
167 ibid. This strongly suggests that, by ‘notice’, Lord Langdale MR meant actual notice, as opposed to 
constructive notice. 
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breach. What is very interesting, for present purposes, is that Lord Langdale MR 
went on to hold that, in addition to being a party to the original breach, the daughter 
was ‘in point of fact, the person who committed the second breach of trust [italics 
added], which consisted of the sale and misapplication of the fund.’168 This shows 
that the knowing recipient was regarded as a trustee in her own right, and that any 
disposition of trust property in breach of the trust amounted to a ‘new’ breach of trust, 
for which she was liable in her own right, rather than merely as an accessory to the 
original breach.169 
 
The third of these significant cases is Coxwell v Franklinski.170 Here, a husband was 
a life tenant under a marriage settlement. The trustees were empowered by the 
instrument to lend trust money to the husband upon the request of the wife (the 
defendant). The trustees, upon receipt of such a request, loaned £1,000 to the 
husband, secured by bond. The husband died intestate without having repaid the 
money. His wife was granted letter of administration. His estate was insufficient to 
meet the repayments. Many years later, his estate received a windfall, which was 
paid to the wife. The plaintiff, who was one of the husband’s next-of-kin, claimed a 
portion of the £1,000. In her defence, the wife claimed entitlement to the £1,000 qua 
beneficiary under the marriage settlement. The plaintiff countered that the wife’s 
claim under the marriage settlement was time-barred.  Holding in favour of the wife, 
Kindersley VC stated that: 
 
                                                          
168 ibid. See also Jesse v Bennett (1856) 6 De GM & G 609, 34 ER 1370, 612 (Lord Cranworth MR). 
169 For an interesting modern example of a knowing recipient (in this case, a company) being held capable of 
being liable in its own right for a breach of trust, see Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 3) (CA, 09 May 2000). This 
supports assertions made throughout Mitchell and Watterson, ‘Remedies’ (n 143). 
170 (1864) 11 LT 153. 
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[i]t was a trust fund, known, of course, by the husband to be a trust fund, 
received by him as part of the trust fund, in his hands as part of the trust 
money, and, until it was repaid, retaining the character of trust money. In fact, 
the husband himself was constituted a quasi-trustee of this fund. He had it in 
his own hands, and, although he was not the trustee of the settlement, he 
made himself liable to the cestuis que trust who, after his death were entitled 
to this fund. He put himself in the position of a person having trust funds in his 
hands, known to be such, and received as such and it would be impossible for 
him or his executors to set up the Statute of Limitations as against the cestuis 
que trust.171 
 
It is crucial here to note that the husband, to whom the limitation period did not apply, 
was described in the same terms as a knowing recipient, despite having received the 
fund in consequence of a lawful transaction by the trustees. Thus, this is a case in 
which the knowing recipient was not jointly liable with the trustees. The latter had not 
breached the trust. The husband’s liability was not accessorial. Moreover, although 
such cases are rare, this is not the only case of non-accessorial knowing receipt.172 
Notably, this does not mean that fraud is irrelevant to such cases, for, as is the case 
with parol agreement trustees, any deviation by the defendant from his/her inferred 
undertaking would amount to a fraud. 
 
In summary, the cases discussed above suggest that knowing recipients were not 
regarded as constructive trustees, but as something more; actual trustees 
constituted under the head of fraud on the ground that they had inferentially 
                                                          
171 ibid 154. 
172 See also Spickernell v Hotham (1854) Kay 669, 69 ER 285. 
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undertaken to perform the trust. Hence, by obtaining trust property in their personal 
capacity, they were in the same position as express trustees who had 
misappropriated trust assets for themselves. As such, the limitation period applied to 
neither to in personam nor proprietary claims against knowing recipients.173 Although 
the knowing recipient’s in personam liability for the breach of trust by which he 
acquired the property was usually accessorial to the liability of the formally appointed 
trustees, this was not always so. Furthermore, the knowing recipient, as a trustee in 
his own right, was capable of perpetrating breaches of trust in his own right. It is thus 
submitted that the pre-twentieth century view of liability for knowing receipt was 
distinct in many important respects from the later orthodoxy. 
 
5.6.4.3 A historical-doctrinal comparison of knowing receipt with parol agreement 
trusts 
If the above analysis is accepted, clear parallels emerge from a historical 
comparison of knowing recipients with parol agreement trustees. Both were 
susceptible to proprietary remedies because they received property in circumstances 
in which it would have been an actual fraud for them to have denied the beneficiary’s 
beneficial interest, and both were regarded by equity as being bound by a trust that 
they had expressly or impliedly undertaken to perform. Hence, both were made 
trustees because they had sufficient knowledge of the circumstances behind their 
receipt of legal title for equity to impose in personam as well as proprietary liability for 
the prevention or redress of the actual fraud which would occur if either dealt with the 
property inconsistently with the trust. Although the phrase ‘constructive trust’ has 
                                                          
173 See also Re Eyre-Williams [1923] 2 Ch 533, CA; Re Dixon [1899] 2 Ch 561, Ch; Ernest v Croydsill (1860) 2 
De G, F & J 175, 45 ER 589; Spickernell v Hotham (1854) Kay 669, 64 ER 285. 
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been associated with both, neither were regarded as constructive trustees before the 
twentieth century. Rather, both were regarded as types of actual trustees, more 
similar to express than constructive trustees, as is shown by the fact that the 
limitation period applied to neither.  
The similarities between the two types of trustees can be illustrated by comparing 
the position of a knowing recipient who receives trust property and dissipates it with 
that the defendant in Rochefoucauld who obtained title to the estates pursuant to the 
parol agreement to take as trustee and then treated the estates as his own and sold 
them in order to repay his debts. There are, it is suggested, striking similarities 
between the two scenarios. Both defendants are, in effect, liable in personam to 
account for their dealings with the property because they knew of the circumstances 
by which they obtained the property and consequentially took as trustees pursuant to 
equity’s general jurisdiction to intercede in cases of actual fraud.  
Although detailed discussion of this next controversial point is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, it is also suggested that both parol agreement trustees and knowing 
recipients may logically owe duties beyond those of a trustee such as a ‘non-equity’s 
darling constructive trustee’, but probably do not owe the full range of duties owed by 
express trustees. For example, as has been suggested above (at 4.3.2), parol 
agreement trustees probably do owe fiduciary duties such as the duty not to profit 
incidentally, but probably do not owe a duty to invest. If it is accepted that a knowing 
recipient is deemed to have undertaken to perform trust obligations, and is made a 
trustee for the prevention of fraud, then it would seem reasonable that s/he ought not 
to be permitted to retain profits obtained, for example, through the exploitation of 
information to which he became privy in consequence of his or her trusteeship. 
There are, of course, long-standing differences between knowing recipients and 
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parol agreement trustees. Perhaps the most obvious difference is that a knowing 
recipient, unlike a parol agreement trustee, always receives property subject to a 
pre-existing trust. Furthermore, knowing recipients were usually, although not 
always, jointly liable for breach of trust with the de jure trustee(s) who had 
transferred the property in breach of trust. In this sense, the liability of a knowing 
recipient has long been regarded as accessorial in most cases, although this should 
not obscure the fact that a knowing recipient, like a parol agreement trustee, was 
capable of assuming liability in his own right. Another difference between parol 
agreement trustees and knowing recipients is that the former receive legal title as a 
result of a lawful transaction, whereas knowing recipients usually, but not 
necessarily, receive the property as a result of a breach of trust. It is suggested, 
however, that, at least in terms of their doctrinal origins and affinities, the similarities 
between parol agreement trustees and knowing recipients are of more significance 
than the differences between these enduringly contentious types of trusts. 
5.6.4.4 Why is the historical orthodoxy obscure? 
 
The principles governing knowing receipt were very clearly elucidated in the cases 
referred to above in 5.6.4.2. It may seem strange, then, that previous attempts to 
analyse the historical basis of knowing receipt have resulted in conclusions which 
are incongruous with the above analysis, and that no affinities between knowing 
recipients and parol agreement trustees have been proposed by modern 
commentators. It is arguable, however, that the accepted historical background of 
knowing receipt has been unduly influenced by three distinct misconceptions, which 
will be examined in this part of the chapter. 
 
 230 
 
The first relates to the famous dictum of Lord Selborne in Barnes v Addy,174 which 
has been treated with almost statutory reverence, and forms the cornerstone of 
modern thinking on the nature of third party liability for breach of trust. This dictum is 
frequently regarded as authority that that knowing recipients or dishonest assisters 
were historically referred to as constructive trustees but that neither are in fact 
trustees at all.175 The second is that the status of knowing recipients as ‘true’ 
trustees has been called into question on the ground that there was a good deal of 
judicial inconsistency regarding the extent to which knowing recipients could rely on 
the limitation period. The final misconception is manifested in the orthodox view that 
pre-1939 courts, when explaining that the limitation exemption did not apply to 
constructive trustees because they obtained possession in consequence of an 
unlawful transaction, were referring to knowing recipients. 
 
 
5.6.4.4.1 The first misconception: Lord Selborne’s dictum in Barnes v Addy 
In Barnes, Lord Selborne stated that there are: 
certain persons who are trustees, and … certain other persons who are not 
trustees… Those who create a trust clothe the trustee with a legal power and 
control over the trust property, imposing on him a corresponding 
responsibility. That responsibility may no doubt be extended in equity to 
others who are not properly trustees, if they are found either making 
themselves trustees de son tort, or actually participating in any fraudulent 
conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust. But, on the other 
                                                          
174 (n 133). 
175 See generally Williams (n 109); Paragon (n 110). See also Davies, Accessory Liability (n 149) 89. 
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hand, strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they 
act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, 
transactions, perhaps of which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless 
those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust 
property, [italics added] or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest 
and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees.176 
It is submitted here that, contrary to what is frequently asserted, the Lord Chancellor 
made no reference here to knowing recipients. When his Lordship mentioned three 
categories of ‘strangers’ who might be treated as ‘trustees’, he was referring to 
agents. This is made clear, for example, in Re Spencer,177 in which Baggallay LJ 
stated that ‘[t]he judgment of Lord Selborne [in Barnes] is very valuable, as applying 
the rules as to agents to trustees’.178 Of these agents, the first two categories, 
trustees de son tort and dishonest assistants, were not, according to Lord Selborne, 
actual trustees, but were treated as actual trustees, the former because of their 
intermeddling and the latter as because they fraudulently assist in the breach of 
trust.179 Lord Selborne’s third category comprised of agents in whom the trustees 
had deposited trust property, and who had knowledge of the trust, but who then 
deviated from the trust by taking the property for themselves or applying it for other 
purposes contrary to the trust. There are many cases from the nineteenth century in 
which the courts considered the liability of agents who had acquired legal title to trust 
property in their capacity as agents and then acted in breach of trust. These agents 
                                                          
176 Barnes (n 133) 251-252. 
177 (1881) 51 LJ Ch 271. 
178 ibid 272. 
179 Note that, since, Barnes, it has been determined that the original breach of trust need not have been 
fraudulent, as long as the accessory’s assistance was fraudulent. 
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were often solicitors180 or ‘merchants’181 into whose business bank accounts trust 
money was paid. The general rule was that agents in whom, in their capacity as 
agents, property had been deposited, and who, at the behest of the trustees, entered 
into transactions which amounted to breaches of trust, were not parties to breaches 
of trust by the trustees,182 unless, of course, those agents had dishonestly assisted 
in the breaches.183 But agents with legal title who, subsequent to their acquisition of 
legal title and without proper authorisation from the trustees, applied the trust 
property in breach of a trust of which they had knowledge, became ‘chargeable with 
the trust property’.184 
5.6.4.4.2 ‘Chargeable agents’ and knowing recipients compared 
‘Chargeable agents' of trustees formed a category of trustees in their own right, and 
were distinct from knowing recipients in a number of respects.185 The leading 
nineteenth century authority on the application of the limitation period to trustees, 
Soar v Ashwell,186 concerned a ‘chargeable agent’. Here, a solicitor to the trust had 
lawfully invested trust money on behalf of the trust. In this capacity, he received and 
partially distributed the proceeds of the investment. But he also unlawfully retained 
some of the proceeds for his own purposes. After his death, the plaintiff, who was 
the sole remaining trustee and also a beneficiary, sued to recover the proceeds from 
                                                          
180 E.g. Lee v Sankey (1872) LR 15 Eq 204. 
181 E.g. Wilson v Moore (1834) 1 My & K 337, 39 ER 709. 
182 See Maw v Pearson (1860) 28 Beav 196, 54 ER 340; Attorney General v Earl of Chesterfield (1854) 18 Beav 
596, 52 ER 234; Harvey v Mount (1845) 8 Beav 439, 50 ER 172; Marshall (n 134). 
183 See Fyler (n 134); Wilson v Moore (n 181); Marshall (n 134). 
184 Examples include Lee v Sankey (n 180); Bridgman v Gill (1857) 24 Beav 302, 53 ER 374; Hardy v Caley (n 
140); A-G v Corporation of Leicester (1844) 7 Beav 176, 49 ER 1031. 
185 Note that in Agip (Africa) (n 46) 291, Millett J alluded to the distinction between conventional knowing 
recipients and ‘chargeable agents’, but did not explore the dichotomy in detail. Agents of this type are dealt with 
by A J Oakley, Constructive Trusts (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997), 239-240 as alternatives to 
knowing recipients. No reference is made in this context to Barnes of to the nineteenth century authorities 
discussed in this part of the thesis. Chargeable agents are discussed at length in Harpum, ‘The ‘Stranger: Part 2’ 
(n 143), but are categorised as types of knowing recipients. 
186(n 115). 
 233 
 
the solicitor’s widow (the defendant) in the latter’s capacity as executrix of the 
solicitor’s estate. The defendant sought to rely on the limitation period. The majority 
held that the solicitor was agent of the trustees and had had property deposited in 
him in his fiduciary capacity. He had obtained possession of the trust property in 
consequence of a lawful transaction. Thus, although he was not holding the property 
on express trust for the trustees, he was, for the purposes of applying the limitation 
period, to be treated like an express trustee for the trustees in much the same 
manner as a director was, for the same purposes, treated as express trustee for his 
company. Although, in this case, the plaintiff sued qua trustee, Bowen LJ explained 
that, in similar cases, the beneficiaries would be entitled to claim against the agent 
with the same rights, against the agent, that their trustees possessed, ‘not because 
the [agent] was their own trustee, but because he was bound under a direct trust to 
persons who were the trustees.’187 
There are numerous other examples of chargeable agents being sued by trustees. 
This is unsurprising, for the agent’s breach, unlike the breach perpetrated by a 
knowing recipient, amounted to a wrong against the trustees, who were his 
principals. For example, in Bridgman v Gill, 188 the trustees successfully sued agents 
who had misappropriated trust money which had been lawfully deposited in them by 
the trustees. Similarly, in Lee v Sankey,189 a beneficiary/trustee claimed qua trustee 
against an agent who had, by an unauthorised transaction, transferred trust money, 
possession of which he had obtained by a lawful transaction, to another 
trustee/beneficiary at the latter’s behest. Lee is also instructive because the agent 
only ever possessed the property ministerially. This can be contrasted with the 
                                                          
187 ibid 399. 
188 (1857) 24 Beav. 302. 
189 Lee v Sankey (n 180).  
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position of a knowing recipient, whose liability depends, inter alia, on his or her 
having received the property in a non-ministerial capacity. 
There were, however, some similarities between chargeable agents and knowing 
recipients. Chargeable agents could be held to be jointly and severally liable with 
one of more of the original trustees if, for instance, the trustee was in breach of his or 
her fiduciary duties by failing to supervise the agent who breached the trust190 or 
because one or more of the trustees had acquiesced in or purported to authorise 
agent’s the misappropriation of trust funds.191  Furthermore, as demonstrated by, for 
example, Soar, Lee and Bridgman, chargeable agents, like knowing recipients, were 
precluded from relying on the limitation period. 
There may also be scenarios in which there may be an overlap between liability as a 
chargeable agent and liability for knowing receipt. It has been suggested obiter that 
an agent of trustees who, at the behest of the trustees and knowing the terms of the 
trust, transferred trust property to himself in his personal capacity, could be liable as 
a knowing recipient.192 In such a case, the breach of trust would committed by the 
trustee in ordering the transfer in breach of trust, and the agent would be a party to 
this breach by knowingly receiving the property in his personal capacity. In the only 
pre-20th century case covering such circumstances, however, the agent was made 
liable on the ground of dishonest assistance (by complying dishonestly, in his 
capacity as agent, with the trustee’s order) rather than on the ground of his knowing 
receipt.193 
                                                          
190 E.g. Corporation of Leicester (n 184); Marshall (n 134). 
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192 Re Blundell (1888) LR 40 Ch D 370. 
193 Wilson v Moore (n 181). See also Re Blundell, ibid. 
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In summary, the three most crucial respects in which chargeable agents differed 
from knowing recipients are: 
1) chargeable agents, having become ‘chargeable’ on account of having 
breached their duties owed to the trustees, were only answerable to the 
beneficiaries vicariously; 
2) bills against chargeable agents could be, and often were, filed by the trustees, 
rather than the beneficiaries; 
3) the liability of chargeable agents did not depend upon personal, rather than 
ministerial, receipt of the trust property.  
To these factors can be added three more general, albeit not decisive, differences: 
1) chargeable agents were quite commonly referred to as constructive trustees, 
as in Barnes itself, and in Soar.194 This is not surprising, for the phrase 
‘constructive trustee’ was also sometimes used to describe agents who 
misappropriated property that they had obtained for their principals in cases in 
which the principal was not trustee for another;195 
2) chargeable agents always initially obtained possession lawfully on the ground 
of a pre-existing fiduciary relationship; 
3) it was common for chargeable agents not to be liable jointly with the trustees. 
 
5.6.4.4.3 ‘Chargeable agents’ and parol agreement trustees compared 
If it is recalled that the liability of chargeable agents arose in consequence of their 
fiduciary relationship with the trustees, some affinities with parol agreement trusts 
                                                          
194 Soar v Ashwell (n 115) 394 (Lord Esher MR). 
195 See Cave v Makenzie (1877) 46 LJ Ch 564. 
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emerge. In 3.3.2.1, above, it was submitted that an agent who dealt unlawfully with 
property obtained in his or her fiduciary capacity from his principal would be liable as 
a trustee on the ground of fraud. The occasional historical merger of agency and 
trust principles was also highlighted; certain cases of parol agreement trusts were 
sometimes seen as having been enforced on the ground that the ‘trustee’ was an 
agent who had misappropriated his or her principal’s property. Thus, the liability of a 
chargeable agent, vis a vis the trustees, was not at all dissimilar from the liability of a 
parol agreement trustee vis a vis his or her beneficiary. 
 
Nevertheless, it may be observed that chargeable agents were, in certain respects, 
doctrinally separate from parol agreement trustees. Unlike parol agreement trustees, 
chargeable agents were frequently referred to as constructive trustees, they held 
property in a fiduciary capacity before assuming their trusteeship, they did not 
acquire the property subject to an undertaking to hold it on trust for the beneficiaries 
(although, of course, they had undertaken to act as agents of the trustees) and, 
perhaps most importantly, they were only answerable to the beneficiaries on the 
strength of their fiduciary relationship with the trustees.  
 
 
5.6.4.4.4 The second misconception: historical judicial inconsistency as to the nature 
of knowing receipt? 
The view that knowing receipt has been treated inconsistently with respect to the 
application of the limitation period196 seems to be attributable to subsequent 
interpretations of some observations made by Bowen LJ in Soar. He stated that 
                                                          
196 See, for example, Williams (n 109) [16] (Lord Sumption). 
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there were several irreconcilable decisions concerning the application of the 
limitation period in various cases concerning ‘instances of constructive trust’.197 His 
Lordship took the view that: 
in some other cases, e.g., in Bridgman v. Gill, by Lord Romilly, and in Wilson 
v. Moore, by Lord Brougham, language has been employed in regard to the 
question of limitations of time in certain instances of constructive trust which 
can scarcely be reconciled with the language held in Bonney v. Ridgard; 
Beckford v. Wade; Townshend v. Townshend, and in other cases.198  
Lord Bowen’s comments have been taken as referring to inconsistencies relating to 
the status of knowing recipients as constructive trustees.199 In fact, most of these 
cases are not concerned with knowing receipt, and his Lordship was likely referring 
to inconsistencies in the treatment of the various types of constructive trusts. The 
first two cases mentioned by Bowen LJ are cases in which the limitation period was 
inapplicable. Bridgman was, as described above, a case in which an agent of the 
trust was sued by the trustees. Wilson, also considered above, was decided on the 
ground of dishonest assistance.  
The other three cases mentioned by Bowen LJ are cases in which the claims were 
held to be time-barred. As has been seen, Beckford concerned an action to recover 
land from a successor in title to the knowing recipient. The successor, not being 
equity’s darling, was a mere constructive trustee and could not rely on the limitation 
period. Townshend v Townshend200 also concerned a ‘non-equity’s darling 
constructive trustee’. Here, the plaintiff had a remainder interest in land. His parents, 
                                                          
197 Soar v Ashwell (n 115) 397. 
198 ibid. 
199 Most notably in Williams (n 109) [19] (Lord Sumption) and [82] (Lord Neuberger PSC). 
200 (n 127). 
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who had a prior equitable interest, sold the land to the plaintiff’s father’s son from a 
previous marriage (the conveyance was also to the transferee’s heirs and assigns). 
Many years later, the plaintiff sought to reclaim the land. The defendant was the wife 
and heir of the son to whom the land had been conveyed. The plaintiff claimed that 
the transfer was a fraudulent breach of duty, and that the purchaser knew that this 
was the case. It was held, however, that there was no fraud in the conveyance 
because the parties thought that the prior equitable interest had been released.201 
Therefore, it was ‘merely the case of a trustee by implication, and as such affected 
by an equity; but that equity must be pursued within some reasonable time.’202  
 
Bonney v Ridgard,203 on the other hand, is a case of a proprietary claim against a 
knowing recipient.204 The key point to note about this case, however, is that the 
parties who transferred the disputed property to the knowing recipient were not 
themselves express trustees. Rather, they were executors who, according to the will, 
were instructed to sell the testator’s land to raise money for the estate. They sold a 
leasehold estate to the knowing recipient in satisfaction of a debt owed by one of the 
executors to him. The knowing recipient apparently knew of the circumstances of the 
sale, and later sold to a bona fide purchaser for value. Although it was held that the 
in personam claim against the knowing recipient was time-barred, this decision can 
be rationalised on the basis that, for limitation purposes, executors were treated 
differently from express trustees. Executors who retained any part of the residuary 
                                                          
201 ‘Covenants in the release’ of the settlement from which the plaintiff derived his interest had been executed by 
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202 Townshend (n 127) 554-555 (Lord Commissioner Ashhurst). 
203 (1784) 1 Cox 145, 29 ER 1101. 
204 The bill was filed by the plaintiffs ‘for an account of the rents and profits of these leasehold premises, and 
that plaintiffs might be let into possession of their respective shares of the rents and profits thereof’. The 
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‘possession’ of those shares. 
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estate were considered to be implied rather than express trustees, and claims 
against executors in respect of such property were subject to the limitation period.205 
In Bonney, there was no express trust in the will. Therefore, it is difficult to see how 
the knowing recipient could have been treated as being in the position of an express 
trustee for limitation purposes when he had, by his knowing receipt from a mere 
executor, impliedly undertaken to perform the office of executorship, to which the 
limitation period did apply.206 A further point to note about Bonney is that it is not at 
all clear that the knowing recipient had more than mere constructive notice. Although 
Lord Kenyon MR’s words would seem to suggest this was the case,207 Lord Eldon, in 
a subsequent case, stated that, in Bonney, ‘there were strong circumstances of 
evidence, that no fraud was intended’.208 It may, therefore, be that the ‘knowing 
recipient’s’ knowledge was of the existence of the will rather than of its terms- 
enough to give him constructive notice of the will’s terms so as to be a ‘non-equity’s 
darling constructive trustee’, but insufficient for him to be charged with actual fraud. 
In conclusion, whilst there are uncertainties surrounding the decision in Bonney, it is 
not a case concerning a party who knowingly received property as a result of a 
breach of an express trust, and it does not damage the position adopted in this 
section of the thesis regarding the nature of knowing receipt. 
 
In summary, although the authorities cited by Bowen LJ show that there was some 
inconsistency in the application of the limitation period between different types of 
trustees, there is no evidence of inconsistency in the treatment of those who 
knowingly received trust property from express trustees in breach of trust, and there 
                                                          
205 See, for example, Re Davis [1891] 3 Ch 119, CA. 
206 Strangely, however, it was held that the claim against the executors was not time-barred. This aspect is rather 
less easy to explain. 
207 See Bonney (n 203) 148-149 (Lord Kenyon MR). 
208 M’Leod v Drummond (1810) 17 Ves Jun 152, 34 ER 59, 165. 
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is nothing in these authorities to cast doubt on the conclusions drawn here regarding 
the historical basis of knowing receipt and the doctrinal similarities between knowing 
recipients and parol agreement trustees. 
 
5.6.4.4.5 The third misconception: the distinction between constructive and other 
trustees 
What the authorities consulted throughout part 5.6 of this thesis seem to suggest is 
that, when pre-1939 courts referred to ‘a constructive trustee in the usual sense of 
the words - that is to say, of a person who, though he had taken possession in his 
own right, was liable to be declared a trustee in a Court of equity,’209 they were not 
referring to knowing recipients, but to constructive trustees of the type discussed 
above at 5.6.2. Such trustees are likely to obtain title to the subject matter of the 
constructive trust in consequence of an unlawful transaction (e.g. a breach of trust by 
a trustee in conveying the trust property to a volunteer or a purchaser with no notice 
of the breach, or a breach of fiduciary duty amounting to self-dealing or the taking of 
an incidental profit), and all have been routinely described as constructive trustees 
for several centuries. Thus, the weight of authorities suggests that the much-
heralded dichotomy between those who lawfully took title as fiduciaries and those 
who took in their own right but were liable to be later declared trustees was 
formulated to distinguish between express trustees and their equivalents on the one 
hand and traditional constructive trustees on the other hand. Knowing recipients, 
made trustees by virtue of equity’s jurisdiction to intercede in cases of fraud, fell 
within the former category, and were not regarded as constructive trustees.  
 
                                                          
209 Taylor (n 115) 651 (Viscount Cave). 
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5.6.5 Summary: parol agreement trusts and constructive trusts 
In addition to mere constructive trustees, there were certain classes of persons who, 
although not formally appointed by a trust instrument, were not usually described as 
constructive trustees. Rather, these trustees and were regarded as similar to 
express trustees in terms of their duties and liabilities and were treated as express 
trustees for the purposes of the applying the limitation period.  Being as parol 
agreement trusts fit this description (see above, 4.3), it is perhaps unsurprising that 
their closest relatives, at least in terms of doctrinal development, should also be 
found amongst trustees of this kind. What is surprising, however, is that those which 
bear the closest doctrinal affinities with parol agreement trustees would seem to be 
knowing recipients. Interestingly, the liability of chargeable agents, with whom 
knowing recipients have frequently been confounded, was also closely related to that 
of parol agreement trustees, albeit for different reasons. Other ‘trustees’ of this type, 
such as trustees de son tort and dishonest assistants, whilst sharing some 
characteristics with parol agreement trusts, were generally described in very different 
terms from the latter in the older cases. 
Although the modern orthodoxy treats knowing recipients as third parties to breaches 
of trust who are liable in personam, who can claim the limitation period as a defence, 
and for whom the term ‘trustee’ is not an apt description, the historical position was 
more complex. Knowing recipients were made trustees for the prevention of actual 
fraud, and could not shelter behind the limitation period in respect of proprietary or in 
personam claims any more than could express trustees; they were regarded as 
having undertaken to perform the trust, and were accordingly treated as express 
trustees, capable themselves of committing breaches of trust. In these respects, 
notwithstanding that they were usually jointly and severally liable with the original 
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trustees for the breach of trust which precipitated their acquisition of the trust 
property, knowing recipients were very similar to parol agreement trustees. This 
demonstrates that equity had coherent mode of dealing with those whose acquisition 
of legal title prompted equity to declare them trustees on the ground of actual fraud, 
and that those deemed to have undertaken to perform a trust, whether a pre-existing 
trust or one arising to prevent deviation from the undertaking, were treated in much 
the same manner. 
5.7 Overall Summary 
The modern orthodox view which prevails, but which is the subject of considerable 
academic debate and some judicial inconsistency, is that ‘non-equity’s darling’ 
recipients of trust property are not trustees, but that secret trustees and their inter 
vivos equivalents, ‘Pallant v Morgan trustees’, Rochefoucauld-type trustees, 
‘common intention’ trustees, surviving testators under the doctrine of mutual wills, 
‘subject to contract’ trustees, fiduciaries in receipt of incidental profits and secret 
commissions and trustees de son tort, amongst others, are constructive trustees. 
Liability for knowing receipt refers only to in personam  liability which affects third 
parties to breaches of trust and is thus considered, like liability for dishonest 
assistance, to be far removed from the concept of ‘true’ trusteeship. Furthermore, the 
phrases ‘actual fraud’ and ‘constructive fraud’ have been replaced in popular legal 
parlance by the more amorphous concept of ‘unconscionability’, 210 which is used to 
justify the imposition of most, if not all, of the types of trusts currently recognised as 
constructive trusts. This is very much at odds with the historical position, according 
to which trusts imposed for the prevention of actual fraud were treated with doctrinal 
                                                          
210 C.f. N Hopkins, ‘Conscience, Discretion and the Creation of Property Rights’ (2006) 26 LS 475, who asserts 
that ‘nothing turns’ on the distinction between fraud and unconscionability. 
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consistency, as evidenced by the development of the doctrine of parol agreement 
trusts and its doctrinal relationship with knowing receipt and the liability of 
chargeable agents.  
Had these jurisprudential developments led to increased clarity and consistency in 
the law of constructive trusts, then there could be much to be said for the 
abandonment of traditional doctrine and terminology. The fact that there is such 
discord amongst contemporary judges and jurists alike, however, suggests that there 
may be good reason to lament the lack of regard which is currently paid to the 
authorities and principles from earlier times. Application of these historical principles 
to the modern law, which might involve ‘common intention’ trusts, and mutual wills 
being subsumed within the doctrine of parol agreement trusts, as well as recognition 
of the status of knowing recipients as true trustees with doctrinal affinities with parol 
agreement trusts could well, it is submitted, provide a means by which the law might 
develop in the future within a consistent doctrinal framework. 
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Chapter 6: Overall Conclusion1 
 
The most significant conclusion that can be drawn from the arguments and analysis 
in this thesis is that all categories of parol agreement trusts are enforced pursuant to 
a single doctrine, the doctrine of parol agreement trusts. It is through the research 
conducted for the purposes of this thesis that the existence, nature, scope and 
requirements of this doctrine have been uncovered for the first time. By virtue of the 
doctrine, parol agreements may be given effect, for the prevention of fraud, through 
the imposition of trusts. The fraud arises when a grantee takes legal title to property 
in circumstances where his/her conscience is affected by a parol agreement 
connected with his/her acquisition of the property, and then reneges upon that 
agreement. The grantee’s conscience will be affected if the other party, as 
determined by the set of rules applicable to the scenario in question, relied on the 
parol agreement and s/he knew this. To prevent such fraud, the grantee takes the 
property as trustee, and can thus be compelled to give effect to his/her promise. 
Despite some recent errant judgments, the doctrine uncovered here has very strong 
foundations in numerous authorities, and has been endorsed by the highest courts 
on numerous occasions. Despite some degree of overlap with the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel and the law of contract in terms of the scenarios to which each 
are applicable, the authorities overwhelmingly indicate that the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts occupies a distinct and justifiable position within the modern law of 
property. 
                                                          
1 This chapter contains material published in G Allan, ‘Once a Fraud, Forever a Fraud: the Time-Honoured 
Doctrine of Parol Agreement Trusts’ (2014) 34 LS 419-443 and G Allan, ‘Ceylon Coffee, the Comtesse and the 
Consignee: A Historical Reappraisal of Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ (2015) 36 Journal of Legal History 43. 
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In unearthing this doctrine, several other important findings were made and 
conclusions reached. This thesis, and the relevant article derived from it,2 contains 
the only complete and accurate account of the facts of Rochefoucauld v Boustead,3 
a case which is widely acknowledged as the leading authority on inter vivos parol 
agreement trusts. Perhaps the most significant finding is that, contrary to what was 
reported, the land which was the subject matter of the parol agreement trust was 
sold by officers of the District Court in Ceylon as a result of the mortgagees having 
successfully sued the Comtesse de la Rochefoucauld for a sale in execution. In 
addition to showing that many previously published accounts of the facts of 
Rochefoucauld are inaccurate, this definitively demonstrates that the facts of 
Rochefoucauld are more closely analogous to those in the Pallant v Morgan4 line of 
cases than in secret trusts or cases such as Bannister v Bannister.5 Furthermore, the 
Court of Appeal’s treatment of the factual scenario in Rochefoucauld sheds much 
light on the nature of the fraud which prompts equity’s intervention in cases 
concerning parol agreement trusts. 
It is apparent from the facts and judgment of Rochefoucauld that a party who 
reneges on a parol agreement upon which the other party thereto has relied will be 
guilty of a fraud even when the property which forms the subject matter of the parol 
agreement was transferred by a third party who has no interest in, or knowledge of, 
the parol agreement. This is entirely congruous with the findings from the analysis of 
other cases concerning parol agreement trusts of all categories; one of the key 
conclusions of this thesis is that, within the context of parol agreement trusts, a trust 
may arise for the prevention of fraud regardless of any detrimental reliance by the 
                                                          
2 Allan, ‘Ceylon Coffee’ ibid. 
3 [1897] 1 Ch 196 (CA). 
4 [1953] Ch 43 (Ch). 
5 [1948] 2 All ER 133 (CA). 
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transferor of the property. Moreover, it is not necessary to prove that reneging on the 
parol agreement would enable the delinquent party to gain, nor that this would cause 
the other party to suffer any loss. Rather, the common denominator running through 
the myriad authorities is that, so long as the other party to the parol agreement relied 
thereupon, and the recipient of the property knew this to be so, any deviation from 
what was agreed would amount to a fraud. The trust arises in order to prevent such 
fraud. This species of fraud is not results-driven, but conscience-driven, meaning 
that a party’s conduct will be adjudged fraudulent based on equity’s assessment of 
his or her conduct, rather than out of consideration of the consequences of the 
conduct. This concept of equitable fraud, which is very old, very well-supported by 
authorities, and likely derives from Roman law, has been examined and rationalised 
for the first time in this thesis and the articles derived therefrom. 
It is further argued in this thesis that, according to modern nomenclature, parol 
agreement trusts are best regarded as constructive trusts. Inter vivos parol 
agreement trusts thus fall within the Law of Property Act, s53(2). Although this is the 
position taken by most modern jurists, what this thesis reveals is a historical-doctrinal 
explanation of why this is so. Until the early twentieth century, trusts imposed for the 
prevention of fraud formed a genus of trusts in their own right; they were not 
classified as express trusts, resulting trusts or constructive trusts. Rather, they were 
trusts arising out of equity’s ancient general jurisdiction to intercede in all cases of 
fraud. There was no reason for the courts to classify them as constructive trusts, for 
constructive trusts were not within the ambit of the Statute of Frauds, s8, which was 
the predecessor section of s53(2). Furthermore, whilst it is apparent that parol 
agreement trusts were not regarded as express trusts and were not subject to any of 
the statutory formality requirements which regulated express trusts, they were seen 
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as sharing some characteristics with the latter, as is evidenced by the fact that they 
were treated in a manner similar to express trusts for the purposes of applying the 
statutory limitation period. It was not until Taylor v Davies6 that parol agreement 
trusts were first judicially described as constructive trusts, in consequence of that 
phrase being expanded to cover all trusts arising out of equity’s general jurisdiction 
that were not already classed as resulting trusts. This absorption of trusts arising for 
the prevention of fraud within the ambit of constructive trusts has gradually become 
entrenched to the extent that it is difficult to argue that parol agreement trusts are 
not, by a modern definition, constructive trusts. Conversely, the classification of any 
parol agreement trusts as resulting trusts would seem to run contrary to principles 
and to the weight of authorities. 
The doctrinal-historical analysis in this thesis also assists in understanding the 
relationship between the prevention of fraud as a justification for the enforcement of 
parol agreement trusts and the principle that equity will not permit a statute to be 
used as an instrument of fraud; this thesis and, the article which draws from this 
material, provide the most detailed examination of this issue to date. Essentially, 
equity’s jurisdiction to intercede on the ground of fraud in cases concerning parol 
agreement trusts pre-dates the earliest relevant statutory formality requirements. 
Ever since the Statute of Frauds, the courts have taken the position that the 
legislature has never sought to interfere with equity’s general jurisdiction to impose 
trusts in order to prevent fraud. This latter proposition, which is frequently 
summarised by the phrase: ‘equity will not allow a statute to be used as an 
instrument of fraud’, should not obscure the fact that the prevention of fraud provides 
the justification for the enforcement of all parol agreement trusts, regardless of the 
                                                          
6 [1920] AC 636 (PC). 
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apparent applicability of statutory formality requirements to any given scenario. 
By building on the conclusions which are outlined in the previous two paragraphs, 
this thesis has been able to provide an original answer the frequent charge that, in 
enforcing parol agreement trusts, courts of equity paid scant regard to the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. It has been shown that, in actuality, the pre-twentieth 
century courts took very seriously their duty to accede to the will of Parliament. The 
courts’ power to recognise and enforce parol agreement trusts, seemingly in the face 
of unequivocal statutory formality requirements, rested firmly upon the entirely 
reasonable position that Parliament has never regulated equity’s general jurisdiction 
to impose trusts in order to prevent fraud. This approach was, in respect of inter 
vivos parol agreement trusts, vindicated with the enactment of the Law of Property 
Act 1925, s53(2), which expressly excludes ‘constructive trusts’ from the ambit of 
s53(1)(b). But this time-honoured reasoning still applies today to post mortem parol 
agreement trusts. Thus, the entirely uncontroversial proposition that the Wills Act 
1837, s9, was not intended by Parliament to, and does not, affect resulting trusts 
which are imposed upon legacies applies equally to secret trusts. 
In fact, many of the propositions laid down in the previous paragraphs of this chapter 
have particular resonance in respect of secret trusts. Notwithstanding the many 
academic assertions to the contrary, it can be confidently asserted that the vast bulk 
of authorities support the view that all secret trusts are enforced for the prevention of 
fraud, pursuant to the instrument of fraud principle. Furthermore, this thesis contends 
that the ‘fraud theory’ and the ‘dehors the will theory’ are not mutually exclusive; 
rather, a combination of these theories provides the explanation for why and how 
equity is able to claim jurisdiction to enforce secret trusts without acting in defiance 
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of the Wills Act 1837. Misapprehensions as to the juxtaposition between the ‘fraud’ 
and ‘dehors’ theories seem to have resulted, in part, from inconsistencies between 
the judiciary and jurists as to the meaning of ‘testamentary disposition’. 
The conclusions reached as a result of the historical-doctrinal analysis which forms 
the basis of this thesis have also enabled original insights to be drawn as regards the 
place of parol agreement trusts within the law of constructive trusts generally, in 
terms of both the historical development of constructive trusts and the extent to 
which the deployment of principles associated with parol agreement trusts may 
provide a sound doctrinal platform for the future development of the law. More 
specifically, this thesis proposes that many controversies in the current law, 
especially those arising out of recent leading cases, could be resolved if ‘common 
intention’ constructive trusts are to be treated as falling within the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts. By the same token, the principles which underpin the doctrine of 
parol agreement trusts could have provided a sound doctrinal framework to support 
the development of the ‘subject to contract’ constructive trusts, which would seem 
now to have largely been superseded by statutory alterations to the doctrine of privity 
of contract . The doctrine of parol agreement trusts is even potentially capable of 
justifying the doctrine of mutual wills.  
In terms of historical development, the findings in this thesis as to the evolution of the 
classification of trusts have enabled a novel approach to be taken in terms of 
seeking to place parol agreement trusts within the law of trusts generally. It is evident 
from, for example, the application of the pre-1939 statutory limitation period that 
parol agreement trusts, being trusts raised under the head of fraud, were seen as 
more akin to express trusts than what were traditionally termed constructive trusts. 
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Moreover, other trusts which were not strictly express or constructive were also 
treated similarly by the courts. Included within the ranks of such trusts were trustees 
de son tort and knowing recipients, both of which were sometimes described as 
arising out of an inferred undertaking. Of these, the latter, being imposed on the 
ground of fraud on the basis of an inferred undertaking by the defendant to take as 
trustee, are arguably most closely allied to parol agreement trusts in terms of their 
doctrinal development before the twentieth century. It seems that the historical-
doctrinal nature of knowing receipt has been obscured as a result of 
misinterpretations of Lord Selborne’s dictum from Barnes v Addy,7 as well as by the 
misconception that the applicability of the limitation period to knowing recipients was 
afforded inconsistent treatment by nineteenth century courts, and by a general lack 
of appreciation as to the meaning given historically to the phrase ‘constructive 
trustee’. It is tentatively suggested that the view that knowing recipients are in many 
respects close cousins of parol agreement trusts may challenge the modern 
orthodox position that knowing recipients are not trustees and are merely subject to 
accessorial in personam liability in the same manner as dishonest assistants. It is 
further suggested that the fraud-based trusteeship which affects ‘chargeable agents’ 
of express trustees is also doctrinally related to parol agreement trusteeship but 
should be recognised as distinct from liability for knowing receipt. 
A general observation that may be made on the basis of the research and analysis 
conducted in furtherance of this thesis is that the general decline in the use of the 
term ‘fraud’ in cases of parol agreement trusts and related trusts may be seen as a 
regrettable development. Replacing ‘fraud’ with ‘unconscionability’ may not be a 
matter of mere semantics; it seems that the former amounted in common judicial 
                                                          
7 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244. 
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parlance to ‘actual fraud’, which formed the basis of equity’s jurisdiction to recognise 
certain trusts which were similar to express trusts, even in ostensible defiance of 
statutory formality requirements. Also encompassed within the modern concept of 
unconscionability, however, is what was once called ‘constructive fraud’. This ‘virtual’ 
form of fraud only permitted the courts to raise mere constructive trusts, which 
shared few similarities with express trusts or trusts arising on the ground of actual 
fraud. Owing to the aforementioned evolution in nomenclature, trusts with a basis in 
actual fraud and ‘traditional constructive trusts’ are now all classified as constructive 
trusts, and are often all said to arise to prevent unconscionable conduct. This may be 
a significant reason as to why some long-standing and fundamental differences 
between certain different classes of trusts are no longer widely recognised. 
In terms of future endeavours, further research into the reasons for the decline in the 
use of the term ‘fraud’ and its replacement with language such as ‘unconscionability’ 
may be warranted, and it may be fruitful to examine whether the characterisation in 
this thesis of equitable fraud as a means by which to regulate conduct has any wider 
implications within private law. Moreover, it may be interesting to investigate the 
extent to which the doctrine of parol agreement trusts and equity’s fraud-based 
jurisdiction have endured in the twentieth century within other common law legal 
systems.8 It is also suggested that the new findings presented here in respect of the 
doctrinal nature of knowing receipt may justify further consideration of the 
juxtaposition of the liability of knowing recipients and other types of private law third 
party liability. As a wider point, it can be observed that long-established legal 
doctrines and cases, even leading authorities, that were once regarded as largely 
                                                          
8 This aspect is covered in respect of secret trusts, to a certain extent, in G Allan, ‘The Secret is Out There: 
Searching for the Doctrine of Secret Trusts through Analysis of the Case Law’ (2011) 40 CLWR 311. 
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straightforward may eventually come to be seen as controversial or may become 
open to misinterpretation. Furthermore, the evolution of legal terminology and judicial 
and academic thinking may cause judicial statements to be construed by modern 
authorities in a manner other than that which was originally intended. It is hoped that 
the research conducted for the purposes of this thesis may, to some degree, serve to 
assist in reasserting the value of historical-doctrinal research, and that it may provide 
some encouragement for similar research to be conducted in other areas of law. 
By way of epilogue, a final point to raise is just how effective the doctrine of parol 
agreement trusts has proven in terms of preventing fraudulent conduct. The doctrine 
has, in the twenty-first century alone, aided the young lover who is persuaded to 
spend money improving land that is not at law hers,9 the first-generation immigrant 
who is deceived into transferring his hard-earned land to a better-educated and 
avaricious son or daughter,10 the informal business partner who is denied his rightful 
remuneration by a conspiracy of lies,11 the victim of a miscarriage of justice who 
relies on an agreement with an insincere friend in order to try to obtain a home,12 
and the daughter whose inheritance is jeopardised by the informality of her parents' 
dealings with the matrimonial home upon their divorce.13 Application of the same 
doctrine has, in far older cases, provided the very same assistance to the woman 
whose faith is betrayed by the man who purported to purchase her land for her 
benefit,14 the daughter who forfeited her inheritance in reliance on a parol agreement 
with her father,15 the wife who transferred her land to her husband to enable him to 
                                                          
9Cox v Jones [2004] EWHC 1486 (Ch), [2004] 2 FLR 1010. 
10Ali v Khan, [2002] EWCA Civ 974, [2009] WTLR 187; Kuppusami v Kuppusami [2002] EWHC 2578 (Ch). 
11Singh v Anand [2007] EWHC 3346 (Ch). 
12Samad v Thompson [2008] EWHC 2809 (Ch), [2008] NPC 125. 
13Staden v Jones [2008] EWCA Civ 936, [2008] 2 FLR 1931. 
14Rochefoucauld (n 3). 
15Young v Peachy (1741) Atk 254, 26 ER 557. 
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attempt to settle his debts,16 the man falsely accused of bigamy who entrusted his 
land to his friend,17 and the man who, upon his retirement, was persuaded to 
surrender his home when he sold his business premises.18 Hence, it can be seen 
that this single doctrine has displayed an astonishing ability to protect the weak from 
the crafty or the careless, even when the precise social circumstances giving rise to 
the said weaknesses could not have been envisaged by the architects of the 
doctrine. The doctrine has undeniably stood the test of time, and has, for centuries, 
provided a guiding hand for judges walking the tightrope of balancing the need to 
adhere to formality requirements without allowing those formality requirements to be 
used in furtherance of the very evils which they were intended to prevent. For such a 
doctrine to be lost and replaced by new laws or ideas could well prove detrimental to 
the ability of the law in this area to protect the vulnerable of the future.  
 
                                                          
16Re Duke of Marlborough [1894] 2 Ch 133, Ch. 
17Davies v Otty (No 2) (1865) 35 Beav 208, 55 ER 875. 
18Booth v Turle (1873) LR 16 Eq 182, Ct of Chancery. 
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